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Psycho-social Dilemma of Employers towards Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities in India

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Abstract:

Inclusion of persons with disabilities at workplace is still a matter of hesitance for many employers. The term disability itself raises an alarm in the mind stating that the cohort is not able to perform the expected role in the organisation. Among the organisations that employ persons with disabilities (PwD), there are a handful of them who offer a mainstream job to them. Other companies hire PwD as an effort to contribute to the lesser deprived section of the society in order to polish their brand image. There could be various reasons behind non-inclusion of PwD at workplace. It can be the inhibition of the employer towards the impact of inclusion of PwD on the customers and co-workers or it can be lack of experience in dealing with the PwD. Thus, employers are trapped between their personal impulses and the societal expectations. Therefore there is a psycho-social impact on the employers towards inclusion of PwD at workplace. This research aims to comprehend the reasons behind such behaviour of the employers towards employing the PwD based on the various literatures available.

Key Words: Persons with Disabilities, Inclusion, Diversity, Psychosocial Dilemma

Introduction: Diversity as an agenda in any organisation is promoted on the basis of gender, ethnicity, education or age in the initial stages. Disability as one of the ways to encourage diversity becomes the last priority. Some organisations in India have started inclusion of persons with disabilities (PwD), but again as a part of the corporate social responsibility or diversity program. Certainly the perfect state of equal representation of PwD in any industry is nowhere near. Rarely very few organisations exist in India that employs PwD at a larger scale giving mainstream job responsibilities. This is well reflected in the employment statistics of PwD in India. As per the last census conducted in India i.e. in 2011, there are more than 26.8 million PwD out of which 36 per cent PwD are employed i.e. 9.6 million. Now, out of these 36 per cent employed disabled people, 31 per cent are agricultural laborers, 23 per cent are cultivators, 42 per cent in others. Only 4 per cent of the total PwD employed population is engaged in household industries. Premising this, more than 17 million PwD are unemployed. Among these unemployed PwD, 46 per cent are in the age bracket of 15 to 59 years which is the ideal age

ISSN-2278-9758

group for employment. Therefore 7.9 million prospective job seekers available in the country who are yet to get employed based on the 2011 Census data. Employment in the private sector has been quite dim. The last report that could be fetched shows that employment rate of the PwD in the private sector is 0.28 per cent and in multinational companies it is 0.05 per cent (World Bank Report, 2009; DEOC, 2009). The percentage of employees with disabilities is merely 0.46 out of total employees in a private organisation (Business Standard, 2019). This data might differ at 2020. The next census will be conducted in 2021 post which the most recent data will be available.

Although the overall scenario of employment of PwD is not great, but there are companies from information technology, hospitality and retail industry are open to hire PwD. Organisations such as IBM, Wipro, Mphasis are known for hiring PwD across job roles (DEOC, 2009). SAP Labs is known for hiring people with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) (Arundhati Ramanathan, 2015). There are even organisations such as Vindhya E-infomedia, SUN ITES, Lemon Tree hotels who specializes in hiring persons with disabilities. They have more than 10 percent of their workforce as PwD.

Methodology: This paper is exploratory in approach in which an effort has been made to explain the various psychosocial factors that affect an employer towards integration of the PwD in an organisation. The research purpose has been discussed in detail which will form a basis for more definitive analysis, thereby providing more insight into the research agenda. The purpose of data collection is to gain insight into the research issues by exploring and understanding the scenario, which is why a qualitative data collection has been planned to seek a thorough analysis. For the data collection available from research papers, journals, studies published by respected international bodies such as the ILO, as well as from the Government of India sharing the macro image of the research objectives, secondary data was referred. This research would result in comprehending the various psychosocial aspects which plays a crucial role for the employers towards the inclusion of individuals with disabilities at workplace.

Literature review: Employment of persons with disabilities in India has a history behind the phenomena. Since the Bangladesh war in 1977, India left large numbers of wounded servicemen. The Indian Prime Minister then was Mrs. Indira Gandhi who passed the order that there should a reservation of 3 percent for people with disabilities in all public sector jobs (Simon Mundy,

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2018). This provision was preserved in law till the time the "Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995" was enacted.

In fact disability as a category was not considered in Census from 1941 to 1971. First time it was considered in 1981 wherein 3 categories of disabilities were included i.e. "totally blind, totally crippled and totally dumb" but in the next census i.e. in 1991, this disability category was discontinued. However in 1995, the first legislation was formed to protect the disability category by introducing the "Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995" where 7 types of disabilities were categorized. In 1991, there was an addition of 2 more categories of disabilities but in the 2001 Census, only 5 categories were included i.e. disability in seeing, in speech, in hearing, in moving, and mental disability. Finally in the last Census i.e. in 2011, 8 types of disability were considered i.e. disability in seeing, in hearing, in speech, in movement, in mental retardation, in mental illness, any other and multiple disability. The data available till date is based on the Census 2011. In 2016, the existing Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995 have been replaced by the "Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016". Under this Act, types of disabilities has been expanded from 21 categories where in dwarfism, thalassemia, Parkinson's disease and acid attack victims have also been included as disabilities.

Sec 35 of this Act states that the private sector employers are entitled to receive incentives from the Government in case they employ 5 per cent of their workforce as persons with disabilities. The incentive will be in the form of reimbursement of the employers' contribution towards the employee provident fund and employee state insurance for each employee with disabilities employed for first 3 years provided that the gross salary of such disabled employee should be equal or less than Rs. 25000 per month and employed on or before 01st April, 2008.

This Act also that states the reservation of 4 per cent jobs to persons with disabilities in Government sector jobs under section 34(1). This 4 per cent reservation is further set aside 1 per cent each for the visually impaired, hearing impaired, loco-motor disability including dwarfism, acid attack victims and muscular dystrophy and autism, intellectual deficiency, specific learning impairment and mental illness. Sec 34(2) of the Act states that in case the vacancies meant for reservation remains vacant due to the non-availability of appropriate PwD, it will be carried forward for recruitment in the next year. If still suitable PwD are not available in the subsequent

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year, those vacancies will be occupied by interchanging among categories of disabilities. Even after interchanging the vacancies remain empty; in that case it will be re-allocated for non disabled candidates. The posts suitable for the PwD will identified by expert committee by carrying out a periodic assessment such positions at an interval of every 3 years.

Under the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, there are two organisations that conduct recruitment for Government sector jobs. Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) manages positions for higher civil service and all India Services whereas as Staff Selection Commission (SSC) recruits of non-gazetted positions in Group B & C categories (DEOC, 2009). There is a provision of age relaxation for PwD in all categories. PwD belonging to the categories of visually impaired, hearing impaired and locomotor disability are allowed a relaxation of 10 years for all positions under the central government. The age relaxation bar increase to 13 years for other backward class (OBC) and 15 years for scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) categories. This provision is applicable for Group C and D jobs in Government sector. Similarly for jobs in Group A and B, there is an age limit has been relaxed by 5 years for PwD belonging to the general caste, 8 years for OBC and 10 years for the SC/ST castes (Business Standard, 2015). In order to manage the issues regarding the reservations of PwD, an autonomous body under the Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment called National Institute for the Hearing Handicapped (NIHH) has been set up. This institution also helps in filling up the blank vacancies identified for the PwD in India.

Apart from incentives to the private employers for employing PwD, reservation policy for the PwD in the Government jobs, employment exchanges in India play a role in leveraging employment to the PwD. There are 978 employment exchanges in India as on 2014. People with disabilities can also avail the benefits from these employment exchanges. In addition to employment generation, it also helps the job seekers by sharing work-related market knowledge, directing them to choose various vocational courses and advising them on different career opportunities. Apart from the employment exchanges, there are also special exchanges and special cells that directly help individuals with disabilities to achieve employment. 42 special exchanges and 38 special employment cells exists in India (ILO, 2011).

According to the “Employment Exchanges (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act 1959”, whether public or private sector organisations with 25 or more employees apart from the firms

ISSN-2278-9758

involved in agricultural activities, are required to inform the nearest employment exchange with regards to the vacant positions apart from the unskilled office work or domestic service. This would enable the employment exchanges to inform the PwD with the most suitable job openings.

Other than the employment avenues for the PwD in India, there are employability readiness avenues also available. One of such prospects is through the rehabilitation centers across the country. The first vocational rehabilitation centre concept was introduced in India in 1968 with a joint agreement between Government of India and the Government of USA. It was established at two places i.e. in Mumbai and Hyderabad. Currently there are 21 Vocational Rehabilitation Centers (VRC) for the Handicapped in India. The primary aim of the VRC is to conduct skill assessment and deliver short-term training which might continue to 1 year also for the PwD. There are some VRCs that offer placement opportunities also to the trainees. In fact, those PwD who wish for an opportunity to get enrolled for a formal academic qualification such as ITI or Polytechnics, these VRC help them to give them an informal training to achieve the same (World Bank Report, 2009). To deliver the informal training sessions in various trades based on the suitability of the type of disability to a particular trainee, there are 7 skill training workshops (STW) established. To cater the PwD residing in the rural areas, there are 11 Rural Rehabilitation Extension Centers (RREC) set up within 5 VRC since all the VRC are established in the urban areas. These RREC collaborate with the NGOs' and organise Community Based Rehabilitation (CBR) in the rural areas. Mobile camps are set up where rehabilitation counselors perform the disability assessments in a periodic manner. In order to ensure the availability of adequate facilities and infrastructure for vocational training centers, development of competent manpower, undertake research and distribute aids and appliances to PwD; composite regional centers (CRC) have seen set up at 19 places in India. It acts as an additional support to the main centers across the country (GoI, 2016).

The protected/ sheltered employment system is applicable for severely disabled and intellectually challenged persons. There are two approaches of managing this system. First, a non-government organisation would take a contract from the government or any industry and thereby establish a residential center as a work facility where the persons with disabilities would be assisted with jobs, either on a daily wage basis or on the basis of final production. The second option is to provide contract-based employment for a group of disabled persons. In this case, the government

ISSN-2278-9758

has specifically laid down the type of jobs to be assigned to the disabled person, such as recaning of chairs, binding books, registers and the sourcing of chalks (ILO, 2003).

The Skills Council for Persons with Disabilities (SCPwD) program has been established within Pradhan Mantri Kaushal VikasYojana (PMKVY) with the goal of enhancing the skills of persons with disabilities according to the industry's requirement to help them achieve effective and sustainable jobs. Currently SCPwD is jointly promoted by CII and Ministry of Social Justice and empowerment GoI. (2008).

The Apprentices Act, 1961 was enacted to encourage training and improve the employability opportunities of unemployed persons in private sector organizations. According to this act, the Govt. has requested the state directories to ensure that at least 3 percent of the seats are allocated to the physically handicapped persons for the apprenticeship training (ILO, 2004). DWARKA Scheme, under ministry of rural development, rural poor under poverty alleviation program, self-help groups receive informal training in trades and business relevant to their employment where persons with disabilities are also included (ILO, 2004).The department of adult independent living under National Institute for the Mentally Handicapped assists the persons with disabilities with multiple disabilities with evaluation, vocational guidance, skills training and employment (GoI, 2018).

Findings:

The ILO report, 2011 states some of the key barriers that employers face in inclusion of PwD at workplace. Unawareness about the employment of PwD is a major roadblock to the employers. They are unfamiliar about the ability of the PwD, assistive technology requirements, the type of workplace accommodation required, costs involved in the overall inclusion of PwD at workplace, the amount of incentives available from the Government or the procedure to claim such incentives. The mindset of the employers towards hiring PwD itself becomes a roadblock. The employers believe that PwD are fit only for few set of common job roles i.e. PwD cannot contribute significantly to the business. They also think perceive that PwD cannot cope up with the work pressures or targets. Unavailability of required education or qualification among the PwD is a challenge for the employers. PwD are generally not qualified academically as per the requirement expected from the employer. Rarely consultancies are available in the urban areas

ISSN-2278-9758

and rural areas that are specialized in the employment of the PwD. This scarcity makes the employers uninspired to hire PwD. Many companies may not have their own premises to work. Hence it is a challenge for them to make any alterations to the infrastructure. Those employers who operate from their own buildings would have already constructed their premise without keeping any consideration for the requirements of PwD. Hence there is a hesitation in breaking or modifying the infrastructure to suit the needs of PwD. Employers also have the inhibition towards making any investment in assistive technologies which can assist the PwD to work. Many companies do not have a specific policy for hiring PwD, although they showcase that they are equal opportunity employer. Some companies have a clear policy on employing only physically fit employees due to which PwD get rejected. There are no sensitization workshops being conducted by the employers for their employees, hence the awareness among the non-PwD employees towards employing the PwD is very low.

There are several employee related factors that becomes a barrier towards employment of PwD such as the work performance of the PwD, co-worker and customer perceptions towards the PwD, various administrative concerns, accommodations and cost related issues, the type of disability and previous experience of the employer in employing the PwD. The work performance related concerns that affect the inclusion of PwD at workplace are employers perception of the PwD as less productive, high absenteeism, increased break timings, stereotypical attitudes towards the PwD regarding their job requirements such as PwD are fit for only certain monotonous job roles only, lack of career development opportunities, PwD do not fit for supervisory or management positions. The co-worker and customer concerns are that employers avoid in deputing PwD where there is any direct contact with the customers, fear of negative reactions towards the PwD due to their unknown behavioral symptoms. The presence of the PwD may affect the morale and productivity of the non-disabled employees. There might be a negative impact of the underperformance of the PwD on co-workers. Moreover, employers' inhibition towards non-compliance of the PwD towards the organisation rules and regulations is also a barrier. The various administrative concerns are employers perceive that employing PwD involves a lot of paperwork, legal stipulations might arise, requirement of adequate accommodations, lack of Government support, required changes in the organisation policies and fear of legal suits regarding discrimination and grievances at workplace. The accommodation and cost concerns are the expenses towards making workplace accommodations, necessary

ISSN-2278-9758

equipments, modifications required in organisation facilities, assistive technologies, work schedules or additional health costs. The lack of previous work experience of the employers with the PwD is also a concern. Due to the lack of earlier work exposure with the PwD, the employers find it difficult to accommodate the PwD; they do not have adequate information or details about the integrating the PwD at workplace. The type of disability also makes a difference in inclusion of PwD in organisations. People with visible disability are likely to receive more positive reactions than hidden disability. For e.g. mentally challenged, psychiatric disabled people are less employable (Sonali Heera, 2016).

There are four factors i.e. social, cost, management and individual that acts as a barrier to the employment of the PwD. The social factors would include the compatibility among the PwD and non-PwD employees and the concern about the negative responses from the customers. The cost factors are extra supervision on the PwD by the supervisors, additional training to the non-PwD employees for social integration, costs associated with the occupational health and safety hazards, inconsistency in availability of subsidies for employing PwD, higher rate of absenteeism due to ill-health of the PwD and cost of workplace accommodations. The management factors involves unawareness about the existing disability act among the employers, employment agencies specializing in PwD recruitment, long term plan of inclusion of PwD, employer reluctance in taking a chance to hire PwD, concern about terminating employment of PwD and the level of employer involvement in the integration of the PwD. The individual factors includes grooming or hygiene standards of the PwD, previous work experience of the PwD in a formal work environment, work satisfactory standards and appropriate social behaviour of the PwD (Graffam et. al, 2002).

Experts (Diksha & Rogers, 1996) studied that there are few factors that are a concern for an employer in hiring a PwD. First, the work performance factors i.e. the employers are concerned if the PwD will be able to perform their job tasks or will be able to produce acceptable quality of work. Second, administrative concerns i.e. if the PwD will be well-accepted by the customers and co-workers, their level of adjustment in the formal work environment, concern about the career advancement of the PwD in the organisations. Third, work personality factors which involves concerns related to the traits of the PwD such as punctuality, reliability, social interaction, respecting the authority and taking pride in the their work. Fourth, symptomatology

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factors i.e. certain symptoms which are observed in the PwD that becomes a concern for their employment such as poor memory, judgments, grooming skills, emotional stability, paying less attention to detail and getting withdrawn in their own world. There are various types of costs associated with employment of persons with disabilities such as employee maintenance, reliability and productivity. Employee maintenance includes the cost of recruitment, occupational health and safety, workers compensation and insurance cost. This is particularly a cost with regards to the PwD since recruitment of the PwD cannot be made through general sources, tendency of occupational health hazards are more as compared to non-PwD employees and as a result insurance cost is an additional burden. Reliability cost involves the rate of absenteeism of the PwD due to ill-health or periodical check-ups etc. Productivity is a cost due to the slow speed, accuracy and quality of the work done by the PwD (Joseph Graffama et. al, 2002). Lack of consultation with the employee about their workplace accommodation appropriateness, employers' tendency to put profitability and productivity issues before the PwD needs, fear of PwD's not able to cope up at work are some barriers to employment of PwD (Nina Nevala et al, 2015).

Government organisations employ PwD as a part of their policy unlike the private sector in India. The private sector companies in India have a long way to go when it comes to the inclusion of people with disabilities in the labor force although some organisations have initiated the inclusion of PwD at the workplace. Several organisations are taking efforts towards this inclusion for e.g. Hindustan Unilever has 200 people with disabilities in direct and contract roles. Organisations such as Lemon Tree, Sodexo and Flipkart who are into non-IT sector has plans to increase the recruitment of PwD. IT giants such as Accenture, Capgemini, Infosys also has similar plans. Some of the main reasons for employing the PwD as stated by these employers are firstly, the employees with disabilities are more retainable in organsations as compared to others and second, these PwD have a higher sense of loyalty towards the employers. Surprisingly no employer stated about the benefits that they can derive from the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 or no one mentioned about the support system provided by the Government of India as one of the reasons that encourages the organisations to employ more persons with disabilities.

ISSN-2278-9758

Many employers are unaware of the benefits or the incentive details for hiring persons with disabilities, neither they are encouraged about the same (DEOC, 2009). Some employers are aware regarding some tax benefit if they employ disabled people. Those employers who are aware of the reimbursement of the exempted amount of employer's contribution to the provident fund and employee state insurance employment policy as per the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 are hesitant to get involved with a government body driven mechanism. Section 35, Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 states that "The appropriate Government and the local authorities shall, within the limit of their economic capacity and development, provide incentives to employer in private sector to ensure that at least five percent of their work force is composed of persons with benchmark disability". Such statement of receiving incentive based on the availability of funds from the local administrative bodies reduces the level of trust in the legislation.

Conclusion: The mindset of the employer towards the PwD restricts them in integrating them in the organisation. The employers have the inhibition towards the ability and work performance of the PwD and perceive that they might not be able to contribute to the business significantly. The employers posses the attitude that the PwD cannot cope up with the work pressure and tend to be take more breaks, remain absent due to their health issues which would increase organisations maintenance cost. Moreover they also witness that the PwD are generally not qualified academically which is required for a particular role hence the employer believe that the PwD are fit only for few set of common job roles at lower grade which are repetitive in nature that required low supervision. On the other side the employers are worried the societal psyche towards the PwD. The PwD are generally not allocated any work where there is a direct contact with the customer, primarily due to the fear of negative response from the customer since they are unsure about the unknown behavioral symptoms of the PwD. Moreover the way that the co-workers might behave with PwD or vice-versa is also doubtful. Lack of effective sensitization among the co-workers increases the fear in the employer. The supervisors might perceive that extra supervision is required to train and manage the employees with disabilities. Hence the employers are caught between their dilemma of personal impulses and social world. Premising this, the employers go through a psychosocial dilemma towards the inclusion of persons with disabilities at workplace.

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Beyond the Creed of Identity: Articulating Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in Urban Spaces

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Abstract: *In the highly interconnected world that we inhabit today, discourses on nationalism with its production of cultural and linguistic standardization and assimilation to a collective 'national' identity formed on the basis of shared past experience stands in contrast with 'cosmopolitanism', which views the world as one entity. Cosmopolitanism with its basic emphasis on the idea of universalism and oneness with the human race is often seen contrary to the idea of nation/nationalism, which is seen as an obstacle to it. Cosmopolitanism is viewed as enabling the local communities to empower themselves and influence the global system, providing them with tools of alternate identity formation, through their appropriation of global forms of culture, thereby also freeing themselves from the local forms of dominance and oppression. But does the idea of cosmopolitanism always stand in opposition to nationalism or function in consonance with globalization? What is the relationship between cosmopolitan thinking and multiculturalism? Can we look upon cosmopolitanism for an ethic of identity in a multicultural world? If the discourse of nationalism is claimed as an exclusionary ideological component of nation building, the problem with cosmopolitanism, as Craig Calhoun argues, is that in spite of its perspectives that counter the parochialism of nationalist thinking, it's an attitude that can be adopted without altering the political or economical structures that one individual inhabits. Debates surrounding cosmopolitanism are largely about this tension between the idea of universality and solidarity with the world on one hand and national parochialism and the solidarity with particular groups on the other. The current paper, however, takes this debate between nationalism and cosmopolitanism as it's point of departure and aims to interrogate the idea of cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the context of urban spaces, the cities of the twenty-first century. By understanding place as cosmopolitan and cosmopolitanism as placed, the paper engages with various negotiations that occur as part of our everyday experience in the complex negotiation between 'global' and 'local' and as a consequence of which, how this complicates one's understanding of the 'nation' or one's 'national' identity. The paper argues that the diverse cosmopolitan modalities that exist in the cities produces subjects that are locally rooted within a global company.*

Keywords: Cities, Cosmopolitanism, Globalisation, Identity, Nationalism.

According to Malcolm Waters (2001, 225), the key feature of globalization 'is to suggest that the world is one place …it accepts only social differentiation and not spatial or geographical differentiation'. In the era of globalization and multiculturalism, where economic and cultural realities were bypassing the boundaries of the state, the nation-state seemed to be losing its agency when faced with the world capitalist powers. The idea of 'nation' looked to be decreasing in importance and the notion of collective national belonging as opposed to

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solidarity with the world as a whole made little sense. However, the increasing movement of people across the national borders and resultant heterogeneity and hybridity of the population in most of the countries, the growing numbers of asylum seekers, refugees and migrants was soon contested and counteracted by the presence and revival of rival and reactive nationalism, which was characterized by production of cultural and linguistic standardization and assimilation to a collective 'national' identity formed on the basis of shared history and experiences.

The idea of 'Cosmopolitanism' suggests recognition and respect of all forms of differences, and engagement across various ethnic, cultural and national affiliations. Philosophically, cosmopolitanism is defined as an ethical and a political stance that takes into consideration not tribes, communities (religious or otherwise) or nations but human beings in their entirety. The cosmopolitan spatial imagination is, therefore, not limited to particular geographical areas, nations or nation-states but takes the whole world as its 'imagined community' (Anderson 1991).

Cosmopolitanism as a concept has a long history and literature that goes back to Ancient Greek thought when Diogenes proclaimed, 'I am a citizen of the world' (*kosmou polite*, or citizen of the cosmos), thus defying the then prevalent source of identity construction, the city-state. According to Angela Taraborrelli, there are two kinds of cosmopolitanism recognized in Western culture; the first comes from the Cynic, Diogenes and the other from Graeco-Roman Stoicism. From the above-mentioned, with Diogenes' proclamation comes the 'individualistic and dissociative' form of cosmopolitanism. Whereas, for the Stoics, the cosmopolitan ideal contains a Universalist outlook, in which solidarity based ethics is a moral obligation. Cicero believed in a universal human community to which all humans belonged, regardless of the multiple political and social relationships in which they may be engaged, and which followed the ethical aims of justice and human welfare, where each individual is held accountable for his own actions. Cicero, however, also believed in having partial ties, loyalties and belongings. Cicero was, thus, aware of the multifarious nature of duties and had realized the need of duties one needs to have for others, not just as a moral obligation but as a legal obligation as well and Immanuel Kant then takes up this approach, later in the eighteenth century (Taraborrelli 2015, x-xi).

In the 18th century, Immanuel Kant (1991, 107-8) talks about 'cosmopolitan condition' that links the nations in the modern age on the grounds that 'a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere'. Kant (1991, 105) locates at the center of his notion of cosmopolitanism the question of universal hospitality, which he defines as 'the right of a stranger not to be treated with hostility when he arrives on someone else's territory'. Cosmopolitanism, in the Kantian tradition, is thus seen as norms governing the relations among individuals in a global civil society and amid Kant's paradigm of cosmopolitan rights is the right of hospitality (Benhabib 2006).

Cosmopolitanism, thus, with its basic emphasis on the idea of universalism and oneness with the human race is often seen contrary to the idea of nation/nationalism, which is seen as an obstacle to cosmopolitanism. Akhil Gupta (2008, 4) sees cosmopolitanism as a 'counterfoil' to the idea of forced assimilation into one racial, ethnic, religious, linguistic or national identity that informs the discourse of nationalism. Globalization and cosmopolitanism are thus viewed as enabling the local communities to empower themselves and influence the global system, providing them with tools of alternate identity formation through their appropriation of global forms

ISSN-2278-9758

of culture, thereby also freeing themselves from the local forms of dominance and oppression.

But, does the idea of cosmopolitanism always stand in opposition to nationalism or function along with it in this age of globalization? If the discourse of nationalism is claimed as an exclusionary ideological component of nation building, does not the idea of universalism in cosmopolitan thinking disguise the unequal practices built in the ostensibly 'Universalist' projects? Debates surrounding cosmopolitanism are largely about this tension between the idea of universality and solidarity with the world on one hand and national parochialism and the solidarity with particular groups on the other. The paper delineates how the idea of cosmopolitanism is not without its own inherent contradictions.

Inspired by Stoics and Kant, Martha Nussbaum presents Cosmopolitanism as an ethos, a habit of mind, and a set of loyalties to humanity as a whole, which is to be inculcated through a specific and distinctive educational programme, which emphasizes the commonalities and role of global citizenship. She constructs cosmopolitanism in opposition to any form of local loyalties in general and nationalism in particular (Nussbaum 1997). In the second half of the twentieth century, triggered by changes due to globalization, the idea of cosmopolitanism, hence, became "at once a theoretical approach toward understanding the world, a diagnosis of the age in which we live, and a normative stance in favour of universalistic standards of moral judgments, international law and political action" (Fine 2007, 452). Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen describe it as a view offering a 'mode of managing cultural and political multiplicities' (2002, 4). This has resulted in looking at the idea of cosmopolitanism through various windows that particularize and pluralize cosmopolitanism in the belief that detached loyalty to the abstract category of 'humanity' is not possible in practice and especially towards providing any kind of strong political purchase (Harvey 2000). In today's world, individuals are articulating complex affiliations, meaningful attachments and multiple allegiances to places, groups, issues and traditions that lie beyond the boundaries of their own nation-state. This is specifically true for migrants, people belonging to different ethnic diaspora groups and other transnational communities. And it is because of such movement and encounters due to migration, that people have been enriched with varied and altered cultural repertoires. As Stuart Hall mentions, it is because of this that people are no longer influenced by the idea of a single culture that is organic, coherent and integrated. He explains,

> It is not that we are without culture but we are drawing on the traces and residues of many cultural systems, of many ethical systems and that is precisely what cosmopolitanism means. It means the ability to stand outside of having one's life written and scripted by any one community, whether that is a faith or tradition or religion or culture - whatever it might be - and to draw selectively on a variety of discursive meanings. (Hall 2002, 27)

This growing consciousness and encounter and confrontation with alterity, fosters what Ulrich Beck calls 'banal cosmopolitanism' (2006) and Daniel Hiebert (2002) puts as 'everyday' or 'ordinary' cosmopolitanism where people from varied backgrounds and differences come together and create a society where diversity is accepted and rendered ordinary. It can be found in the prosaic locales and streets of a cosmopolitan city, through which everyday nationalism can be circumvented and one finds herself/himself more integrated into a sense of global commonality. Therefore, a cosmopolitan began to be defined as an individual with multiple memberships, which often transcends the limits of nation-state. According to Jeremy Waldron (1992, 754), a cosmopolitan is someone who 'refuses to

ISSN-2278-9758

think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language'.

Scholars like Ulrich Beck are of the view that global media, mobility and consequent encounters with difference and diversity lead people to, inevitably, move beyond their national thinking and identity to establish a shared cosmopolitanism (Beck and Sznaider 2006). Robert Fine (2007, 11), therefore, defines cosmopolitan social theory as 'a collective endeavor to build a science of society founded on a claim to universalism …within which all forms of difference are recognized and respected but conceptualized as internal to the substantive unity of all human beings'. According to him, the idea of cosmopolitanism existed long before that of nationalism and has been associated with the universalistic orientation towards the world community.

Cosmopolitanism is, however, charged with being a Universalist ideology or reflecting an elitist mobile global world with disdain for the local (Delanty 2006, 28). As Gerard Delanty (2006, 26) points out, just because the world is increasingly becoming more like a global society interconnected by powerful global forces, it does not necessarily follow that it is a cosmopolitan world too. According to David Hollinger (2001, 238), modern cosmopolitanism does not stand for a universal human community over and above local loyalties, but it rather seeks to reconcile the idea of universal human solidarity with particular solidarities that are smaller and more specific, aspiring for a universalistic world order that is in consonance with the rights of particular solidarities. According to Delanty, globalization did not bring about an end of the national community rather a transformation of it and this transformation of national identities is expressed through cosmopolitanism. 'Cosmopolitan refers to the end of the "closed society" of the nation-state, but it does not spell the end of the nation' (Delanty 2006, 220).

Anthony Appiah in *The Ethics of Identity* (2005) also speaks of a 'rooted cosmopolitanism' that refers to multiple attachments and forms of belonging. That is, you can be attached to a home of one's own, have your own particular cultural solidarities and identity but on the same hand you celebrate the variety of human cultures that are there in the world, people belonging to various different groups. David Held talks about cultural cosmopolitanism, which is 'not at loggerheads with national culture; it does not deny cultural difference or the enduring significance of national tradition. It is not against cultural diversity . . . Rather, cultural cosmopolitanism should be understood as the capacity to mediate between national cultures, communities of fate and alternative styles of life' (Held 2002, 57). According to Samuel Scheffler (2001, 151), it underlines the fluid nature of individual identity and one's ability to forge new identities from diverse cultures and other sources. It celebrates the 'hybridity, impurity, intermingling, the transformation that comes of new and unexpected combinations of human beings, cultures, ideas, politics, movies, songs' as Salman Rushdie says (qtd in Waldron 1992, 751).

Global landscape today is seen as characterized by hybridization where the contact with the 'other' means that practices and products are dis-embedded from their original context and re-embedded into new locales. Cosmopolitanism, much like globalization, is often linked to diversity and hybridity. Peter van der Veer (2016, 19) sees cosmopolitanism as representative of the multicultural hybridity that characterizes the postcolonial period. According to Bhabha (1994), hybridity can lead to a new cosmopolitanism that will engage with different possibilities of cultural agency. But Pheng Cheah (1997, 172-3) argues about the uncritical celebration of hybridity with respect to cosmopolitanism by pointing out that although cultural hybridity may bring about cosmopolitanism, it is really a kind of 'closet idealism', since the motivation of the meaning and symbols of neocolonial culture 'via

ISSN-2278-9758

economic and political institutional structures in an unequal global order means that they cannot be translated, reinscribed, and read anew in the ways suggested by theories of hybridity'. Dipesh Chakrabarty (2016) calls the use of 'hybridity' within cosmopolitanism as a particular strategy formulated to resolve the universalism/relativism binary.

If some people view the relationship between cosmopolitanism and nationalism as dialectical (Veer 2016, 16), for some the opposition between the two has been an unstable one (Cheah 1998, 22), particularly under conditions of globalization. Contrary to common belief, Cheah considers statism, and not nationalism, to be the antonym of cosmopolitanism. She argues that cosmopolitanism could not have possibly meant the overcoming of national particularisms because when cosmopolitanism came to be articulated as ideology and as practice, the popular national state did not exist in Europe and the doctrine of nationalism was not yet fully articulated (Cheah 1998, 22). Cosmopolitanism, then, was an oppositional stance to absolutist statism, since the territorial state was not yet hitched to an ideology of nationalism (Cheah 1998, 22-5). Hence uncritical cosmopolitanism will lead to a non-reflexive, static and closed model of inquiry where nationalism is simply replaced by cosmopolitanism (Cheah and Robbins 1998). Delanty (2006, 222) sees cosmopolitanism as 'a process of self-transformation in which new cultural forms take shape and where new spaces of discourse open up leading to transformation of the social world'.

Globalization today is seen as a synonym of westernization, where an increasingly homogeneous global culture is replacing the individual distinction of cultures and societies. Operation of globalization and its ideological machinery cannot be separated from the structures of power perpetuated by European imperialism and hence the hierarchical world power relations today as demonstrated by globalization are seen as a legacy of Western imperialism. Similarly, cosmopolitanism as an idea is seen as being derived and located within the West (Bhambra 2010, 314). Hidden behind the veneer of an universalistic discourse of cosmopolitanism lies cultural assumptions, national prejudices and power positions, leading critics to decode it as a disguise for the imposition of 'Western' values on the 'East' and 'South', or 'as an instrument serving the political and financial interests of the sole remaining superpower' (Fine 2007, 39). According to Beck (2002, 33), Cosmopolitanism doesn't ascribe to the immigrants, thereby making them the 'excluded Other's' and he further locates them within the nationalistic particularity as proof of doing so. To this, Bhambra (2011, 318) succinctly replies 'Beck's cosmopolitanism is a cosmopolitanism of similarly constituted individuals that is unable to accommodate "Others" within its conceptual or political frameworks and is an expression of cultural Eurocentrism masquerading as potential global inclusivity'.

Avoiding the conflation of cosmopolitanism with globalization and multiculturalism (Beck 2000; 2002), it is believed that social diversity in a particular place, although a necessary precondition, doesn't lead to cosmopolitanism (Humphrey 2013). According to Ulf Hannerz (2006, 6), mobility, too, in itself does not provide an adequate climate for the development of cosmopolitanism, here seen as 'an intellectual and aesthetic openness toward divergent cultural experiences, and an ability to make one's way into other cultures'. Encountering otherness, he mentions, is not always characterized by openness but rather rejection or narrow, controlled selection within the mainstream population. As a result of this, there are many forms of cosmopolitanism, ranging from liberal to rooted but David Harvey (2009, 33) points out that study of cosmopolitanism without adequate geographical underpinning and foundation, runs the risk of smoothing over all kinds of geographical and cultural

ISSN-2278-9758

differences. He cautions that cosmopolitanism 'bereft of geographical specificity' can become an abstraction, liable to become 'either mere heterotopic description or a passive tool of power for dominating the weak' (Harvey 2000, 57). Thus, as Vertovec and Cohen (2002) say, there exist many forms of cosmopolitanism, especially in an urban space.

There has been a longstanding association of cosmopolitanism with the city. Owing to their multicultural character and as converging points in transnational networks, cities are often seen as spaces that promote cosmopolitanism. A 'cosmopolitan city' is marked by diversity and difference as the key feature of its urban landscape. Cosmopolitanism, apart from an ethical and political commitment to the global 'other' that develops out of mobility and the consequent interaction with various kinds of differences, is also seen as an aspect of social life constructed through the multiple meaning making processes involved in the everyday urban reality of a society. The capacities of cities to generate new spaces and means for contact, interaction between its various communities and dwellers, its role as a congenial site for encounter and exchange between people from varied backgrounds, and acceptance of various individual experiences, lifestyles, perspectives and subjectivities, make cities an important site of weaving cosmopolitanism in the imaginings of its urban spaces. But what makes a city cosmopolitan? Is the presence of myriad cultures and different registers of population, an only prerequisite for a city to be called cosmopolitan? Is a city cosmopolitan just by virtue of its demographic assortment or is cosmopolitanism a philosophy that must be present in the very fabric of the city? Does the outlook of those who inhabit the city constitute it's cosmopolitanism or is it to be found at the convergence of interaction of differences within the city?

City is seen as a space of encounters between cultures and as a center of new cultures as well. As Hannerz (1996, 128) suggests, cosmopolitan world cities are centers to which 'people from different parts of the world look, even from considerable distance and often from one continent to another, as fairly durable sources of new culture'. Cosmopolitanism, for Hannerz (1996, 103), requires a 'state of readiness, a personal ability to make one's way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting, and reflecting'. It implies 'the possibility of belonging to more than one ethnic and social localism simultaneously' (Werbner 2008, 34).

Founded on 'openness to, desire for and appreciation of, social and cultural difference', Cosmopolitanism is associated with gentrification and urban formations of the 'new middle class' and bound up with notions of knowledge, cultural capital and education (Binnie et al. 2006, 7). Cosmopolitan urban identities find physical expression in gentrified urban settings through local territory and encounters commodified through ethnic restaurants, import stores, international media and architectural forms: 'Thus the socialization of cosmopolitan global identities and the generation of encounters with difference and diversity find their locus in particular "consumptionscapes" in the city' (Binnie et al. 2006, 15). In a similar way, Cohen (1997, 167) sees global cities as cosmopolitan, partly because they are more integrated to other global cities than to their original national context, but also because prevalent 'tastes, consumption patterns and forms of entertainment are drawn more from an emerging global culture than from the national culture'.

The process of urbanization necessarily 'foregrounds encounter and contact in the metropolis', and the city is the most appropriate geographical space where 'challenges of multiculturalism is met and ironed out' (Keith 2005, 1). However, in the cities 'cosmopolitanism…is not just taken to be a sign of social progressiveness, but also

ISSN-2278-9758

a cultural resource with which cities are increasingly being marketed' (Yeoh and Lin 2012, 211). Yeoh and Lin argue that a normative 'global city' culture premised upon a distinct standard of diversity and openness is beginning to be taken as an example to be followed by other cities. Other theorists (Chang and Huang 2008; Notar 2008) also reiterate the same, 'cities universally are increasingly cajoled into accepting a hegemonic brand of cosmopolitanism, often favouring "worldly" (read: Western) and "festive" appearances of multicultural vibrancy, to the neglect of more indigenous and grounded ways of negotiating difference' (Yeoh and Lin 2012, 211).

Jacques Derrida (2001), in his essay "On Cosmopolitanism", conceives of cosmopolitan cities as 'open cities' (un villefranches) and 'refuge cities' (villes refuges), a place of hospitality where non-indifference to the 'other', a welcome rather than mere tolerance operates as a norm of sociality. Derrida, however, cautions about how the idea of cosmopolitanism is deliberately adopted by cities to fashion their self-image of tolerance, openness and hospitality. The cosmopolitan feature of cities can, thus, be assessed through urban discourse of self-representation and city branding. Hannerz (1990) talks about a neoliberal kind of cosmopolitanism, which focuses on the lifestyles and class outlook of those 'elite' few who are world travellers and have a cultivated taste for the 'other'. Mike Douglas (2009) distinguishes between 'globopolis', a city that solely maintains its cosmopolitan image for the sake of capitalist investments, market and global competition and recognition, and 'cosmopolis', a city which champions the participation of all its diverse people in the making and re-making of the city.

Talking about the performance of urban cosmopolitanism in the cities, Muller (2011) points out how it is unequally accessible to people positioned differently on the basis of race, class and residential status. Actually existing cosmopolitanism and its practices is limited by various social, political and cultural institutions; also it is clearly defined and controlled in only certain sections of the city that show cosmopolitan character (Breckenridge et al. 2000; Binnie et al. 2006; Cheah and Robbins 1998). It is the mundane, 'micropublic' sites, where people from different backgrounds come into contact with each other and interact in their everyday life, that cosmopolitan encounters and tolerance to urban difference develops (Amin 2006). Paul Gilroy (2005, 67) has argued that cosmopolitanism invested with a political currency is one, which is characterized by a 'principled and methodical cultivation of a degree of estrangement from one's own culture and history', and that this estrangement 'is now a routine feature of the postmodern and postcolonial processes that condition metropolitan life'. For Gilroy, the experience of living in a metropolitan represents an ontological condition that is equivalent to cosmopolitanism. The metropolitan city breeds defamiliarization, that Gilroy (2005, 70) suggests is central to cosmopolitanism, where 'a fragmented and stratified location in which cultures, histories, and structures of feeling previously separated by enormous distances could be found in the same place'. These simultaneous processes of defamiliarization and recombination define the ontological existence of the metropolitan city.

Henri Lefebvre (1991) talks about the way in which various modes of cosmopolitanism diversify singular locations and produces worldly subjects who are locally rooted within a global company. Thus, the mutability associated with cosmopolitan culture acts as a reminder that cosmopolitanism marks neither a caesura from earlier historical moments nor a straightforward continuation from 'eternal' notions of human universality. Cosmopolitanism should thus be seen as an interpretative practice, with myriad expressive possibilities, rather than an identity to be claimed or a model of global governance.

ISSN-2278-9758

Today's world is marked by endless acts of religious and patriarchal fundamentalism, intolerance and violence that are construed as expressions of nationalism, along with decreasing recognition of pluralism and respect of individual and group rights. The ethical questions regarding the notion of identity need to be approached in a way that the person has the freedom to either create an identity of its own or to choose to belong to the collective identities available to him/her. Whether or not cosmopolitanism provides one with such an ethic of identity is fraught with questions, as we have seen above. In this global civil society, as John Keane (2003) terms the world we live in today, one can be deeply embedded in the specific history of a nation or particular group of people but on the same hand one can identify as a citizen of the world. Cosmopolitanism is viewed now not just as a notion of detachment from a particular political system of nation state or as a notion of "oneness with the world", it is also an ethical ideal and a vision of justice as proposed by Kant initially in his philosophical sketch "Towards Perpetual Peace" and increasingly as an identity choice made by individuals that cuts across social and political boundaries that have been imposed upon them.

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Market for Higher Education: Case for Effective Regulation

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Abstract

This paper locates the creation of a market in higher education (HE) in the context of globalisation since the early 1990s. It outlines three related developments that have facilitated the conversion of a public or a merit good to a marketable, tradable and a private commodity and increased demand for HE. These comprise the emergence of the notion of knowledge economy and massification of HE givingrise to demand for HE, state withdrawal from funding of HE and inclusion of higher education in the GATS-WTO framework.These trends have created a space for private providers to enter the market.This paper argues that HE is at best a quasi-public good, the market for HE is not perfect, rather subject to market failures. Hence co-existence of both public and private providers of HE with a rise in the market share of the latter requirescontinued state provisionof HE to meet the objective of social justice. It calls for tight regulation of the performance of all HEIs with a focus on governance, autonomy, quality assurance, equity and access especially when new arrangements of dissemination of knowledge have emerged.

Key Words: Higher Education, Knowledge-based economies,Market, GATS-WTO, Regulation

Introduction

Knowledge has the attributes of a public good in that it is non-subtractive or non-rival and non-excludable. This makes a case for government intervention and public funding of HE to facilitate internalisation of these externalities, provide an opportunity for upward mobility and overcome class, gender, social and community barriers. The notion of well-being that all societies must strive to achieve is to allow its people the freedom to choose and acquire capabilities to live a life they have reason to value. These capabilities depend on the opportunities available to individuals determined by history. If they are not available to people at the bottom of society then public action to provide these opportunitiesbecomes imperative (Sen2006).

Increasingly the world over, private HEIs have registered a strong presence in addition to or sometimes in place of public-funded HE. International demand for private HEIs has increased to the extent that 30 per cent enrolment globally in 2008 was in private universities (OECD 2012). The underlying compulsions faced by fiscal-constrained states have conceded privatisation and commodification of HE. The state has retracted from its role of providing the masses access to quality HE to ensure equity across different socio-economic strata.

Three related processes have informedthe conception of a competitive market in HE in the context of globalisationsince the 1990s and the changein the status of higher education (HE) from a public good to a private commodity with a change in policy stance in favour of massification of HE. The emergence of the notion of knowledge economy has emphasised the need for generation of critical knowledge and research especially in science and technology, mathematics and engineering(STEM) whereby the HEIs have acquired a special place in the new growth paradigm. This has accelerated demand for graduates and researchers and made HE critical to growth, competitiveness and innovation. As a possible route tosocial mobility,demand for HE has hastenedthese developments whichare coterminous witha decline in publicexpenditure on HE. Excess demand for HE has made it easier fordomestic private players and international universities to acquire a large share of the HE market, particularly in developing countries.In addition to the rise in demand for and supply of HE is the inclusion of HE in

ISSN-2278-9758

theGeneral Agreement on Trade in Services under the aegis of the WTO (GATS-WTO)which has engendered HE tradable.This confirms the contention that many changes in the domestic policy towards HE are not independent of the commitments made in the WTO by developing countries.

We argue that HE is not a pure private, tradable commodity that can be governed by the user-pays principle. It is,at best, a quasi-public good. The market for HE is imperfect and limited by the lack of all attributes of a market and is ridden with market failures which begs state intervention. In this scenario commodification, privatisation, commercialisation and internationalisation of HEcombined with its massification[1] and corporatisation[2] have brought into focus issues related to state's role in effective governance, regulation, equity, access and quality assurance of HE. The paper puts into perspective the developments with regards to HE and higher education institutions (HEIs) beyond the realm of domestic policy. It opens research on the pertinent governance and regulation arrangements needed to dispense with the new configuration of a mix of public and private HEIs and make it compatible with the realisation of objectives of equity, access and quality assurance in a socially and economically diverse developing economies like India.

The paper is organised as follows. The next section briefly discusses the three processes which have created an excess demand for HE and trade in HE. It further examines the elements of a market in HE where the students are the consumers and the HEIs are the providers and investigates whether HE qualifies as a private, tradable commodity. In a scenario where privatisation of HE is here to stay and coexist with state-funded HE, new arrangements of public-private partnership (PPP) and for-profit institutions raise associated concerns of regulation, governance, autonomy and quality assurance to protect the 'consumer' from 'goods' of spurious quality and guarantee diminution in societal distance. The last section concludes.

Making Higher Education a Private, Tradable Commodity

Emergence of the knowledge-based economy

Since the 1990s, increasing demand for HE has been triggered by the recognition that future growth will be based on creation of new ideas and knowledge i.e knowledge-intensive growth. The requisite increase in fundamental research and critical thinking shall come about in HEIs. The notion of a knowledge-based economy (KBE) has brought to the fore the vital role played by human capital and technological change in the process of growth. It defines a new paradigm which moves away from neo-classical growth and makes knowledge central to new growth theories. It treats technological change endogenous to the system[3]. Knowledge and innovation play an important role in determining growth and competitiveness of nations. HEIs are key to the creation of knowledge and critical thinking in the framework of KBEs (OECD 1996; World Bank 1998-99; ADB 2007).

KBEs are characterised by knowledge, skill and information-intensity of production. Unlike the conventional factors of production which deplete or are subject to decreasing returns, knowledge is a resource which has positive externalities and can be shared by many at the same time. Rather growth in knowledge contributes to generation of new ideas and technological development and leads to productivity increases. Growth and generation of novel ideas and knowledge and learning relies on the availability of skilled and educated workforce in the population.

ISSN-2278-9758

Knowledge-based development goes further in its attention to social infrastructure to support creation, application and commercialisation of knowledge for sustainable development (ADB 2007). This assigns a central position to HE, R&D, national innovation systems, information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructure and effective policies, governance and regulation with strong financial, social and legal institutions. These are termed as the pillars of KBEs. Thus, HE has a pivotal place in KBEs in building the requisite skilled manpower to generate modern designs and concepts and translate them into innovation and value creation. This forms the basis of an increase in demand for HE in the context of KBEs.

Knowledge is both explicit and tacit[4]. A continuum in the creation of knowledge, learning and absorptive capacity has to be maintained for sustainable and inclusive development. A significant part of knowledge generated is tacit in nature[5]. Improvements in ICT have helped transfer of codifiable or explicit knowledge across time and space. Implicit knowledge embodied in people has positive externalities for society. The basic requirement of KBE is thus a highly educated manpower especially in STEM subjects to create researchers who undertake R&D and new inventions which are then applied by the industry. This has led to a rise in demand for skilled and educated workforce and pushed for massification of HE. Universities equip students with knowledge which are useful in solving the problems of the society.

Knowledge and technology improve growth via increased productivity and positive externalities as opposed to a mere increase in physical resources in the framework of innovation ecosystems. Moreover, new knowledge and technology are path-dependent (OECD 1996) but the developing world *must* innovate and indigenise borrowed technology. As most developing countries operate below the dynamic technology frontier a more relevant approach is to focus on learning and encourage context-specific inclusive and sustainable innovation.

HE as a route to upward mobility with a fall in government's social spending

HE has been conventionally defined as a public good[6]. Public goods are non-excludable and non-rival[7]. Provision of public goods cannot be left to the market as it allocates sub-optimal resources to its production and due to associated positive externality and market failure. In this context public-funded higher education is imperative to ensure social justice and inclusive growth. It may be possible to restrict admissions to HEIs but cannot restrict the advantages to the receivers alone. It confers both private and social benefits. HE therefore easily qualifies as a 'quasi-public good' (Tilak 2008, 451). HE has features of both, 'publicness' and 'privateness' (Chattopadhyay 2012, 157). Stiglitz (1999) argues that higher education is concerned more with the generation of ideas and knowledge and creation and dissemination of knowledge with positive externalities and this makes it a pure public good. Saner and Fasel (2003) contend that HE is more than a mere acquisition of knowledge and skills. Rather it ensures social and national cohesion and equity in access to knowledge for all socio-economic groups and hence should be treated as a public good.

The perceived role of HE in upward mobility and expanded employment has also accentuated the 'demand' for HE. The ability to earn higher incomes is empirically found to be directly related to the levels of tertiary education attained. However, a concomitant tendency with increased demand for HE is the decline in government expenditure

ISSN-2278-9758

on HE and withdrawal from social sector spending due to fiscal austerity imposed on the developing world as *structural adjustment* since the 1990s. It is argued that private benefits of HE far exceeds the social benefits and hence user-pays principle should be the norm. As a result, the state has withdrawn from the provision of subsidised HE. What follows is a decline in the 'supply' of subsidised HE.

Insufficient employment opportunities in the period of global recession for more than a decade has also added to demand for HE. Many people have also gone back to the universities. This has occurred due to change in the demographic structure with a larger proportion of population in the 18 plus age group and because a larger proportion of people are now completing secondary education and aspire to register for a university degree. This reflects in data on higher enrolments (Altbach, Reisberg and Rumbley 2009).

GATS-WTO and Trade in HE

The WTO was set up in 1995 as a multilateral, single undertaking institution. It rests on two important pillars, reciprocity and non-discrimination. Non-discrimination includes national treatment and most favoured nation (MFN) clauses. Education is included under the GATS-WTO and classifies it into primary, secondary, higher, adult and other education. All services trade can take place in four 'modes' comprising cross border, consumption abroad, commercial presence and movement of natural persons which also apply to trade in education. Only a few countries had committed to open up either a few or all of these sectors under education in 1995**.** Discussions on trade in education have been part of the Doha Ministerial since 2001. Hence the policy outlook of international monetary institutions and the GATS-WTO have further abetted privatisation and commodification of HE and made it a tradable commodity. The GATS-WTO agreements have aided the creation of a market and trade in HE[8].

Traditionally developed countries have had high quality education systems but more recently have experienced 'excess capacity' which needs to be 'exported' to developing countries to sustain their high-cost structures. The latter have systems of HE deficient in quality and given their demographic structures have excess demand for HE. The increased purchasing power of the elite and rich middle class in developing countries has led to an outward movement of students to foreign universities. It has also triggered demand for other forms of trade in HE including online education and commercial presence abroad with foreign universities setting up campuses in developing countries. Inclusion of education in GATS and trade in it has been pushed by exporting countries like the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. They are also keen to set up their branches abroad and increase the number of international students in their home countries' institutions in an endeavour to improve their image of supporting 'diversity'.

The above three processes have caused a rise in participation of private providers along with fall in state-funding of universities. Some private players in developing countries rely on collaborations and twining arrangements with foreign universities to acquire a 'branding'. This has increased competition among providers. New curricula has gained prominence in line with the GATS-WTO prescriptions with a greater reliance on private funding and bank loans. Since expansion in the demand for HE implies increased public expenditure the contradiction between subsidies and greater reliance on privatisation of education cost has sharpened. For example, in India, the latter

ISSN-2278-9758

cannot enter the HE independently and must have twining or franchise arrangements with Indian partners. India's commitment of HE in the WTO makes clauses like reciprocity and non-discrimination binding. Thus, trends towards privatisation of HE in India have more often been accompanied by internationalisation of HE as well.

Main Features of the Market for HE

An appraisal of the main elements of a competitive market in HE show that the specificities of this market at best make it an imperfect market. There are concerns of market failure due to externalities and asymmetric information which justify state intervention and it does not fulfil all the assumptions of a competitive market. The theory of a market applied to HE treats the individual as a utility maximising consumer subject to his income constraint and confers social benefits. Student treated is as a utility maximising consumer and hence getting the best quality becomes the most important concern to ensure value for money.

Market structure under perfect competition is determined by the number of buyers and sellers, entry-exit conditions, monopoly power, nature of competition among sellers, product differentiation, diversification and selling and production costs. It requires adequate infrastructure and fixed investment. HEIs are treated as corporations which compete with each other to promote marketability of their product. Competition is expected to lower cost, improve quality of teaching and research caters to the needs of future employers who are at times also the private sponsors. This is often in STEM subjects and at the cost of critical research to which the humanities are crucial.The principles governing the markets are profitability and efficiency in resource allocation. Application of these principles to public-funded HEIs must be critiqued because efficiency is not superior to social justice. The latter *is not secondary to issues of cost, finance and profitability*. An elite HE created by privatisation is exclusive and militates against social justice and talent simultaneously.

The HE market is more imperfect than a perfect competitive market. HE is a *differentiated product* with close substitutes with difference in content, quality and intrinsic value across institutions. There is heightened competition between various providers of HE for research grants, public funding and contract research based on individual institutions' performance and number of students (OECD 2012a). A decline in public funding means most institutions must raise money to supplement public grants. It is assumed that competition between public and private universities improves quality of teaching in the former and makes courses job-oriented. Questionable global rankings have become foremost signalling tools in this context of institutional competition. The global quality assurance agentswork with criteria not necessarily applicable everywhere. In the emerging education regime universities become corporation-driven by profit motive and tax saving. Needless to add, the boards of private institutions have influential businessmen as members in a system based on the 'user-pays' principle. Though privatisation[9] of HE is promoted to meet excess demographic demand for HE, its cost can be afforded only by the rich. Further, cost-cutting often compromises quality because most private HEIs do not pay attractive salaries to retain talent. It is seen that this dissuades students from joining these institutions.

ISSN-2278-9758

Traditionally the imperfectly competitive markets operate on the basis of certain assumptions and the price mechanism is the signalling device. However, the nature (monopoly, monopolistic or competitive) and the maturity (new or established) of the market are history-specific. Robertson and Komeljenovic (2016) trace the making of a market in HE[10]. Overtime excess demand for HE, prospects of making profits, pressure on governments to exercise fiscal prudence in social sectors and pruning of state subsidies has created the space for private and foreign players in HE. The withdrawal of state support weakens the HE sector, lowers quality and spurs privatisation. Presence of foreign HEIs, independent or in collaboration with local institutions convert them into transnational HEIs (TNHEIs). Most HEIs collaborate with foreign HEIs as a mark of quality and credibility. Private HEIs set up institutions with foreign providers because the latter are seen as a guarantee for quality assurance and accreditation. The risk of compromise on quality due to poor payment to teachers, no check or parameter on qualifications and sub-standard courses offered are some of the typical features of the lightly regulated HE market. More often it is not the high-ranking universities which set up campuses in developing countries.

The HE market is associated with the unbundling of the university system. Formal education, quality and curricula of HE is separated from the experience of acquiring HE in a private or foreign university. A real market is created with differentiation in the programs offered and the quality of university teachers. In 2004 the role of ranking international universities on the basis of quantifiable criteria came up. This has increased competition among universities everywhere and marginalised teaching and learning functions of the HEIs (Wadhwa 2016). To attract students, marketing agencies organise interactions between universities and students, *sans* guarantees.

As different universities offer different courses the costs of product differentiation are incurred and calculated by the lawfully operating marketing agents. Given that demand exceeds supply, the HE market is a seller's market and universities command a price for their brand. Marketing HE involves innovating new products, marketing strategies, giving freebees, etc. Domestic universities both public and private are increasingly patterned on foreign universities. The foreign, often Western, universities produce the desire for the *experience* of being part of a high-ranking university synonymous with quality. This is *a sufficient condition* for the demand for foreign degrees favouring universities in the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These five countries attract droves of English-speaking students from India, East Asia and China. Marketing agenciesare crucial to this process. (Robertson and Komeljanovic 2016). Having created a sellers' market in HE credible agencies must assure quality to the disadvantaged consumer. The disadvantage arises because of asymmetric information and because it is an 'experience good' (Tilak 2008, 452). This implies that the students can test it only after they take admission into the course. Once admitted they cannot leave it easily as the money (fees) is sunk. Vocational institutes, polytechnics, private colleges and universities have assumed a new importance and are integrated with the labor markets. The new courses are shorter and more job-oriented. It is estimated that India and China will account for 50 per cent of global enrolments in 2030 from the 30 per cent in 2017 (OECD 2017). However, the social penetration of ICT in developing countries is a problem in small towns and villages[11]. Private HEIs resemble corporate organisations leaving little space for academic autonomy. STEM subjects are preferred to the humanities and the curricula and teaching in the private HE is usually not rigorous. From the view-point of providers of HE, the

ISSN-2278-9758

market is not a typical competitive market. The sellers cannot exit the market easily and their quality cannot be easily assessed. They choose to provide more professional courses and charge unjust fees which in turn has escalated the demand for student loans. From the point of view of students also they have the freedom to choose the provider but admission is not guaranteed by their ability to pay, rather merit or entrance-based admission process limits their entry into the institution of their choice.

Internationalisation of HE

In the developing economies privatisation of HE is accompanied by the influx of foreign capital but this must be understood alongside the HE commitments made in the GATS-WTO by these economies. A rich and middle-class friendly domestic-foreign collaboration is perceived and advertised as a guarantee of high-quality education[12]. Foreign collaborations in HE fall under the GATS-WTO and are treated as an export item. The four GATS-WTO modes of services trade correspond to four forms of mobility– program mobility, student mobility, institutional mobility[13] and academic mobility. This has raised demand for universally applicable knowledge, skills and labor mobility in sectors like the IT where labor from developing countries is, really, *cheap labor*. India has committed HE and China has committed all five sub-sectors of education in the GATS-WTO and comprise profitable market for private and foreign players. The status of education as a tradable commodity has encouraged offshore, on-line lessons, foreign branch campuses and cross border movement of students who fall into debt due to high fees. Knight (2003) observes that the objectives, functions and delivery (offshore and foreign universities coming into host countries mostly in the form of collaborations, franchise or twining arrangements) of education have become globalised. There is a convergence of organisational structures, rationale and curricula across countries. Data on student mobility suggests that in 1975, 0.88 million students moved across countries and this number increased to 4.1 million in 2010 especially due to China, India and EU (OECD 2012b). This one-way student mobility imposes high costs on developing world in terms of domestic debt and outflow of precious foreign exchange.

Internationalisation of HE comprises application of strategic management methods and techniques to achieve integration as well as local responsiveness guided by improving quality, faculty and students. It aims at creating globalised knowledge in specific contexts, student mobility and research collaborations with an eye on quality assessment and assurance mechanisms. It is a dynamic process and endeavours to bring in the international and intercultural aspects in teaching and research. De Witt (2011) lists misconceptions in defining internationalisation of HE and the confusion between the means and ends. These include the use of English language as a medium of instruction, student mobility and teaching of subjects with international contents and orientation. Other misconceptions are a high share of foreign students in class, internships abroad and focus on strategic relationships. The alternative is described as a process of cooperation or inducting inter-cultural and global dimensions in the 'purpose, functions and delivery' of HE 'at the institutional and national levels' to make it truly international (Knight 2013, xi). The transnational HEIs (TNHEIs) enter a country with a clear strategy. These must retain the reputation of the mother institution and cater to local contexts. Many international HEIs see a foreign campus as value addition to their brand. Between 2006 and 2009 especially post-2008 when a deep recession hit the West, there was 43 per cent growth in international branch campuses (Shams and Huisman 2012). Waterval et al. (2017)

ISSN-2278-9758

note that many HEIs promote cross-border partnerships to improve the curriculum but local needs and work environments vary in many fields like law and medicine. The borrowing of student-centered curriculum necessitates regular update of syllabus. The home country, often a developed country, has services and online assistance sites in its curriculum and the host demands the same. The language of instruction, the choice between teacher and student-centered methods and local accreditation methods remain important. It is observed that trends of privatisation and internationalisation of HE are concurrent. For example, in India, a large number of new private HEIs collaborate with multiple foreign partners to create globalised classrooms to ease campus placements.

Internationalisation promotes competition, brain race and an unhealthy obsession with international rankings (Knight 2013). The foreign HEIs also lower standards to cater to social heterogeneity in the host countries. Internationalisation thus involves not just a movement of students but of programmes and providers as well. The obsession with internationalisation is reflected in data; from 24 branch campuses in 2002 to more than 200 campuses in 2012 (OBHE 2012). However, whether this will translate into the integration of international, intercultural and global dimensions with local contexts remains to be seen (Knight 2013, 85).

Thus, utility derived from a commodity called HE and the welfare enhancing effect of HE are not confined to the carrier of knowledge but extend to the society. Aim of acquiring education including HE is to not merely to increase one's own benefits but as a means to become capable to exercise the freedom to choose and increase well-being. It indirectly benefits the society. HE if left to the market will end up allocating lesser resources because of market failure due to externalities and asymmetric information. Moreover, there are vast distributional concerns and it is for the state to intervene to rid these failures and decide on the form, time and area of intervention and reform to maximise the spread of the benefits and encourage inclusive growth. Distributional implications especially for the socially excluded and marginalised groups require public action.

New Arrangements

Two new arrangements have evolved which assign the private HEIs a supplementary role along with the public-funded HEIs to cater to the needs of KBEs. Whether such arrangements have the will and the ability to assist the formation of KBEs, promote critical thinking and fundamental research and address the issues.

Public-private partnership (PPP) is seen as a milder form of privatisation. It confines the state to provide infrastructure and an institutional and a regulatory framework within which the markets can operate. However, there is the need to govern and create competition between domestic firms and foreign firms. 'Parentocracy' matters in choosing HE – i.e., wealth and wishes of the parent are more important than the ability and efforts of the child (Robertson and Verger 2012, 7). PPPs are considered more soft and socially more acceptable form of privatisation or private participation in HE somewhere in between the extremes of total public or total private presence. This entails 'reinventing' the role of the government. Partnership is expected to deliver better results than monitoring and implementing regulatory norms. Robertson and Verger (2012) assert that effectiveness over efficiency of outcomes is more important with 'organisational experimentation'.

ISSN-2278-9758

PPP defines the role of the government as a financier and form broad policy while the private sector delivers the 'good'. The quality, quantity and price are pre-determined. Liberalisation of HE connotes reduction in regulation and ease the entry of foreign universities, open for-profit institutions which can repatriate profits and set a market price of HE in the form of tuition fees. Government intervention implies adherence to a set of standards which should be met by an institution to function as a university. The main function of the state under PPP is to create an enabling environment and let the market deliver with lose rather than tight regulation. Management of HEIs resembles a corporate entity with board of governors from the corporate sector. Marketing agencies provide consultancies to further the objective of private participation and fulfil certain functions which are outsourced to them. PPP is a supposed redefinition of power, authority, legitimacy and equity with accountability. It remains to be seen whether PPP in HE achieves social justice in terms of political, economic and cultural mobility. Managerial governance looks at competition and efficiency in providing education outcomes.

The other institutional arrangement is the for-profit HEIs. Their numbers have increased in developed and developing countries. These institutions offer certificate courses of less than one year, two-year associate degrees and four-year full time degrees. The institution is treated as a private enterprise, they may have IPOs and are listed in the stock market and therefore do not have the compulsion of re-ploughing the profits in the institution. Rather the investors operate it to share profits. The difference between the public and not-for-profit HEIs on the one hand and the for-profit private HEIs is that the former set of institutions is faculty-centered whereas the latter is adult-student-centered. The disruptive innovation that the for-profit institutions introduce include condensed courses, use professionals from the industry in teaching to keep curriculum in line with the latter's needs, rely on team collaborations and operational outcomes.

With regards to the accreditation and regulation of the for-profit institutions the list of parameters to judge their efficacy remains contentious. High fees charged by these institutions is exploitative and increases the incidence of student loans and defaults. This makes it important for the faculty to work closely with management and tinker course structures and student evaluation and placement to appear a favourable to prospective students. This also impacts for future sources of funding, grants and stock market valuations. The faculty has little academic autonomy, no permanent tenure or job-security and their continuation in the institution depends on the feedback or their evaluation by students. Critics firmly believe that the for-profit HEIs compromise on quality of HE imparted with greater reliance on online learning modules, job-orientation and year-round classes. The quality of research is also suspect.

Regulation and Governance of HEIs

Creation of a market in HE converts education into a *commodity* and the student into a *consumer* and allows choice based on partial *information* offered or promised by various providers *competing* with each other. Regulation is required to protect the interests of the consumers and evaluate outcomes. Role of state is to reduce the risk of market failure by forming an appropriate policy framework, provide funding (access) and ensure equity.

ISSN-2278-9758

Social accountability must be imposed on all HEIs to offer students value for money. This requires monitoring and compliance with regulatory policies. Various institutional arrangements in HE have arisen, ranging from public-funded to private-public partnership, polytechnics and institutions which validate the degrees of other institutions. With HEIs of heterogenous quality and delivery it is vital to ensure 'competitive neutrality' and a minimum base-line quality without creating a tiered system which has to be assured to all students (OECD 2015). Different providers should be bound by identical rules of the regulatory framework irrespective of ownership (public or private). Governance of HEIs entails a check on corruption at all levels. The best regulation is self-regulation and till HEIs achieve this as a voluntary practice, monitoring and compliance remain the key components of regulation. Many HE institutions in the informal sector remain outside formal regulation[14]. The HE market does not have the ease of entry or exit with significant implications for the students. The student often does not have prior knowledge of the course, university and faculty. HE is thus an 'experience good' (OECD, 2015, p.17) making 'repeat purchases' difficult for the consumer (OECD 2015, 18). The exit of various HEIs must be at minimum risk to the students. It is essential to form a structure of continuous quality assessment of HEIs. Sanctions against non-compliance should vary the least between alternative providers especially if they are differentiated on the basis of public funding. The focus of penalties should be the risks faced by students. Regulation should focus on quality and governance on utilisation and management of finances.

Quality assurance requires substantive and procedural autonomy[15] and sound institutional governance is fundamental in both public and private HEIs (Henard and Mitterle 2009). Governance arrangements and quality assurance principles are related and significant to achieve the objectives of HE. Nonetheless, governance is more advisory in nature while quality codes are binding on the HEIs. In general governance arrangements concern autonomy and accountability while quality arrangements are specific and strict.

Governance is central to ensure delivery of HE and utilisation of funds to address individual and social needs. With increased internationalisation of HE the ranking of universities is related to the number of good students seeking admissions. Quality assurance mechanisms ensure effective utilisation of public funds in HE and accessibility of tertiary education by the non-elites of the society. It also warrants that skills and knowledge creation in universities helps the diversified labour market.

The risk of market failure necessitates the creation an appropriate regulatory environment to ensure accountability of HEIs. Governments can use public funding as a performance incentive. The objectives of quality teaching, institutional accountability and student employability are the guiding principles for contemporary universities. Good governance helps preserve "the integrity of the academic value system' (Fried 2006, 81) besides encouraging a "cooperative higher education system" (OECD 2010, 26). It aims to "tackle institutional and managerial dysfunctions" (OECD 2010, 43). Governance *can* promote the making of a knowledge economy (Raza 2010). Many government councils or bodies co-exist to deal with the quality and accountability in HE[16]. Principles found in most governance guidelines comprise ethics, accessibility, transparency, simplicity, selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership[17]. Inclusion of faculty and students in governing bodies of HEIs is essential to warrant good governance in terms of addressing student grievances and countering

ISSN-2278-9758

corruption. The three levels of governance are internal, external and international but each system has its specificity (Zgaga 2006). Van Vught (1995) presents a state control and supervisory model with strict regulation. Regulation should provide an 'enabling' environment and eliminate shop-type establishments. Yet sufficient flexibility to experiment with and incorporate new, dynamic and evolving 'knowledge domains' should be ensured (Goswami 2012, 188-189).

Finance has become the most important binding constraint on HEIs in the period of neo-liberalism. Alternative financial sourceshave to be tapped and competition is to be promoted between regulated autonomous HE institutions (Raza 2010). Quality is the underlying concern of all quality assurance and accreditation bodies with focus on inputs (funds) and outcomes (performance). There is an increasing trend in public funding related to performance[18] and governance and incentives are positively correlated to compliance. The Japanese model of a large share of private sector in HE (more than 75 per cent) operates on the basis of making universities compete for public funds. Regulation should "promote greater competition, choice and standards in the higher education sector with the goal of delivering better outcomes and value for money for students and taxpayers" (DOE 2017, 2).

Regulatory system has to ensure quality is delivered in terms of faculty, curricula, infrastructure and teaching. Transparency is essential in providing information to prospective students regarding placements, funds, scholarships, etc. The reliance on contractual/temporary faculty impacts quality of teaching. In most private universities research opportunities are limited, working conditions are poor and there is little academic freedom. Cross border or distance education is not relevant across space as curricula must suit local contexts and needs. Appropriate regulation and accreditation are essential to assure quality and maintain entrepreneurial spirit (Altbach 2005).

Conclusion

HE is a quasi-public good that calls for government provision and regulation of public and private HEIs. Demand for HE has risen due to the emergence of KBEs, decline in state funding of HE, a rise in demand for HE for social mobility and trade and internationalisation of HE in the post-WTO period. Closer examination shows that the assumptions of a perfectly competitive market are absent in the HE sector because of the restrictions on the mobility on part of the consumers and providers of HE. The asymmetric information and the low incidence of repeat purchases makes it less than a perfectly competitive market. The structure of HE as part of the GATS-WTO policies is designed to favour the developed countries. The privatisation of HE happens at the expense of public education, promotes elitism and militates against the principles of social justice. Tight regulation and governance to assure quality in delivery of HE and accountability on part of HEIs is imperative. All HEIs must be subjected to social accountability. To give people a choice, public universities should be made capable of competing with the private sector. They should not be crowded out in the process of creating a 'capitalist university[19]' in the third world where the majority of people are poor and socially disadvantaged in myriad ways.

Notes and References

ISSN-2278-9758

Notes

[1]Chattopadhyay (2012, 157).

[2]Sarker (2015, 14).

[3]Neo-classical growth models explain growth in terms of physical accumulation of capital but it displays decreasing returns beyond a point. Modern growth theoriesendogenise the role of technological change with increasing returns.

[4] Knowledge has explicit components comprising 'know-what' and 'know-why' and tacit aspects which deal with 'know-how' and 'know-who' (OECD 1996, 12). The explicit nature of knowledge gives it the dimensions of a commodity which can be stored, reproduced and transferred from one place to another via books and the use of ICT. Knowledge and learning are integral to each other in that the former requires the latter for better use of knowledge that has been created and the latter helps dynamise the former by influencing capabilities, competencies and the absorptive capacity. That is, 'codified' knowledge is created by skilled labour and certain kinds of learning, training and tacit capabilities are required to use and further evolve knowledge. This in turn results in innovation. Critical to innovation, both incremental and radical, is the dissemination, diffusion, assimilation and exploitation of knowledge via formal and informal networks in a non-linear and path-dependent manner in a systemic framework. Critical to this is the interaction between and feedback from the various agents in the system. This is further intensified by the emergence of global value chains (GVCs) and organisational structures. In this context state policy is assigned the task of creating KBEs via promotion of technology, HE and business environment to promote competitiveness through academia-industry-government linkages / interface.

[5]Vast literature on the East Asian miracle explains the East Asian growth largely in terms of qualitative investments in human capital than mere investment in physical infrastructure and capital formation.

[6] Tilak (2008) classifies public goods as pure public goods, quasi-public goods, local public goods and international or global public goods. The last concept draws upon the notion of international public goods given by Stiglitz (1999).

[7] Non-excludable means that more than one person can consume a good simultaneously. Non-rival means the good is not subtractive or the quantity available to another person does not reduce if one person is already consuming it.

[8] Only those services can be excluded from the GATS which are not offered on commercial basis, which do not compete with a private counterpart and are exclusively used in the exercise of governmental authority.

[9] Privatisation includes private sector participation and commercialisation of HE.

[10] Here we may differ from the view point of Robertson andKomeljenovic (2016)in that the creation of a market should be understood as creation of an ***imperfectly competitive market*** with private and foreign players participating in the supply of HE. As such a market for HE already existed even in the hey-day of public university system both in response to the demand for HE and with the vision of creating institutions of higher learning which would help achieve the goals of growth, self-reliance and development. In India this space in the post-independence period was filled by public universities and institutions of national importance like the IITs, IIMs and NITs.

[11] This can be due to the expense of obtaining a computer, internet connection and power shortages. Low levels of computer literacy due to poor schooling also affects access to online courses in English language. In 2017, based on the NSSO data for 2014 it was estimated that only 8.8 per cent of rural population versus 30.2 per cent of urban population has computing ability (Bagchi 2017). The BCG (2017) in their report on *Decoding Digital Consumers in India* define computing ability as the ability to use a computing equipment like desktop, laptop, smart phone, etc. this is separate from the digital infrastructure or internet penetration. This ability falls further if exclude smart phones. BCG Report has predicted that by 2020, 50 per cent of internet users will be in rural areas and 40 per cent will be females. In December 2016 internet penetration in urban areas was almost 60 per cent compared to 17 per cent in rural areas.

[12]However, it is interesting to note that although all private universities that have set up campuses in India have a collaboration arrangement with more than one foreign university at a time but these universities are not the top-ranking universities internationally.

[13]OECD(2004), 14.

ISSN-2278-9758

[14] For example, in India these include various coaching centres and tuition classes to help students secure admissions in engineering, law, medicine, management and other professional courses. The tuition centres which provide coaching to students enrolled in their undergraduate degrees charge high fees and at times students who attend these classes do it at the cost of their regular university classes especially if it is a public- funded university which charges nominal fees. Because these coaching centres exist outside purview of the government's regulation there is no control over either the price or the quality of such teaching.

[15] Raza (2010) notes substantive autonomy comprises freedom to set curriculum, hire and fire of faculty and determine size of enrolment. Procedural autonomy includes decisions regarding ownership of buildings and equipment, borrowing of funds, allocation of budgets, fixation of fees and of salaries (11).

[16] In India there are almost 14 autonomous councils created by the UGC to oversee accreditation of higher learning.

[17] Most guidelines treat leadership as a context specific tenet of governance which is also influenced by cultural factors. It should be both collaborative and decisive andan amalgam of leadership of the institution, internal leadership involving the faculty, students and non-teaching staff and external leadership which includes the alumni, business community, donors, parents and the media (OECD 2010).

[18] Measuring performance is a challenge in that requisite manpower and data is required to evaluate performance.

[19]Heller (2016).

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Sikh Ethnic Assertions and its Manifestations during Militancy in Punjab (1978-1993)

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Abstract

Sikh ethnic consciousness and its resultant manifestations have serious repercussions for the issues of unity, security and integrity of the Indian state. The state of Punjab passed through the serious turmoil for more than a decade throughout the 1980s. This situation was the culmination of social, economic and political grievances among the youth of the state. The politics of agitation in Punjab was the result of political developments throughout the country. The first issue was raised by the Akalis for the formation of Punjabi speaking province. This demand was the assertion of distinct identity of the Sikhs. Later on, this demand was converted into the State Autonomy. Under this demand, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution became the political goal of the Akalis. Some Diaspora Sikhs raised the concern regarding the discrimination against the state of Punjab in general and Sikhs in particular. The rising unemployment among the youth of Punjab became the dominant factor for this movement. Khalistan movement proved as a major threat to the unity and integrity of India. The terrorist turmoil was itself the result of the resentment among the some sections of the Sikhs, which by and large motivated and abetted by the external factors. The crux of the Akali demand was to introduce the federal spirit of the Constitution. This paper highlights the issues of Sikh ethnic assertions and its manifestations during the phase of Sikh militant movement in Punjab. An attempt has been made to evaluate the measures, which have been taken by the Indian state for the accommodation of the genuine demands of the Sikhs.

Key Words: Ethnic Assertions, Khalistan, Nation-Building, Religious Revivalism, Sikh Identity.

Historical Background

The issue of Sikh identity arose out of Hindu-Sikh controversy over the religious and social matters, which came into limelight in the last two decades of nineteenth century. The Sanatan Dharmi Hindus claimed that Sikhs were Hindus. As a matter of fact, Bhai Kahn Singh Nabha wrote his *Ham Hindu Nahin* (we are not Hindus), responding to what he perceived as a threat to a tradition that he cherished. The main contribution of Bhai Kahn Singh is the recognition of the Sikh *Panth* (community) as a political community, thereby his writing proved as a declaration of Sikh nationality. In this regard, two evidence can be mentioned, i.e. the *Adi Granth* as the exclusive scripture of the Sikhs, and the Khalsa identity as the preferred Sikh identity (Grewal 2014, 292-293). The Khalsa tradition was introduced by Guru Gobind Singh (the tenth Sikh Guru) on 13 April 1699 during the Baisakhi day in Anandpur Sahib (Macauliffe 2000, 95). In the pre-independence days and particularly in the post-independence phase, Sikh intelligentsia was quite worried about the assimilative power of

ISSN-2278-9758

Hinduism and then erosion of their identity (Nath 2008, 86-87). The Sikh community has cultivated a fear of absorption into Hinduism, which provide the necessary impetus to the Khalistan (the land of pure) movement in Punjab.

Moreover, the Sikh nationalists sought to link their survival as a separate ethnic group to the vesting of political power in the hands of the community at large (Pandey 2005, 112). The veteran scholar, Khushwant Singh opines: 'The only chance of survival of the Sikhs as a separate community is to create a state in which they form a compact group, where the teaching of Gurmukhi and the Sikh religion is compulsory and where there is an atmosphere of respect for the traditions of their Khalsa forefathers' (Oommen 2004, 29-30). After independence, the Akali leaders particularly Master Tara Singh raised the voice for the Sikh community regarding the formation of Punjabi Suba (Vedalankar 1985, 113). Moreover, the local Hindu leaders did not know what promises the Congress leaders had made, there was no formal agreement, the Congress resolution of 1929, and the open promises of 1946 and 1947 were no more than statements of goodwill (Kumar 1997, 395). The growth of agitational politics in Punjab needs to be viewed in the context of political developments throughout India. Simultaneously, the increasing concentration of power at the Centre, especially in the hands of the Prime Minister, led regionalist and other mainstream bodies like the Akalis to see it as a deliberate attempt to threaten their capacity to exercise legitimate autonomy. The local and regional interests demanded greater autonomy in keeping with the federal spirit of the Constitution (Ali 1993, 96).

Articulation of Identity Claims

The emergence of Sikh nationalism in the 1980s, in the form of Khalistan, a Sikh homeland in the Punjab, touches some complex issues of ethnic conflict in the post-colonial nation-building process in South Asia. It raises the issues of identity among the Sikh community, which has moved from group consciousness to political community and staked a claim for statehood (Tatla 1999, 11-12). There were three major events in the post-partition period, when the main newspapers of Punjab particularly, the *Akali Patrika* and the *Ajit* came to the support of the Shiromani Akali Dal and demonstrated their sectarian commitment. First was the struggle for Punjabi speaking province launched by the Akali Dal from 1950 to 1966 and second was the *Khooni saka* (bloodiest episode) on 13th April 1978 at Amritsar. And third was the adoption of Anandpur Sahib Resolution by the Akali Dal in 1978. Not only the *Akali Patrika* and the *Ajit,* but the entire Jalandhar based newspapers exploited linguistic and

ISSN-2278-9758

religious sentiments of the people. The demand for Punjabi speaking province was actually the assertion of distinct identity of the Sikhs (Singh 2006, 11-12). On the contrary, the Punjabi Hindu Press asserted that the Sikhs were at the old game of establishing Khalsa *Raj* (Singh 2014, 354).

Identity Assertions: Psycho-Political Factors

The Akalis' claim that Sikhism was in danger received its greatest boost from the movement for a Punjabi-speaking state. In 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru set up the States Reorganisation Commission in order to consider demands from many parts of India that state boundaries should be redrawn on a linguistic basis. Some linguistic groups received satisfaction, but not the Akalis. The Commission rejected the Sikh claim for a Punjabi-speaking state, on the grounds that Punjabi was not sufficiently distinct from Hindi, and that furthermore the movement lacked 'the general support of the people inhabiting the area' (Tully and Jacob 2010, 39). This rejection was the main factor of resentment among the Akalis against the Centre. After the 1962 split in the Akali Dal and the subsequent defeat of Master Tara Singh Akali Dal in the Gurudwara elections (1965), Tara Singh put forth the demand of the self-determined status for the Sikhs. In December 1966, Master Akali Dal passed a resolution in favour of a Sikh Homeland within the Indian Union, because the Akali's were not satisfied with the reorganisation of Punjab, 1966 (Dhami 1977, 154). It was well known that the Akali Dal was committed to the federal structure of the country with more powers to the states (Khan 2006, 80).

Identity Assertions: Economic Factors

The communal divide between the Sikhs and the Hindus is dominantly based on the language controversy, though the economic division between the Sikh cultivators and the Hindu traders has been added to this divide as another factor (Judge 2005, 51). The absence of industries in Punjab resulted in a rapid and alarming increase in the number of educated unemployed (Singh 2011, 10). The modernisation of farm machinery was another factor of unemployment among the youth of Punjab. As a result, majority of them migrated into abroad in search of livelihood. This was the time, when Punjab witnessed a series of agitations and counter-agitations, fasts and counter-fasts by the Hindus and the Sikhs, the protagonists of Punjabi Suba striving for a Sikh majority (Dhillon 1974, 370).

ISSN-2278-9758

Political Scenario of Punjab in the decade of 1970s

In 1967, Sant Akali Dal (a more powerful political force among the Akalis) simply demanded more powers for the states. After the 1967 elections, Akali Dal became the major partner of the ruling coalition of the Akali led government composed of the Jan Sangh, Communist Party of India (CPI) and independents. Because of the Akali's experience of governance in the state, the Akali Dal passed a resolution on state autonomy known as 'Batala resolution' in 1968 (Dhami 1977, 155), which declared that the Constitution be amended suitably on a "correct federal basis" and that the states should be given more autonomy (Pal 1993, 145). But, after the declaration of national emergency by the Indira Gandhi led Congress government on 25 June 1975, there has naturally been a setback to the Akali's state autonomy demand (Dhami 1977, 156). Most of the Akali leaders courted arrest against the national emergency. As a result, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA) was extended to all top Akali leaders while still in goal for defying the ban orders (Singh 2014, 342). The movement continued right to the day, when Parliamentary elections were announced and the emergency provisions relaxed (Sethi 2009, 14). Under the direction of Sant Harchand Singh Longowal (the President of Akali Dal), over 40,000 Akali workers were jailed for their 'Save Democracy' movement against this lawless act of the Congress-led Union government (Singh 2010, 230). After the Assembly Elections of June 1977, the coalition government led by Parkash Singh Badal came into power in Punjab. During this time, the Akali Dal was also the alliance partner of Janata government (the first non-Congress government) at the Centre. The Badal government came in conflict with the organisational wing of the party headed by Jagdev Singh Talwandi (Sharma 1992, 96). The Akalis were in a dilemma so long they were in power, and failed to adequately deal with the emergent situation in Punjab (Singh 2014, 345). After 1980, following the loss of power, the Akali Dal leadership manipulate the instruments of religion and identity. In addition, the Congress party supported Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale and the extremist movement that he led in Punjab, leading to the erosion of Akali authority among the Sikhs. But Bhindranwale turned hostile against the Congress, and began to cultivate his own followers by appealing to religious revivalism and the need for greater political control over Sikh destiny (Kinnvall 2006, 92). This was the time, when Punjab passed through the Sikh militant movement. The Akali leadership led by different factions adopted the Amritsar Declaration in 1994, which called for the formation of 'an independent Sikh homeland wherein the community would be free to profess and propagate Sikhism without interference from any quarter' (Singh 2000, 185). Thereafter, the Akali Dal

ISSN-2278-9758

(Badal) adopted Moga Declaration on the seventy-fifth anniversary of the party in 1996, asserting its faith in moderate politics and distancing itself from identity oriented radical politics (Kumar and Kumar 2002, 19). In 1997, the Akali-BJP coalition ministry under Parkash Singh Badal came to power in Punjab. Their major commitment was to bring communal harmony in the state and it started with the loudly trumpeted declaration of bringing honesty in the administration (Khan 2006, 83). This government also celebrated the Tercentenary of the founding of Khalsa at Anandpur Sahib (Punjab) on April 14, 1999 (Singh 2003, 239). Thereafter, the Akali-BJP alliance governments came into power in Punjab in the year 2007 and 2012 respectively on the basis of developmental agenda.

Mechanisms of the State for the Accommodation of Sikh Demands

In 1970, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi announced an award proposing to transfer Chandigarh to Punjab provided Fazilka and Abohar, which are Punjabi speaking areas but Hindu majority areas are given to Haryana in lieu of Chandigarh (Darshi 1999, 22). In March 1976, the Central Government issued another award about the distribution of surplus Ravi-Beas waters in accordance with the provisions of Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 (Sethi 2009, 70). Under this section, the government had retained arbitrary powers to allocate waters of the Beas project (Singh 2014, 342). The award arbitrarily distributed the water between Punjab and Haryana on equal basis. It was a clear cut violation of the Punjab State Reorganisation Act 1966. The Act had stated clearly that moveable and immoveable property between Punjab and Haryana would be shared on 60:40 ratio respectively (Dhillon 1992, 50). Further misusing the centralised provisions of the Constitution, the defense ministry issued a notification (Singh 1982, 43), which lay down that henceforth recruitment in the army would be made from the different states of the country in proportion to their population (Grewal 1996, 152).

Manipulative Strategies of the State

Throughout this period, the Chief Minister of Punjab Giani Zail Singh began pushing the Akali leaders, even otherwise busy fighting their own battles, into a corner by attempting to appropriate the agenda of Sikh identity politics (Ananth 2010, 272). In this sense, the ruling elite tried to embarrass the Akalis by financing and propping up the extremists, who had their own grievances against the Akalis (Akbar 1985, 189). These political manipulations further led to the re-assertion of the Sikh identity, which took many forms, including a revival of

ISSN-2278-9758

separatist agitation and a re-statement of the case for greater autonomy for a Sikh-dominated Punjab (Panda 1993, 86).

Violence as a Political Mechanism

During the Baisakhi Day (13 April 1978), tension between Sikhs and Nirankaris exploded in a violent way. On this day, a procession of Sikhs clashed with the Nirankaris during the latter's convention in the city of Amritsar. As a consequence, 13 Sikhs were killed by the Nirankari *guru's* armed bodyguards (Chima 2010, 42-43). This incident was the beginning of terror and violence in Punjab (Government of India 1984, 23). In June 1978, a *hukmnama* (A religious dictate) was issued from Akal Takht to all the Sikhs that they should not have any connection with the Sant Nirankaris (Singh 2002, 53). As a consequence, a five-member Council was formed in Chandigarh (August 1978), known as Dal Khalsa with a sole purpose to fight the 'Nirankari onslaught on the Sikhs'. Another religious organisation, the Akhand Kirtani Jatha also decided to take revenge upon Nirankaris and other officials, connected with the incident of the Baisakhi day of 1978 at Amritsar (Sidhu et al. 2009, 323). Moreover, the Dal Khalsa was committed to the achievement of an "Independent Sovereign Sikh Nation" (Chopra 1984, 69). Later on, Baba Gurbachan Singh (the spiritual head of Nirankaris) was assassinated by Ranjit Singh on 24 April 1980 (Singh 2010, 61). The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) lodged the first information report, named twenty persons, many of them followers of Bhindranwale, and accused him of 'hatching the conspiracy for murder' (Singh 2014, 329).

Instrumentalist Framework by Political Elite

After raising the demand for state autonomy, the Akali Dal passed the Anandpur Sahib Resolution (17 October 1973), thereby demanded a true federal Constitution, which envisages the retention of only four subjects with the Centre i.e. Defense, Foreign Affairs, Currency and Communication. All other subjects would be under the jurisdiction of Punjab (and other states) (Barooah 1985, 23). The Resolution states that:

> "the Sikhs of India are a historically recognised political nation ever since the inauguration of the order of the Khalsa in the concluding years of the 17th century" (Chattopadhyay and Sarkar 2011, 97).

ISSN-2278-9758

It went on to claim juridical status by asserting that the Sikh nation had already been internationally recognised and that the only thing standing between the Sikhs and full nationhood was the 'brute majority of India', which 'denuded the Sikhs of their political identity and cultural particularity' (Kinnvall 2006, 99-100), "shackled and enslaved" by Hindus who reneged on solemn promises made at the time of independence (Chadda 1997, 127). The 'political goal of the *Panth* was defined as 'the pre-eminence of the Khalsa (or Sikh brotherhood)', with the 'fundamental policy' of the Akali Dal being the 'realisation of this birth-right of the Khalsa through creation of congenial environment and a political set-up' (Guha 2008, 558). In real sense, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution clarified that "an autonomous region in the north of India should be set up forthwith wherein the Sikhs' interests are constitutionally recognised as of primary and special importance" (Advani 1986, 5). In September 1981, a set of forty-five demands was submitted to the central government, which later on, reduced to fifteen. The core of these demands concerned the socio-economic grievances over the centralisation policies of the Indian government, which were adversely affecting the rural sector of the society (Deol 2000, 102-103). Through their efforts of mobilisation, the Akalis combined economic demands, such as that for more irrigation water, with religious and political issues of greater autonomy for the Sikhs within India. That enabled them to strengthen their hold on the party's core supporters, the Jat farmers, as well as broaden their base among other Sikhs (Kohli 1991, 361). The repeated failures in the negotiations with the Union government that began in October 1981, led to the intensification of the second phase of the Akali agitation for the right to self-determination/autonomy (Kumar 2009, 175). The second round of talks between the Akalis and Union government began on 26 November 1981. At the same time, Akalis wanted to reopen the 1955 agreement and stated their objections to Indira's 1976 Award.

Moreover, the Akalis pleaded to include Jumna waters, which earlier undivided Punjab utilised and were now available to Haryana to form part of the common pool, but drew a blank (Singh 2014, 361). From 4 August 1982, the Akali Dal launched *Dharam Yudh Morcha* (righteous struggle) for the acceptance of their long standing demands including the implementation of Anandpur Sahib Resolution, combining economic, religious and political issues of the Sikhs (Kinnvall 2006, 92), thereby created a serious situation in Punjab (Singh 2010, 48). Basically, the farmers began an agitation (morcha) against the digging of the Sutlej Yamuna Link (SYL) canal in Kapoori village (district Patiala of Punjab) on 4 April 1982. The *morcha* was followed by a protest in early 1983 against the alignment of the SYL canal

ISSN-2278-9758

that would reduce the amount of water available to Punjab for irrigation, and divert it to the neighbouring states of Haryana and Rajasthan. These were the momentous events in the years just prior to 1984, and the fusion of agrarian agitations with the religious-political protests created an emotional landscape of uncertainty (Chopra 2011, 50). Each *jatha* (group of volunteers) would proceed daily to the site of construction and be subsequently arrested, by September some 200,000 agitators had been arrested (Deol 2000, 103), much beyond the capacity of all jails in the state (Singh 2002, 56). The Akali agitation passed through different phases such as *Rasta Roko* (stop transport), *Rail Roko* (stop train) and the *Kam Roko* (stop work) in 1983. Throughout these 'morchas', the Akali 'Jathas' were daily courting arrest, while negotiations with the government continued periodically (Chauhan 1995, 165). To accelerate the pace of warfare, Sant Longowal gave calls for 'Direct Action' and, for effect, called for an Army of one lakh volunteers called *Marjeevras* (Do or Die Squads) (Danewalia 2001, 475). Within a span of two months, nearly 30,000 Sikhs were arrested by the government. The jails could not accommodate all; some were detained in camps, or even in homes. Meanwhile, thirty-four people died, when a bus carrying them ram into a train. On 15 October 1983, on the eve of Diwali, Indira Gandhi released all Akali prisoners (Nayar 2013, 284). Along with this, Indira Gandhi announced that the government had decided to accept the religious demands of the Sikhs such as the Jalandhar Radio Station will broadcast the Gurbani programme relayed from the Golden Temple Amritsar, the Sikhs will be permitted to wear a nine-inch long sword during Air flights and the concerned state governments would enact the Gurudwara Act (Sidhu et al. 2009, 331).

Radical Manifestation of Sikh Assertions

Coming to the radical stance of Punjab politics, the demand for Khalistan was hoisted by Jagjit Singh Chauhan at a press interview in London, 1971. At that time, he got published a half page advertisement in the *New York Times* on 12 October 1971 (Judge 2004, 5). In 1977, he formed the Dal Khalsa, whose objective was to set up a separate state for the Sikhs, independent from India, having a separate Flag and a separate international status, including the membership of the United Nations (Basu 1985, 1). The Dal Khalsa announced a two-point programme i.e. to create Khalistan and to make the Sikhs more conscious of their faith (the same old fear) (Akbar 1985, 189). At the 54th Sikh Educational Conference, organised by the Chief Khalsa Diwan at Chandigarh on 13 March 1981, a formal resolution was proposed and passed, under the Chairmanship of another Sikh U.S. national, Ganga Singh Dhillon, demanding United Nations membership for 'Khalistan' (Akbar 1985, 190-191). He

ISSN-2278-9758

put forth the view that the Sikhs formed a 'nation' (Grewal 1998, 71). In May 1981, activists of the All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF), the Dal Khalsa and the National Council of Khalistan resurrected the demand that the sale of tobacco be banned in Amritsar, because the use of tobacco is considered taboo for Sikhs. Thereafter, the AISSF began forcibly preventing merchants in Amritsar from selling cigarettes, thus causing communal tension in the city.

As a result, more than 20,000 Sikhs, led by Bhindranwale, the AISSF, Dal Khalsa and National Council of Khalistan, participated in the protest march in Amritsar, supporting the AISSF demand. After this procession, Hindu-Sikh clashes erupted in the city, forcing the government to institute special laws with the purpose to ban non-religious processions in Punjab (Chima 2010, 60-61). On the same pattern, the Arya Samaj and some Hindu organisations took out a massive procession demanding that there should be a ban on the sale and use of liquor and meat (Nayar and Singh 1984, 39).

Retaliative Measures and Scale of Violence

In September 1981, Lala Jagat Narain, editor of the *Hind Samachar* and *Punjab Kesari* group of newspapers and critic of Bhindranwale, was killed (Chandra et al. 2008, 431). Bhindranwale was suspected about the murder. After this, Bhindranwale came to know of the warrants of his arrest through the news bulletin of All India Radio, when he was at village Chandokalan, in Haryana. Subsequently, the Punjab police party reached Chandokalan on 14 September 1981, and not finding Bhindranwale there wantonly thrashed some of his followers (Singh 2014, 358-359). Later on, Bhindranwale voluntarily offered his arrest at his headquarters at Mehta Chowk, near Amritsar on 20 September 1981 (Deol 2000, 105). His arrest sparked off large scale violence, where the police were attacked with deadly weapons (Government of India 1984, 25). The agitated Sikhs clashed with the police and paramilitary forces, resulting in the death of 18 protestors. In response, the Sikh extremists responded in a quick and forceful manner. During that period, a goods train was derailed by an act of sabotage in Punjab. Moreover, there were a series of bomb blasts and shoot-outs throughout the state. On 29 September 1981, an Indian Airlines plane, bound for Srinagar, was hijacked to Lahore by Dal Khalsa activists (Chima 2010, 64). The hijackers demand was that Bhindranwale be released (Ananth 2010, 273). He was detained for 25 days in police custody and after intensive interrogation and at the behest of senior Congress leaders; he was released because of lack of evidence (Deol 2000, 105). In April 1983, Avtar Singh Atwal (a Sikh Deputy Inspector General of Police), was killed just as he was coming out of the Golden

ISSN-2278-9758

Temple after offering his prayers (Chandra et al. 2000, 330). The son of Jagat Narain, Ramesh Chander picked up the cudgels against Bhindranwale, through his papers and ultimately he also gunned down by the terrorists in May 1984. During this phase of venomous propaganda, the life of Hindus was not safe on the roads. In some of the incidents, the Hindu passengers were segregated and shot down in cold blood. One such incident took place on 5 October 1983, when a private bus going from Amritsar to Delhi, was hijacked around 10 P.M. at Dhilwan and six of its Hindu passengers were shot dead and another was seriously injured. As a consequence, Darbara Singh resigned from the office (Madhok 1985, 119). Then, Punjab was brought under President's rule and declared a disturbed area (Goraya 2013, 6). The police and paramilitary forces were given unprecedented powers to bring the situation under control (Panda 1993, 92). To protect themselves, Bhindranwale and his associates were shifted in the Golden Temple and other Sikh religious shrines in Amritsar. In order to flush out the militants, the Indian army attacked on the Golden Temple under the code name 'Operation Blue Star' in June 1984. Consequently, the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards on October 31, 1984, which led to the anti-Sikh riots in Delhi and other surrounding places. In these riots, approximately 2,733 people (official data) were killed in Delhi alone, belonging to the Sikh community (Judge 2004, 11).

Destabilising Factors and External Support

Due to antagonistic relations between India and Pakistan, the latter readily provided armed support to the Sikh militants for destabilising India. The leader of the National Council of Khalistan, Dr. Jagjit Singh Chauhan (a Sikh resident in the United Kingdom and former minister of Punjab) had claimed that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whom he met in 1972 (before the signing of the Simla Accord) in New York had offered to help to start a movement for Khalistan from Pakistan's territory (Shukla 2005, 112). Besides, Chauhan complained of atrocities on Sikhs and their exploitation by Hindus and the Government of India. After visiting the United States in October 1971, he visited Pakistan to attend the birthday celebrations of Guru Nanak and made anti-Indian statements for which Pakistan readily provided good publicity (Adiraju 1991, 169-170). In 1978-79, he played the assigned role in the SGPC elections, and also in propping up Dal Khalsa Naxalites (Singh 2014, 354). On 12 April 1980, Chauhan announced the formation of 'National Council of Khalistan' with himself as the president and Balbir Singh Sandhu as its secretary general. Three months later, he proclaimed from London, the formation of the state of 'Khalistan', a similar

ISSN-2278-9758

announcement having been made in India by Balbir Singh Sandhu (Chopra 1984, 113). Simultaneously, various hidden facts came into limelight regarding the Punjab politics.

After assuming office, Rajiv Gandhi seemed ready to reopen negotiations and begin a new era in relations between Sikhs and the Central government (Chatterjee 2012, 297). On 22 July 1985, Rajiv-Longowal Accord was signed in New Delhi to hammer out a settlement to the "Punjab problem" (Chima 2010, 115). As per the provisions of Accord, Chandigarh was to be transferred to Punjab by January 26, 1986. In turn, Punjab was to compensate Haryana with equivalent territory for a new capital and other territorial disputes were to be settled by the appointment of a separate commission (Sethi 2009, 81). The accord has 11 clauses of which the first promised compensation for innocent persons killed in above events and another clause conceded the Akali demand for an inquiry into the November 1984 riots after the assassination of Indira Gandhi, which had left the killing of thousands of Sikhs in Delhi and other parts of India (Panda 1993, 94).

Besides, Rajiv Gandhi promised that the claims of Punjab and Haryana regarding the shares of the water would be referred for adjudication to a judicial tribunal. The Centre decided to appoint the Eradi Tribunal to deal with the water dispute, but because of the protest from Haryana and Rajasthan, it did not include riparian principles in its terms of reference (Swain 2010, 31-32). Despite these obstacles, the signing of Punjab accord was the serious effort of conflict resolution through negotiations (Singh 2011, 4). But, the Accord has not secured from the Akalis any commitment on the implications of these objectives, nor on how far and by what means the Akali Dal will pursue them (Shourie 1987, 156). Within a month of signing the Punjab Accord, Longowal was assassinated by Sikh extremists. Afterwards, the age of the Morcha politics was over, the revolutionary street-actions, and confrontations with authorities ushered in the era of gun and violence in pursuit of political goals (Danewalia 2001, 480).

State's Version about the Sikh Assertions

The religious, political and economic policies outlined in the Anandpur Sahib Resolution were designed to appeal to Sikh nationalists (Mitra 2006, 94). On many occasions, the government was to refuse to negotiate on the Anandpur Sahib Resolution, claiming that it was 'a secessionist' document (Tully and Jacob 2010, 50). The Prime Minister could not accept the Akalis' demand for a separate territorial entity for the Sikhs (Nayar 2013, 283).

ISSN-2278-9758

An Assessment of Political Developments Since 1966

The Akali Dal has raised the demand for greater autonomy obviously with a view to ending the discriminatory attitude of the Union government. Since the reorganisation, Punjab has not been given sufficient financial grants and the state has not been allocated much heavy industry. Therefore, the attitude of the Union government towards Punjab is partly responsible for creating a feeling of discrimination among the people of Punjab (Singh 1981, 86-87). The Akalis were forced to resort once again to the religious idiom by giving the slogan of '*panth* in danger' (Kumar 2009, 173).

A Critical Explanation of the Sikh Assertions

Basically, the Anandpur Sahib Resolution demanded a genuine federal structure of Indian government and administration, wherein the states could enjoy greater autonomy in their socio-cultural and economic development (Singh 2010, 246). As pointed out by Harish Puri, the 1978 resolution called for giving the Indian Constitution a 'real federal shape by redefining the Central and state relations and rights'. It did not even mention the words 'Sikhs' or 'Panth', but talked in more general terms about the fundamental rights of religious and linguistic minorities (Kinnvall 2006, 100). On 3 September 2013, the Akali Dal passed the unanimous resolution at Teja Singh Samundari Hall (Amritsar) and reiterated, "the Centre has usurped and concentrated all powers in its hands, reducing states to beggars and this has led to a serious imbalances in growth and economy. The state governments are in the best position to understand and address the problems of the people. Therefore, the polity of the country must be decentralised and federalised" (Tribune 2013, 5). In January 2014, the Akali-BJP government submitted a memorandum to Punjab Governor, which indicates that the United Progressive Alliance government's decision to extend tax concession only to Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand was discriminatory, illegal and unconstitutional (Hindu 2014, 3). The Akali stalwart Parkash Singh Badal argued, the 1984 riots were the fourth *Ghallu Ghara* (genocide) committed against the Sikhs in which thousands of people were killed in Delhi and other cities soon after the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The first two were committed at the behest of Mughal's at Sangrur and Gurdaspur in which 35,000 and 15,000 Sikhs were killed, respectively. Later on, the Operation Bluestar (June 1984), committed at Golden Temple, Amritsar was the third genocide. He further reiterated, "The massacre was orchestrated by political leaders. Those involved in the conspiracy and killings, were given security by the then government. It further rubbed salt

ISSN-2278-9758

into the wounds of the Sikh community by giving ministries to the politicians and promoting police officers" (Tribune 2014, 1).

Concluding Observations

Since the reorganisation of Punjab, the Akali leadership blame that the policy makers of the Centre provide step motherly treatment while distributing the grants and other financial benefits to the states like Punjab. Actually, they were against the over-centralisation of powers. In real sense, it was the issue of threat to the Sikh identity. In their politics of agitation, the primary focus of the Akali Dal was the state autonomy, which itself was the reaction against the concentration of powers into the hands of Centre government. As per the present requirements, the Centre government should evaluate the basic ideals of Constitution like egalitarianism, secularism and socialism. With the passage of time, agriculture, health and education rights of the states have been taken by the Centre, which were given to the states by the Indian Constitution (Punjabi Tribune 2014, 2). The diverse religious, ethnic, cultural and linguistic components must be permitted to flourish unhindered while working for a common goal and strengthening the bonds of internal cohesiveness (Tiwana 2002, 257). The separate Sikh religious identity is a reality and it is the duty of all Indians to ensure Sikh religion its full and proper rights. All Sikhs in whatever nook or corner of the country must feel secure and also free to believe in and practice their religion. But, the notion of an independent and separate political identity of Sikhs is not only wrong, but dangerous (Dang 2004, 140). The Sikhs are the integral component of the India and contributing towards the development process of the country. In real terms, the phase of terrorist violence was the serious challenge to the sovereignty and integrity of India. The point noted here is that the people of Punjab never supported the unlawful activities of the hardliners. The genuine grievances of the minority communities should be considered by the government on priority basis. The minority rights must be protected by the states. These issues ultimately created an emotional landscape of uncertainty in the country.

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Research Paper

A Brief History of Adivasi Mahasabha: Formation, Political Activities and Agendain Chhotanagpur, 1930s-40s

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Abstract

This research paper is an attempt to retrace the historical background of Jharkhand Movement in Chhotanagpur during first half of twentieth century. This paper presents a brief history of Adivasi Mahasabha and highlights its political activities and agendas by noting the views of its founding members and tribal leaders. This is a case study about political growth of Adivasi Mahasabha in Chhotanagpur during 1930s-40s which is important to understand political history of this region during late half of twentieth century. This paper tries to trace out the statements and speeches of tribal leaders who played a crucial role in recognising ethnic question in the mainstream political discourse.

Keywords: ***Adivasi, Adivasi Mahasabha, Jaipal Singh, Chhotanagpur***

Introduction

It is noteworthy that a series of tribal revolts and uprisings occurred in tribal dominated regions of India likeChhotanagpur, SanthalParganaand its adjoining areas during whole ninetieth century. For instance, there occurred some important historical incidents such as *Kol uprising of 1831-32*, *Santhal revolt of 1855-56*, *SardarLadai of 1888* and Birsa Munda led movement, known as *Ulgulanof 1895-1990.*It is noteworthy that most tribal revolts,duringlate half of ninetieth century, emerged as an anti-colonial struggle, thus, emergingnation-wideprotests against British rule appropriated all such ethic, regional and identity based uprisingsas integral parts of India's independence movement. However, most historical writings consider *Sepoy revolt of 1857* as India's first freedom struggle,though few research works highlight about the significance of *SanthalHul of 1856* in political growth of anti-colonial struggle against British rule in India.It is noticeable that politics of this tribal dominated region began to changeafteremergence of Birsa Munda led *Ulgulan* during last decade of ninetieth century. Since this struggle was, by and large,socio-religious centric and traditional in character, it could not become a modern based political movement. But soon, during early decades of twentieth century, constitutional arrangements of 1909, 1919 and 1935 Act along with enactment of Chhotanagpur Tenancy Act 1903 provided such political background in which several tribal outfits began to appear in the politics of Chhotanagpur region andconsequently, in 1938, Adivasi

ISSN-2278-9758

Mahasabhawas formed by the leaders of different tribal communities. It was, in real sense, the launching pad of a statehood movement that popularised as Jharkhand Movement after formation of Jharkhand Party in 1950.

Socio-economic Conditions in Chhotanagpur and Nationalist Overtures

It is important to point out here that several scholars have been working on socio-economic aspects of tribal revolts in Chhotanagpur region but very few emphasized on social identity and marginalization of tribal economy.Before going detail in political history of this region, it is important to brief the role of socio-economic factors in emergence of political movements in tribal dominant region of Chhotanagpur. For instance, the effect of industrialisation had been to give it a new identity with its own character. The result of entering into a capitalist system of production has been to break down the homogenous nature of tribal society. (Beteille 1977, 14) It is noteworthy that it was the beginning of twentieth century when urbanization and industrialization had made a rapid advance in Chhotanagpur region as we knows that this region is reach in mineral resources. As a consequence, the bond of kinship and ethnicity, the primitive identities those were in the process of dissolution became stronger in that region because of the appreciation of the political advantages of the continuation of tribes as an entity. (Singh 1978, 1227) We can say that most tribal movement deeply rooted in the economic distress created by colonial rule and was a struggle of agricultural working class against the capitalist exploitations.

It is noteworthy that emergence of political mobilization among tribal communities was a reflection of regional economic disparity and social injustice. Backwardness to a given region is identical to colonial status and it is function of dominance within a larger political system. (Rekhi 1988, 225) It is well said that nationalism is mysterious and mystifying ideology which constructs the entity of nation by playing down the aspect of class and laying stress on certain homogenous features of a particular community or people. (Simeon 1982, 226) It is true in some extent that tribal movements are categorized by contrast and so the growth of industrialization in Chhotanagpurhad dissociated the links of tribes with their traditional mode of survival. Few Marxist writings highlight that mainstream national movement was an integral part of class struggle and in order to end the exploitation, Adivasis would have to unite within the proletariat class. Apart from this, Rekhi argues about political involvement of Adivasi Mahasabha in national freedom movement and highlights about its regional politics against mainstream political discourse. It is important to highlight here that the nature of tribal movement during first half of twentieth century which was persisting ceaselessly for a long time an identity of oppressed had emerged. It is a juxtaposed identity with respect to the concept of diku. Adivasi movement of twentieth century was neither a regional movement nor simply an ethnic one. (Sengupta 1982, 137)

ISSN-2278-9758

For instance, Adivasi Mahsabha supported the British War efforts and helped in recruiting Adivasis into combatant forces and so Congressmen and other political opponents of Mahasabha allegedJaipal Singh, then president of the Mahasabha as anti-national and separatist leader. In counter, Jaipal Singh cleared his political stand, in his words that 'I was, of course, dubbed as a traitor to the struggle for national freedom. It did not worry me at all. I found the Congress financiers, like, Birlas and Tatas, taking full advantage of war contracts.'(Katyayan 2004, 104) However, Jaipal Singh soon clarified his political stand in his reply to Rajendra Prasad and urged that 'I have felt that nothing should be done to weaken the nationalist forces of India and I am most concerned that Adivasi movement should be within the major national struggle for an all-India freedom.'(Choudhary 1984, 4) Thus, we can say that marginalization of Adivasis and economic disparity of Chhotanagpur region became a crucial factor in unifying different tribal identities into one political fold. The idea of separate statehood was concretised with the region's cultural uniqueness and so common political desire of different tribal communities began to endorse regionalism with its own ethnic character.

Emergence of Tribal Outfits and Formation of Adivasi Mahasabha, 1930s

On the one side, mainstream freedom movement against colonial rule had become popular and mobilized the whole masses of Indian sub-continent. And on the other side, ethnic nationalism were flourishing and taking shape across India. According to colonial time and progress of the Adivasi societies in Indian sub-continent the Adivasi struggle had to change its method and mode to suit with the changing time. The first Adivasi organization in this direction was the formation of ChhotanagpurUnnatiSamaj (CUS) in 1915. ChhotanagpurUnnatiSamaj was a much organized body than Tana Bhagat Movement which preceded it and had wider scope and area with a constitution, defining aims and objectives. The main objective, as written down in the rules and by laws, was socio-economic and cultural aspects, although political ambitions were also not excluded. For instance, when Simon Commission visited India in 1928, ChhotanagpurUnnatiSamaj submitted a memorandum and asked the demand of separate administrative unit for Chhotanagpur and SanthalPargana region. CUS got supports from every section of tribal communities irrespective of clan and creed. However, every section of the Adivasi societies was not satisfied with it. It had full support from German Evangelical Lutheran Mission; the SarnaAdivasis were in good numbers but Catholic section of Adivasis strictly boycotted it. Of course, Some Catholic were enrolling themselves as a member or occupying executive post in the organization, were ostracized. The main reason behind this attitude of Roman Catholic Mission seems to be due to the pre-dominance of G.E.L Mission followers. In the beginning, CUS flourished and functioned well and achieved some creditable responses in unifying the Adivasis of this tribal dominated region of Chhotanagpur. It did some concrete work in social and economic fields by establishing stores for grains, few hostels and schools for Adivasi students.

ISSN-2278-9758

Ignace Beck, a prominent Adivasi leader states that 'However, with the progress of time, the first fervour cooled down and energy flagged. But the worst feature was that leaders began openly to indulge in party politics and undesirable groups' wrangles.' (Beck 2002, 9) Therefore, the very outcome of such activities in the organization was that many of intelligent and able Adivasis excluded themselves from taking active part in the affairs of the organization while few others were expelled from the organization. Thus, while it continues to exist, it very soon become inactive and was almost a defunct society. On one side, those who were discontented and expelled later got together and formed the Kisan Sabha. The aims and objectives were not very different from ChhotanagpurUnnatiSamaj but it was clear that it was formed to breakdown ChhotanagpurUnnatiSamaj. On the other side, Roman Catholic Adivasis were prohibited to join CUS but they could not be kept in mere political vacuum whenever the whole Adivasis were imagining about the very idea of ethnic nationalism. The core element of any Adivasi revolts in Chhotanagpur region was *AbuaDisumAbua Raj*; it means our country, our rule. However, despite of prohibition from Catholic organization there were some Catholic members who secretly enrolled themselves in CUS and some even occupied the executive posts. In this situation, Roman Catholic authorities felt it imperative to form an association for Catholics. The outcome was the formation of Chhotanagpur Catholic Sabha in 1932-33. The aims and objectives of this association were purely religious and non-political. But as it represented several sections of Adivasi communities on several occasions, this association also indulged on some political issues with British rule. For instance, Chhotanagpur Catholic Sabha gave its opinions and advised to colonial administration when the 'Excluded and Partially Excluded areas' were formed in Chhotanagpur region. Membership of the Catholic Sabha was confined to only Catholics. Similarly, the Munda Sabha was mainly confined to Mundas and its activities were basically on Khuntkatti and Bhuinhari Land rights. The Munda Sabha was led by J.C. Heyward. The Munda Sabha also played vital role in politics of the time.

Above mentioned tribalorganisations were trying to mobilize the Adivasi masses and created the tribal political discourses. Astribal politics had become the core concern in Chhotanagpur region,tribal leaders began to embracesuch parliamentarian approaches through participating in electoral politics. The Governance of India Act, 1935 was practiced for the first time in 1937 when the electoral system was introduced on the extended modern franchise. Provision of this Act was that there were six Adivasi reserved seats for Bihar Legislative Assembly. All these reserved seats were won by Indian National Congress. However, some of the Adivasi leaders contested the unreserved seats as independent and won the election. For instance, BonifasLakra and Ignace Beck from Ranchi contested as a nominee of Catholic Sabha but in the overall picture, Congress in Bihar province as well as all over India swept the polls. Hence, according to provisions of 1935 Act of India, Congress was asked to form the council of ministers to run the administration. Ignace Beck expressed in his writings that

ISSN-2278-9758

'after a good deal of hesitation and indecision the Congress decided in favour of accepting office. They said that we accept office not to run the government but to wreck from within!'(Beck 2002, 9)

In February 1938, Municipal election was held and in this situation Ignace Beck and some tribal leaders convened an informal meeting of maintribal leaders of Chhotanagpur region irrespective of the party affiliations to Catholic Sabha, Ranchi to discuss the municipal election matters. To convene this meeting, all tribal organizations and some independent Adivasi leaders had been approached individually in the town. It was the first time in the history of colonial Chhotanagpur when President of Kishan Sabha, ThebleOraon and President of ChhotanagpurUnnatiSamaj, Bandi Ram Oraon, both who always counteracted and opposed each other were ready to sit and discuss on matters regarding the Municipal Board Election. In this meeting, proposal to contest the forthcoming Municipal election was unanimously accepted. Actually, it became easy to convince the tribal leaders regarding the urgency of unity within tribal communities of this region in this election because in previous elections of Provincial Legislative Assembly of 1937 all the candidates of the tribal organizations had suffered a crushing defeat due to lack of unity.

Subsequently, several other meetings were held to chalk out plan for election campaign and generally all the tribal leaders from various tribal outfits took keen interest in the election campaign programmes. The United Front eventually selected five tribal candidates for the election. Whole election campaign was so well conducted and due to these efforts all seats were not only won but they secured highest number of votes. This election was a great experiment for the tribal leaders who, for the first time came together under one united front against the 'others'. One important observation was that volunteers of United Front played decisive role in polling booth management and went around the *mohallas* to see that not a single voter remained behind and were even prepared to perform the household duties to relieve the tribal women for casting their votes. The people of Chhotanagpurregion had experienced the new electoral franchise and so they established their own political discourse in parallel to mainstream politics. This was the new beginning of regional identity based movement that enters into the new political system which had been successfully implemented in Indian sub-continent.

Another factor which brought new consciousness among tribal communities at this time was the beginning of Second World War and the rise of anti-colonial movements across India. For instance, independence movement under Indian National Congress was on the height of its ambition. At the same time, several self-determination movements and ethnic nationalism were strongly emerging in different parts of India and thus, identity-politics became decisive into mainstream political system. In Chhotanagpur, some Christian Missionaries along withtribal leaders and political activists felt and so involved in the process of establishing Adivasi identity in Chhotanagpur region as well as other tribal dominated regions of India. Ignace Beck, then president of Catholic Sabha mentioned in his writings

ISSN-2278-9758

that 'I put my ultimate plan of country-wide Adivasi unity before the leaders in a blunt question form – Is our unity thus far or further? The unanimous and enthusiastic answer was that the unity move must continue.'(Beck 2002, 9) It was demand of the time and will of tribal people that transformed their oldest mode of struggle and embraced all the sections and groups of tribal communities into one political fold. There were all majortribaloutfitsof Chhotanagpur region who agreed to come under one roof. Politically, unification of tribal organisationsgave the legitimacytoethnic centric discourse in this region that gradually provided the political base to new emerging statehood movement. In this regard, a representative gathering of all tribal leaders met in the month of May 1938 at Adivasi Bhawan, Ranchi and discussed the aims and objectives of the new Sabha. It is interesting to note that in this gathering all tribal leaders and their outfits discussed and had good deal of wrangle over the name of the new organisation. Ultimately, they unanimously accepted the name 'Adivasi Sabha'.

In this gathering temporarily an Executive Core Committee was formed and a 'Munda Raja' Theodore Surin was nominated as President and Paul Dayal, an Advocate, became General Secretary of newly formed Adivasi Sabha. Few days later, Roman Catholic authorities and delegates called second session of Chhotanagpur Catholic Sabha in Gumla and gave their unanimous support in favour of political unity of the Catholics with all other tribal communities of this region. The Sabha was immediately set in motion and people of Chhotanagpur generally received it well and welcomed such revolutionary initiative. At the beginning, newly born Sabha's field of operation was Ranchi district. It was June 1938, when Adivasi Sabha organized four meetings at once in Singhbhum district. Places were Jagnathpur, Bahragora, Majhgaon and Bharbharia. All the meetings completely succeeded and received unanimous support from all tribalcommunities of this region. In the presence of Adivasi Sabha's leaders like Bandi Ram Oraon, ThebleOraon, Ignace Beck and some others, Adivasi Sabha's unit was also established in Singhbhum district under the leadership of Surendranath Birua.

The very next year in 1939 Adivasi Sabha became 'Adivasi Mahasabha' when Jaipal Singh Munda came to Chhotanagpur and took over the leadership of Adivasi Sabha. Jaipal Singh, a Munda Adivasi who left homeland for his further studies in England returned in last month of 1938. Jaipal Singh wrote in his autobiography that 'De Meulder had collected Adivasi leaders to meet me. Rai SahebBandiramOraon, Paul Dayal, Ignace Beck, ThebleOraon, Theodore Surin, Julius Tigga and a dozen were there. They requested I become President of the Adivasi Sabha they had just started. I agreed to preside over the conference on January 20th 1939.' (Katyayan 2004, 98) Whatever the causes at first contact, he agreed to preside over the second annual conference of Adivasi Sabha to be held in the month of March 1939. Ultimately, dates were fixed for the conference which was well organized and sufficiently popularized. The very open session was preceded by procession. Jaipal Singh was unanimously elected as the President of Adivasi Sabha in the open session. His presidential speech was completely on tribalissues and had marvellous effects on audience. Technically, Adivasi Sabha was formed in 1938 but began to flourish when Jaipal Singh took over the leadership. At the

ISSN-2278-9758

second annual session of the Sabha, name of the organisation was changed to 'Adivasi Mahasabha'. However, formation of Adivasi Mahasabha was neither spontaneous nor sponsored; it was need of the time and desires of emerging tribal middleclass of Chhotanagpurthat got mass support under the leadership of Jaipal Singh and several concerned tribal leaders.

The formation of a separate administrative unit for Chhotanagpur and SanthalPargana regions was not only demanded by tribal communities but *Sadani* people, non-tribal inhabitants participated equally in demand for same. *Sadani* communities consider themselves as the genuine sons of the soil, joined hands with tribal people and formed Chhotanagpur Separation League to agitate and struggle on the behalf of non-tribal communities of this region. Deokinandan Prasad Sinha, non-tribal leader from Palamau, became the first president of Separation League. The first annual session was organized alongside of Adivasi Mahasabha's conference on the same ground on 22nd January 1939 and 'Separation Resolution' was passed unanimously. Henceforth, Adivasi Mahasabha gained major supports and sympathies from all section of tribal communities and became political representative of people of Chhotanagpurand SanthalPargana. The final phase of consolidating Mahasabha was completed when Jaipal Singh, the newly elected president and other executive party members and activists from Ranchi attended the gathering which was organized by localcommunities of Shinghbhum. Ignace Beck was one of leaders who addressed the huge audience by saying that 'It was amidst such a gathering and such enthusiasm that green flag of Adivasi Mahasabha was for the first time planted and unfurled in this industrial town. (Beck 2002, 26-27) There conducted five more gatherings at Chakulia and Musabani in Dalbhum sub-division.

After formation of theMahasabha as a political outfit, aims and objective were declared, later, published in *Adivasi* magazine owned by Julius Tigga, one of foundering members of theMahashabha. It was clearly mentioned at top of objectives that 'Chhotanagpur, the term, would be considered as *Greater Chhotanagpur* including SanthalPargana and nearest dominated Adivasi regions.' (Tigga 1939, 53) There were also other aims and objectives such as – to consolidate Mahasabha, unite tribal communities, to establish harmony and peace and to awakepolitical consciousness among tribal communities of Chhotanagpur region. Its other objectives were to preserve and save the hereditary properties such as traditional social and political indigenous systems, *Parha* system, tribal villages, language, customary practices, rituals, folk songs and epics, etc. Mahasabha also declared that it would be neutral on religious matters. Likewise, several other proposals were passed during the open conference in 1939. One of the proposals mentions that 'It is essential for the economic and educational improvement of Chhotanagpur that the amount of revenue derived from the mines in Chhotanagpur should be appropriated in and allocated with for the improvement of Chhotanagpur.' (Tigga 1939, 55-56) Therefore, leaders of Mahasabha began to demand that no discrimination be made against people of this region in the matter of either appointment or promotion in government or other services. Besides, all these aims and objectives of Adivasi Mahasabha, its primary objective

ISSN-2278-9758

been the separation of Chhotanagpur from Bihar province and create a separate province for 'Greater Chhotanagpur'.

Political Activities and Agenda of Adivasi Mahasabha in Chhotanagpur, 1940s

From 1938 to 1949, Adivasi Mahasabha succeeded in creating a popular discourse of ethnic centric politics in Chhotanagpur region and tried to establishtribalissues in mainstream political discourse through participating in legislative assemblies and public gatherings. Though, Adivasi Mahasabhacould not become a pan-India tribal movement but it definitely played a decisive role in the making of tribal identity in Chhotanagpur and its neighbouring region. After the grand success of second annual conference of Mahasabha, its message spread to every corner of Indian sub-continent and it had become a well-established regionalpolitical outfit during 1940s. Series of campaigns, gathering, meetings and processions were conducted by Mahasabha leaders to mobilize the tribal people of this region. Under the leadership of Jaipal Singh, Mahasabha became stronger both in the towns and country-side and gathered major supports and sympathies from the tribal communities as well as non-tribal inhabitants. These political activities were not spontaneous but planned, and articulated through using modern print media that established ethnic based political discourses in the popular domain of this region.

Just after the completion of second annual conference of Adivasi Mahasabha in the month of May 1939, District Board election was held. The Mahasabha, after the executives' and delegates' review meeting on the matters of contesting election, decided to participate in the District Board election in districts of Ranchi and Singhbhum. The outcome was that in both the districtsMahasabha nominees won majority seats and captured the executive posts of Chairman and Vice-Chairman. In Singhbhum district, Adivasi Mahasabha succeeded to occupy Chairman Seat and the post of Vice-Chairman was shared with alliance. In Ranchi District, special meeting was convened for the post of Chairman and Vice-Chairman and it was chaired by Congress loyalist S.M. Ahmed who was known as BannuBabu. There were two nominees, one was BandiramOraon from Adivasi Mahasabha and another was P.K. Banerjee, backed by Bihar Congress. During the scrutiny process, the presiding officer S.M. Ahmad cancelled the nomination paper of BandiramOraon and declared as invalid. Automatically, P.K. Banerjee was elected as Chairman of the Board. Ignace Beck commented about this incident that 'It was, indeed, a pre-planned plot as they saw no chance whatever if there were to be a contest. This is another instance of exploitation of the Adivasis by the Non-Adivasi, but this time in the political field.' (Beck 2002, 28-29)

For the purpose of mobilizing the people of Chhotanagpur, Mahasabha organized several meetings and conducted village-level campaigns. With the support of the mass, Mahasabha very soon become a well-established political organisation eligible to take part in elections at all level. Henceforth, Mahasabha captured Chairman and Vice-Chairman posts in Ranchi Municipality election. The elected

ISSN-2278-9758

members were BandiramOraon, Paul Dayal, JilophilTigga, Samuel Purty and Ignace Beck. Though Mahasabha candidates won the election with highest votes, yet in numbers Mahasabha had only five commissioners out of 24 commissioners. Congress got the highest seats and hence occupied executive posts. But very soon when Second World War began in the middle of 1939, Indian National Congress decided to boycott the British war efforts. In pursuance of this decision, Congress high authority issued the notice to Congress members and leaders to resign from all the executive posts of legislatures and local boards. This led to resignation of all Congress members.

On 18 December 1939, Adivasi Mahasabha organized a campaign against Congress who accused Mahasabhafor working in the interest of Christian Missionaries. It is noteworthy that Mahasabha invited Subhash Chandra Bose who was then roundtable opponent to Gandhi in'Anti-Compromise Conference'. Jaipal Singh expressed his view that 'The Congress Party got the shock of their life. RajenBabu decided that annual AICC should be held in Ramgarh so that the presence of Gandhiji, Nehru, Sardar Patel and others would kill my work.' (Katyayan 2004, 100) In opposition, Mahasabhadecided to boycottRamgarh session of Congress and provided crowds for Anti–CompromiseConference presided by Subhash Chandra Bose. Mahasabhaalso boycotted the visit of Gandhi. Jaipal Singh mentioned in his writings that 'two days later Congress session began. Gandhiji came to Ranchi. I had organized a *hartal* against his visit. All shops were closed. There was not a crowd to hail him. He never forgave me' (Katyayan 2002, 102).Though, very opposite report was published in one of the weekly magazinesthat reported 'Mr. Gandhi paid a flying visit to Ranchi for twenty minutes on the 19th instant to open Thakkar Bhawan at Niwaranpur. A crowd of a thousand people or so, of all ages and both sexes, cheered him on his arrival' (Ahmed 1940).

At the same time when Second World War commenced and Congress declared to boycott the decision of war efforts, Mahasabha got an opportunity to show its strength and popularity. Mahasabha supported the British war efforts and helped in recruitingtribal youthincolonial combatant and non-combatant forces. Jaipal Singh argued in defense of his political stand that 'I was, of course, dubbed as a traitor to the struggle for national freedom. It did not worry me at all. I found the Congress financiers, like Birlas and Tatas, taking full advantage of war contracts' (Katyayan 2004, 104). During the war, Jaipal Singh appointed as Chief Warden of Ranchi, temporary headquarter of Eastern Command, and was also nominated as Civilian Advisor of Eastern Command Services Selection Board. A Ranchi weekly magazine wrote in editorial comments that 'the margin of the choice before them was, perhaps, nil. No person who was deemed eligible for the job was, we understand, willing to take up the work. So the choice of Mr. Jaipal Singh was unavoidable' (Ahmed 1942).

Jaipal Singh served these posts until the end of Second World War. After this war, in July 1945, the new government was formed in Britain that declared new policies for colonial India and decided to form executive committee for the making of Indian Constitution. The election was held for 296 seats

ISSN-2278-9758

out of 389 seats. These seats were fixed for provinces. There were 33 members fromSchedule Castes and Schedule Tribes in Constitution Assembly. Jaipal Singh and BonifasLakra of Adivasi Mahasabha from Ranchi and DevendranathSamant of Congress from Chaibasawere elected from Chhotanagpur region. It is noticeable that Mahasabha did not participate directly in nationalindependencestruggle, though, represented people of Chhotanagpurand SanthalPargana regions in both legislative and constituent assemblies. For instance, Jaipal Singh expressed his views after nominated as member of tribal affair sub-committee in Constituent Assembly. He commented that 'the Adivasi cause became an All-India affair, more so, when Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, the real pilot of the Constitution, took me under his wing and saw through the Schedules for safeguards for Adivasis' (Katyayan 2004, 104).

In December 1945, Adivasi Mahasabha organized 'Jharkhand-Chhotanagpur-Pakistan Conference' at Ranchi and invited several leaders of Muslim League such as Hasan ShahidSuhrawardi, LatifurRehman and others. They shared stage in order to address the audience with their speech. Muslim leaders blamed the Congress government for the critical condition of Momins, Adivasis and Dalits. A local Journalist reports about this conference that Muslim League supported the demand of separate Chhotanagpur and requested the audience to vote for Adivasi Mahasabha. He argues that Muslim League provided financial supports to Adivasi Mahasabha for election fund. He highlightsin his writings about political alliance between Adivasi Mahasabha and Muslim League in which he presents a private letter of Muslim League leader Rageeb Ehsan. Zafar Imam, a prominent leader of Muslim Leaguewrote a letter to Rageeb Ehsan in which he instructed to leaders of Bengal Muslim League to support demand of Mahasabha and to share joint political platform with tribal leaders of Chhotanagpur region. (Dutt 2017, 87) In 1946, Muslim league declared 16th August as a 'Direct Action Day' and organized grand gatherings on this day in Calcutta. Jaipal Singh as a representative of Adivasi Mahasabha attended this meeting and gave controversial speech to the audience. He urged that 'hundred million Adivasis are with Muslims. The Adivasi have had enough of Ram Raj. Hundred million Adivasis and hundred million Muslims are ready to fight against Congress, hand in hand. Adivasis in Assam are 47 lakhs and the Hindus are not in majority. Hundred million Adivasis there are ready to fight and face bullets to help the Muslims' (Dutt 2017, 103).

However, very soon, when communal violence began tospreadall over Indian sub-continent, then, leaders of theMahasabhadecided to break its political alliance with the League. They clarified their political stand later and announced that Mahasabha had temporarily alliance with the League just because they needed electoral support from all sections of society but will never go against national interests. For instance, Jaipal Singh in his presidential speech in April 1947 at Ranchi said that 'while Muslim League was supporting the movement for separate Chhotanagpur, but Adivasis would not be misled by Muslim League. Adivasi Mahasabha was never in favour of formation of Pakistan. So, Mahasabha would not be boycotted Constitution Assembly'(Singh 1947).Though, he repeated that the demand of separation of Chhotanagpur from Bihar Province and its movement would continue until it

ISSN-2278-9758

is achieved.In 1946, Mahasabha under the leadership of Jaipal Singh submitted a memorandum to interim Bihar Provincial Government on the matters of participation and development of tribal communities of Chhotanagpur but Shri Krishna Singh, then Premier of Bihar government, did not consider these demands on serious note.It is noteworthy to mention here that in counter of the demand for separation of Chhotangapur from Bihar, S. K. Singh distributed pamphlets in and outside the legislative assembly in1939 in which he encountered such demand by giving examples of possibilities in resolving this issue, however, completely disapproved the demand by saying it as irrational and illogical demand (Singh 1939). It was basically due to emergence of politicalrivalries between leaders of Mahasabha and Bihari Congressmen, However, Mahasabha initiated statehood movement went an extra mile when it opened the gates of the organisationfor non-tribal inhabitants too.

In 1947 'Adivasi Labour Federation' was formed by Jaipal Singh that organized a conference for triballabourers on 16th March 1947 at Jorapokhar, Jhinkpani, Shinghbhum for the betterment of tribal working class population of Chhotanagpur region. But despite the presence of charismatic leadership like Jaipal Singh Munda, Labour Front did not survive and soon collapsed. Jaipal Singh considered himself as a poor labour leader and accused Congress trade unions and industrial mafias for this failure. He expressed his views that 'a law should be enacted so that there is only one union in a factory. Workers must unite. Non-workers should be allowed to hold any office. The annual bonus should be given in share and not in cash. Workers would then have a big say in the affairs of the companies. All contractors should be eliminated' (Katyayan 2004, 111).However, there were huge numbers of non-tribal communities, mainly industrial workers who began to supportthe demand of separate statehood for Chhotanagpurand so they started toparticipate in various protests and programmes of the Mahasabha. Tribal leaders of this region, therefore, felt the need to broaden the foundation of the organisation and boosted the movement for separate state under a new political party i.e. Jharkhand Party.

Conclusion

It is noticeable that leaders of Adivasi Mahasabha had experienced the ground realities of geo-politics of Chhotanagpur region. They learned from their own political mistake and realised that the movement for a separate state would not succeed untilit would getpopular support from non-tribalpopulation of Jharkhand region. It became essential tomake changes in organisation and so they began to appropriate regional identityas a core political agenda fortheir statehood demand. Finally, it opened up the doors to non-tribal people and changed the name of the organisation. Adivasi Mahasabhatransformed into Jharkhand Partyand thus, *Jharkhandi* identity took the place of Adivasi identity in the politics of ongoing statehood movement for Jharkhand region.Thus, tribal oriented struggle became the struggle of all *Jharkhandi* people who resided in this region. During the last annual session of Mahasabha in 1949-50, Jaipal Singh became the first President of newly formed

ISSN-2278-9758

Jharkhand Party. It is noteworthy that with beginning of second half of twentieth century, the movement began to popularise as Jharkhand Movement under the banner of Jharkhand Party.

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Peasant Organisations and Anti-Dam Movements: Case of Protests of KMSS against Subansiri Dam in Assam

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Abstract

Forms of organised protests by new peasant organisations against large dam construction in Assam are relatively recent developments. Many new peasant organisations were formed in the recent decades in the state to represent lands-related problems arising due to large dam constructions. Dam sites consumed lands used by poor and landless peasants and displaced them from traditional livelihoods. Protests begun by such local peasant groups in the Lower Subansiri Dam project site demanded rehabilitation and participation rights in dam construction decisions. The local protests were subsumed within agitation politics of the peasant organisation Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS). The contentions of the local groups were seen becoming wider to take up larger problem of survival and livelihood concerns of small and landless peasants near dam sites, environmental safety of the Lower Subansiri dam, ecological damage in the dam site, and popular participation in decision-making in the project.

Key Words: peasant protests, large dam constructions, displacement, KMSS, Lower Subansiri Hydroelectric Power Project

Introduction

Over past two decades, Assam witnessed peasant protests against large river dam constructions for conservation of agricultural livelihoods. Protests of peasant organisations against dam construction projects in Assam have been relatively recent developments. Peasant bodies were formed in the recent times to collect around peasant problems related to displacements and dispossessions from lands, and around other common lands-related problems (Mahanta 2012, 119-121).

The new peasant bodies in Assam have centered on peasant livelihood concerns. It positioned itself in evolving political dynamics in the state since the 2000s to demand attention of the State to resolution of livelihood rights of poor and landless peasants that come in the way of rapid construction progress and installation of the large dams. Peasant bodies protesting such dam constructions have been constituted of landless cultivators who were required to be removed from state or community lands for clearing lands for project sites. In the beginning, protests highlighted only the livelihood issues of the locals. However, in future course of the anti-dam protests, movement of local peasants in

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Subansiri river valley organized itself to bring out larger problem of survival and livelihood concerns of riparian small and landless peasants near dam sites, environmental safety of dam construction, ecological damage and popular participation process in large development projects.

A grassroots peasant's organisation called Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS) took up the movement efforts. It initiated sustained protests against construction of Lower Subansiri Hydro Electric Power Project (LSHEPP). This paper argues KMSS's protests against construction of LSHEE showcase interest aggregation of poor peasants in Upper Assam in making an organized anti-large river dam movement in the state.

In the movement against LSHEPP, KMSS questioned how supporters for the mega project claimed to benefit peasants by moderating flood in the state as project outcome. It used variety of protest methods such as submission of memorandums, organizing marches, agitations, road blockades and demonstrations. It downplayed the importance of power generation from the project for the state; and it has alleged the project has neglected downstream impacts on peasant communities. The government was forced to relent somewhat on problems of rehabilitation and resettlement, and conducting proper project planning, but core problems of long-term sustainability of the project and dispossession of peasant communities were not wholly addressed.

Why Peasant Organisations Protest against Large Dam Constructions

In India, as dam building accelerated after the 1950s, opposition to dams by peasants started to become more vibrant, widespread, vocal and organised. Peasant organisations opposing dam constructions put questions to the real cost of dams, to who paid for the costs of dams, who suffered losses from constructions and who finally gained from irrigation and power production systems. Such critical questions were soon always associated with dam building projects but no clear answers or alternatives were arrived at. Peasant organisations were largely concerned with sustainability of large-scale projects and negative impacts on peasant communities such as due to debt burdens, inequitable distribution of project benefits, loss of agricultural lands, large-scale displacement, loss of biodiversity, destruction of flora and fauna and loss of river ecosystem.

In words of Himanshu Thakkar, coordinator of South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and People (SANDRP), "mega projects largely affect resource poor and politically silent sections of people. Typically deriving the least benefit from the projects realized on their land, they are almost always neglected in the decision-making process…" (Werner 2015, 4). Although dams make important contributions to human development, in most cases, a heavy social price has been paid to secure the benefits of dams due to its impacts on societies and the environment. A major problem that often arose out of large dam constructions was large-scale displacement of peasants and tribal people from traditional homelands. Dam construction required acquisitions of lands. It changed land occupancy structures and tenures. Land acquisitions lead to de-peasantisation, that is, loss of agricultural livelihoods, to dispossession from lands due to

ISSN-2278-9758

acquisitions and displacements due to submergence. It caused commodification in the local agrarian economy (Suhali 2018, 16 & 168).

It has been acknowledged that large dam constructions affect downstream floodplains, and dam construction plans incorporate the harm aspect into calculations. Agricultural productivity and estuary fisheries are harmed due to changes in character of water flows and changes in nutrient contents. The most immediate harms are often encountered by local peasants and fisher communities. Due to such costs on communities, sites for such large dams are located in rural remote areas, but in these areas it has often been the rural poor who have had to take the costs of constructions. River-dependent peasants who have traditionally lived in downstream areas of dammed rivers have relied on small agricultural productions and river fishing (Owusu, Obour & Nkansah 2017, 1-6). In non-rainy times and dry years, need of maintaining water flow to dam reservoirs has diverted waters from neighboring fields, thus, causing peasants in vicinity to have lower irrigation output and low production yields.

Opposition of local peasant communities to dam projects was recorded also in the colonial period. For example, in the 1920s, farmers of Mulshi Peta, near Pune, protested against construction of a dam that was being built with help of government support by the industrial house of the Tatas (Guha 2008, par.1). The protests aimed at preventing submergence of the Mulshi valley by using the protest methods of hunger strikes, marches and demonstrations. It came to be known as the "Mulshi Satyagraha" in the spirit of the other satyagrahas taking place across the country during the freedom struggle. The Mulshi Satyagraha has been considered the first anti-dam movement organized in India (Vorha 2009, 2-7).

Peasant's organisations have protested state policies for acquiring agricultural lands for large construction projects without taking all stakeholder peasant communities into confidence. This was observed in the Silent Valley Movement, in the Tehri dam site, and in the *Narmada Bachao Andolan* (Save Narmada Campaign) (Nilsen 2008, 303-304). Omvedt called the Narmada river dam project 'boondoggle' in terms of money involved and time spent in constructing the dam. Initially it was thought the Narmada project would lead to a revolution in agricultural productivity in the river valley area, but it resulted in social and ecological losses due to submergence of huge lands and forest areas and forced evictions on peasants and tribal people (Omvedt 1992, 47 & 63).

After liberalisation of the Indian economy in the 1990s, industrial growth and infrastructural development became privatized processes. There was greater pressure on lands due to parallel demands of private bodies and corporate forces for land parcels. In dam construction sites, many crucial functions of the State were outsourced to private parties, causing agony to poor peasants in the area who looked to the State for resolution of socio-economic problems. There were dispossessions from state lands. Peasants with valid land entitlements were compensated, and to an extent rehabilitated, but the greatest blow fell on sharecroppers and poor, landless peasants who were traditionally used to cultivating in vacant state lands.

ISSN-2278-9758

Losses due to dam constructions in some places resulted in forced migration of rural peasants to urban areas for search of new opportunities, and hence, it changed both the rural and the urban labor landscape. Because of construction of the Sardar Sarovar Dam, places in Maharashtra located in downstream areas of the project underwent drought-like conditions, and led to exodus of rural workers. There were anti-drought campaigns in affected areas. In Gujarat where the Sardar Sarovar project was situated planning of agriculture and irrigation projects was done through a top down approach in which peasants were not really involved. Such lack of convergence of interests caused peasants to mobilize against dam building projects.

Peasant organisations in North and Western India built the campaign against large dams to protest the role of the State in permitting dam constructions for faster national economic growth but not addressing livelihood problems of poor peasants cultivating in vacant and sharecropped lands. The movement was not wholly successful in derailing projects in Narmada or Tehri, but it highlighted central universal problems associated with dam constructions. The lessons of the mobilisations were bound to have impact on large dam constructions when large dam constructions took up as massive government infrastructural push in Assam and the Indian Northeast region since the 1990s and 2000s.

Peasant Organisations and Large Dam Constructions in Northeast India

From the 1990s, increased attention was given to infrastructural development of the relatively underdeveloped Northeast region in India. It was identified as India's 'future powerhouse' with possibility for construction of 168 large hydroelectric dam projects with total installed capacity of 63,328 MW (Vagholikar 2011, 360). The region consists of the Brahmaputra river basin and its vast number of tributaries apart from other smaller river systems so that it was thought all the river systems could together generate enough excess hydropower to supply to the rest of the country. The region was found blessed with highest potential for hydro-power generation.

In this context, it would be interesting to look at what Union Minister of State for Power (2008), Jairam Ramesh, said on hydropower potential in the country in general and in the North-east (NE) in particular. According to him,

> India has an estimated hydro potential of about 1,50,000 MW of which only about 35,220 MW has been harnessed so far. 5 Hydro projects aggregating to about 15,365 MW are presently under construction and another 120 projects aggregating to a capacity of 48,624 MW are under various stages of survey and investigation. the bulk of the potentiality yet to be developed along the Himalayas i.e. in the hill states of Jammu and Kashmir, Uttarakhand and the North East, more particularly, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. It is, therefore, imperative that development of this vast potential in the Himalayan States, particular the North Easter Region, is taken up expeditiously with the twin objectives of economic development of these special category states as well as providing power to the deficit regions of the country. (Ministry of Power GoI 2008, ii)

ISSN-2278-9758

However, soon after this, protests against construction of vast network of dams in the Brahmaputra valley gathered momentum. The politics of 'damming the northeast' because of its enriched water energy resources and potential for generating huge portion of country's electricity emerged as new area that led different quarters of society: civil society groups, environmental activists, student organisations, and mass organisations like the KMSS; to engage in debates on the subject. Baruah (2013, 170), for example, expressed concerns on dam constructions in this geographical area, and raised concerns that damming rivers of the Eastern Himalayas would destroy health of some of the world's most powerful rivers and their ecosystems. Its adverse impact would be huge on aquatic and terrestrial communities dependent on it.

In such a complex situation, it has been need of the hour to develop a comprehensive approach to integrate social, environmental and economic dimensions of river dam construction projects along with creating greater levels of transparency and certainty for all involved in the projects. There has also been need for creating a positive situation for purpose of creating proper resolution of conflicts arising out of competing interests of different stockholders (Baruah 2013, 182).

Large dam constructions have been offered as big development initiatives for industrially undeveloped region of Northeast India. Large dams have been held as win-win development projects: it harnesses actual power-production capacities of the nation; secondly, states could have economic gains through exporting surplus power to other parts of the country; and finally, large dams are seen to displace very small numbers of people from dam sites. However, the ground reality has been very different. Conflicts have arisen amongst various stakeholders on downstream, upstream and cumulative impact assessment and social impacts of dams. The real costs on lives of people in lands adjacent to dam sites in Assam are still being studied. There have been no conclusive evidence large dams only minimally damage local communities.

Dams have become a major issue of conflict in the North-east region in the recent decades. At procedural levels, large hydroelectric power projects need to pass through mandatory environmental clearance procedures at the Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF) in the central government. Projects need to be cleared for its viability on environmental as well as on social grounds. It involves mandatory public consultations for appraisals for grants or rejections of clearance. Based on specific geographical locations, some projects also require other clearances such as forest clearance from MoEF and approval from the Standing Committee of the National Board for Wildlife (NBWL) when locations of sites are inside or within a 10 km radius of wildlife Protected Areas (PAs).

Prior to protests against LSHEPP, the North-east region witnessed other similar anti-dam protests. One should note dam-related hazards and anti-dam protests were not new to the region. Construction of the Kaptai dam in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh in the 1960s submerged traditional homelands of the Hajong and Chakma communities and it forced thousands of the two communities to migrate to various parts of Northeast India. In the 1970s, the Gumti Dam in Tripura led to submergence of large tracts of tribal land. Moreover, Loktak Hydel Project

ISSN-2278-9758

commissioned in the 1980s impacted seriously the wetland ecology of the Loktak Lake area in Manipur. Similarly, impending losses of homes, cultivated lands and agricultural livelihoods led to protracted protests against the Pagladiya project in Lower Assam and the Tipaimukh project on the river Barak in Manipur located along the Manipur-Mizoram border (Sharma 2018, 6).

The local Adi community was outraged by various hydel projects initiated since year 2010 on the river Siang in East Siang district of Arunachal Pradesh. Besides Siang River, projects were also begun on other smaller rivers in the Siang valley. However, in 2010 protests centred on construction of the 2,700 MW Lower Siang Hydropower Project. The protesters were led by organisations like the Forum for Siang Dialogue. The protest bodies argued the dam construction projects would destroy livelihoods of Adi villagers living in areas the Siang dam would submerge. Protests of local, peasant communities also occurred in Dibang valley of Arunachal where the only multipurpose hydel power project in Arunachal Pradesh is situated. However, even before foundation stone of the 3,000 MW Dibang Hydel Power project was laid in January 2008, it faced resistance from local Idu Mishmi villagers for its downstream impact on their cultivations and settlements. From 2007 to 2011, the Lower Dibang Valley district, especially the headquarters in Roing town, was hotbed of public protests on this issue. In March 2008, protesters blocked a large stretch of road between Lower Dibang valley and the Dibang valley districts. The Forest Advisory Committee (FAC) of the MoEF had rejected approval to the Dibang valley project twice, in 2013 and 2014 but it was cleared in third round of consideration (Sharma 2018, 10).

LSHEPP, Protests of Local Peasants and the Role of the KMSS

Dam constructions in Assam in the post-colonial period started to receive increased public attention and became subject of public uproar for first time in cases of the Karbi Langpi and Kopili Projects in central parts of Assam and Pagladiya dam in Lower Assam. The Karbi Langpi and Kopili Projects caused flash floods in areas of Nagaon district. The Pagladiya dam also received much attention due to submerging huge lots of cultivable lands near the dam site.

The first proposals for the LSHEPP can be traced back to as early as 1983 when the Brahmaputra Board, a river basin agency of the Ministry of Water Resource, Government of India, was entrusted with responsibility for undertaking a detailed survey work for a 4,800 MW dam project on river Subansiri. The Subansiri River originates from snow ranges of Tibet and flows through Arunachal Pradesh into Assam. Because of the high magnitude of the dam project and expected submergence of large areas in Arunachal Pradesh state, the project could not be immediately begun. However, in 1998-99, the Brahmaputra Board once again conducted survey works on the Subansiri Lower Dam and kept a completion schedule of 2002. As work was not completed on time, the Government of India transferred the project to National Hydro Power Corporation (Choudhury 2010, 19-20).

The project site is located in the upstream areas of Gerukamukh village of Lower Subansiri district which borders Assam and Arunachal Pradesh states. The central government along with the Government of Assam and National

ISSN-2278-9758

Hydro Power Corporation (NHPC) are implementing agencies of the project. The agencies aim at meeting the energy needs of the country through its power generation. The dam has been expected to supply 2,000 MW power. Before the protests started, the project was expected to be completed by 2014. The NHPC termed the project the biggest hydroelectric project undertaken in the county so far.

By mid of 2001, the Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) report of the dam project was made available to public. Many civil bodies and concerned environmental organisations criticised the report. It was found going against some provisions of the Forest Conservation Act of 1980 and Environmental Protection Act of 1986. Despite the criticisms, environmental clearance and stage I forest clearance were given to the project in June and July 2003 (Dandekar and Thakkar, 2014, par. 3-4). In the month of September 2001, the process of public hearing for the project took place which was a mandatory process under existing laws. However, people of the Subansiri valley areas were unfamiliar with the public hearing process. They were not sensitized for participation in the process, and because of this the whole public hearing process in the project came under another round of criticisms (Choudhury 2010, 20).

It was also argued that apart from losses to downstream peasant communities, the dam would destroy crucial wildlife wealth such as river dolphin habitats; it would block an important elephant corridor and submerge part of the Tale Valley Sanctuary. Other endangered species recorded inhabiting in vicinity of the dam site are tiger, leopard, clouded leopard, marbled cat, golden cat, dhole, gaur, serow, capped langur, slow loris and gharial and all these species were listed in Schedule I of the Indian Wildlife Protection Act.

Since the 2000s, especially since formation of a pan-Assam peasant organisation called the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS) in 2005, the peasant identity rather than tribal, caste-Hindu or other forms of assertions re-emerged in discourse of agitation politics in Assam as distinct category for making political assertions. It took up the campaigns of local peasants against dam constructions. It made them part of its overall agitation for enforcing land reforms in the state.

It has been leading a movement for turning claims of indigenous people of Assam on cultivable possessed vacant but unsettled lands into rights of possessions. Areas around dam sites have government unsettled lands but the lands are often in possessions of traditionally cultivating local or migrating peasants. Claims on these lands as well were made part of KMSS movement, and thus, since most large dams have displaced traditionally cultivating small and landless peasants, the organisation came to have an anti-dam stance. It launched a series of protests to resist what it saw as anti-peasant policies of the State with respect to evacuees from the dam sites. To KMSS, constructions of the large dams in Assam have indicated the Indian State has been traversing through a dilemmatic path of seeking fast-paced private sector-supported economic development while forsaking responsibility of the State for fulfilling basic economic necessities of poorer citizens.

ISSN-2278-9758

Since beginning of the multiple proposed dam constructions on the rivers in Assam, peasants protested against the projects where dam constructions have already submerged or are going to submerge cultivated or settled lands. Protests against LSHEPP was an illustration of this where apart from the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) a number of private contracting parties were given works for the power project. Local communities pointed to losses of their livelihoods as impacts of construction of the dam. KMSS adopted the struggle of local peasant communities in the Lower Subansiri dam area in the late 2000s.

Protests against the Subansiri dam began soon after the project was given environmental clearance under India's environment, forest and wildlife laws. Initially protesters were primarily concerned with environmental aspects, but gradually the anti-dam campaign covered other important dimensions as well. Different ecological dimension like landslides, high flood, ecological damage, loss of land, biodiversity of the entire region, seismicity and carry capacity, and socio-economic dimension like rehabilitation and settlement of project-affected people, livelihood security, compensatory afforestation, health hazards etc. associated with the project were made part of the campaign.

The protest against the project gained strength from around 2005 when KMSS and All Assam Students' Union (AASU) announced an anti-dam movement in the state. It was a major issue of confrontation between government and street agitations until year 2011. The Assam Legislative Assembly conducted debates on concerns raised by the local organisations, and although a house report was prepared, it was inconclusive on the ends of the project. At the dam site, organisations joined strength to get the government to stop work on the project. Some of these organisations apart from the KMSS and AASU were Assam Jatiyatabadi Yuva Chatra Parishad (AJYCP), Takam Mising Porin Kebang, and Mising Mimak Kebang etc. Due to pressure of these organisations, the constructions had to finally cease in December 2011.

KMSS issued press statement to claim it was concerned for the project-affected small peasants and traditionally farming communities in districts of Lakhimpur, Dhemaji, Majuli and Jorhat. These communities could be adversely affected by abrupt releases of dam reservoir waters. The KMSS also mirrored worries of peasant families fearing for submergence of cultivable lands because of the dam construction.

From 2010 onwards, KMSS intensified its anti-dam campaign by launching series of peasant protests and marches in administrative centres and more particularly at Gerukamukh project site of the dam. In May 2011, they started a week-long agitation that took off from Pandughat, near Guwahati on the Brahmaputra, and continued onto other river port towns; Biswanathgath in Sonitpur district, and then onto Jugighopa. These port demonstrations were held against transport ferries carrying machine goods and turbines for the Subansiri project. These prolonged demonstrations continued until the end of November when the state government deployed several contingents of police and paramilitary forces on the National Highway leading to Subansiri project area to disperse the protestors and to ensure arrival of the turbines at the project location. During these agitations, many KMSS workers received bodily injuries due to police actions.

ISSN-2278-9758

Public Reports and Concern raised by the KMSS on LSHEPP

Downstream impact concerns raised in the dam construction sites in Assam have included changes in wetland ecology in the floodplains, loss of fishing habitats, impact on agriculture in the *chaporis* or riverine floodplains, increased vulnerability to floods due to massive boulder extraction from riverbeds for dam construction and sudden water releases from reservoirs in the monsoons **(**Vagholikar 2013, 172). Large dams not only block the natural flow of the river it also traps sediments and nutrients vital for fertilising downstream areas. KMSS claimed to reiterate these losses of the communities over and over again in its memorandums. It requested the MoEF and its Expert Appraisal Committee (EAC) on River Valley and Hydroelectric projects to address the downstream impacts during the environmental decision-making process for the project.

Environmental risk assessment in downstream areas has been poor in case of most of the projects in the region. Downstream flood risks due to sudden release of water from upstream reservoirs in the monsoons have been an important area of concern which has needed proper study. Dam-induced floods are crucial areas that cannot be overlooked. In case of Subansiri dam, repeated washing away of coffer dams in monsoons led to heavy sedimentation in the downstream areas. Geological incidents continue to be considered major environmental risks in hydropower projects, KMSS alleged the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) in one of its report on NHPC and NEEPCO pointed out considerably less time and money was being spent in the project on crucial geological surveys and investigations into impact of the hydropower project. This was a matter of serious concern for an ecologically fragile region like Assam and Northeast India (Gogoi 2010-13, 211).

KMSS then used public reports to counter some of the vital circulating claims that the Subansiri dam was going to benefit Assam by moderating occurrence of floods in the state. Whether large dams could effectively moderate floods was still a debatable subject. As per official plans, only one project out of over 120 hydropower projects for which MoUs were signed by Arunachal Pradesh government until 2010 was explicitly described as multipurpose project with flood moderation component. Lower Subansiri was not a multipurpose project as per its official plans, and hence, KMSS contended the claim it would moderate floods and benefit people in Assam was still vague.

KMSS mobilised people by pointing to such contradictions. It found further that the Prime Minister's Office had asked for downstream impact studies to be done in Lower Subansiri project in 2006 but construction work of the dam had already begun before the studies were complete. Due to lack of public data, independent concerns were being raised since 2001, but all these were ignored while granting clearance to the project in 2003. Second phase of downstream impact studies was carried out after commissioning an Expert Committee consisting of members from Gauhati University, Dibrugarh University and IIT Guwahati. In its interim report in February 2009, the committee raised doubts on foundations of the dam. It asked construction works on the dam to cease until the full downstream impact studies

ISSN-2278-9758

were completed. Despite this, the NHPC continued construction work on the dam. In the final report made available in June 2009, the Expert Committee expressed that the selected project site for the mega dam for the present dimension was not appropriate in a geologically and seismologically sensitive location. It recommended stopping the mega dam construction in the present site (Gogoi 2010-13, 212).

Conclusion

In most large dam construction projects, local peasants have not been usually consulted before initiation of the projects. Local poor and landless peasants have been at the losing ends of such construction projects. Power generated from large dams has been diverted to urban areas and irrigation channels opened up by dams have benefited large peasants more than it has impacted poor peasants on lands near dam sites. In Assam, peasant organisations have collected local peasants affected by large dam constructions, especially in LSHEPP, to demand rights of resettlement and participation in dam construction decisions. Over period of time, the peasant bodies asked details of magnitude and extent of submergence by the dam, availability of alternative lands, master plan etc. The campaigns were taken up by organisation KMSS to give it larger organisational strength and to lend it strategies already put in use by the organisation. Although campaigns against LSHEPP failed to make headway, it has highlighted important problems in way the project was undertaken.

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India and Japan: a Multifaceted Relation

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Abstract

India and Japan until the onset of Cold war had a vibrant relationship. With the Cold War the relationship also lost its warmth and it continued for four decades. The end of cold war in 1990s did not help in reviving the relationship between the two countries. It was only after the landmark visit by the Japanese PM Mori to India in 2000 that the relations rapidly progressed. From the relation of a donor (Japan) and recipient (India) it got elevated to global partners and then the strategic partners. In addition, the economic relations also elevated as result both the countries became trading partners.

Keywords: India, Japan, Cold War, Donor and Recipient.

Introduction

In April 1952, India and Japan established diplomatic relationship based on historical and cultural linkage. The relationship showed the potential of growing into a strong and vibrant relationship. However, with the dawn of the Cold War and its ideological based politics made the relationship cold for almost four decades. A cautious joint venture in the Maruti Suzuki during 1980s between the two countries gave ray of hope for turnaround in the relationship. But the venture failed to put life into the cold relation.

The end of cold war, the collapse of Soviet Union, India opening her closed economy followed by the launch of Look East Policy by India were not sufficient to help revive the relationship between the two countries. Nevertheless, a very limited relationship that of a donor (Japan) and recipient (India) re-started based on Official Development Assistance (ODA) while trade and investment from Japan was miniscule in amount.

The limited relationship that had just started got evaporated after India conducted nuclear test in 1998 and Japan imposed economic sanctions on India, and this further deteriorated the relationship. The turning point or a new leaf in the relationship emerged when Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India in 2000. This visit revamped the relationship between the two countries. Then onwards the relationship has grown from ODA to diversification in economic ties and then to global partnership to special strategic partners.

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Thus, this article would delve and articulate that the Indo-Japan relationship has become multifaceted thereby not only confined to religious, cultural and ODA based economic ties but economic relations has diversified with emphasis on trade and investment and strategic ties as well.

Historical Linkage

India and Japan came in contact with each other albeit indirectly in the 7th century AD when Buddhism entered Japan from India via China and Korea. The relationship was further bolstered as the two countries engaged themselves in cultural exchanges.

The Indian missionary, Bodhisena, visited Japan in 736 A.D. along with his followers and became the Buddhist Bishop (known as the Brahmin Bishop) of Japan till he died in 760 A.D. (Mathur, 2012,4) The Buddhists promoted art, culture and philanthropy, thereby gradually spreading the roots of the religion to many parts of the country, even as it branched out into several cults and sects of their own like Tendai and Shingou. (Mathur, 2012,4).

The influence was deep and widespread. According to Haijima Nakamura, "Without Indian influence, Japanese culture would not be what it is today" (Nakamura, 1961,4) Thus, this influence continues even till today as seen from the visits made by Japanese people to different sites of Buddhism.

Swami Vivekananda visited Japan while he was on his way to Chicago to attend the Parliament of Religions in 1893 and Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore also visited Japan five times. Similarly, Japanese painters such as Okakura KaKuzo (Tenshin), Yokoyama Taikan, Hishida Shunso, and Arai Kanpo visited India particularly to Bengal during India's freedom struggle. Okakura KaKuzo (Tenshin) involvement in the Bengal Renaissance in art at the beginning of the twentieth century is well known (Inaga, 2009,149)

Japan's victory over Russia in 1904 was praised by India and it acted as a source of inspiration for the Indians who were struggling to free India from the British rule. Japan's assistance during India's freedom struggle is well known fact as Japan provided support to Netaji Subash Chandra Bose and the Indian National Army in its effort to drive out the British from India.

Post- World War II Period

By the time India got independence and was occupied in the process of integration, on the other side Japan was defeated in the World War II and was engaged in the process of reconstruction of the country. The relationship between the two countries, immediately during post-war period, remained optimistic particularly the role of the Indian Justice Radha Binod Pal in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East was well appreciated by the Japanese people.

ISSN-2278-9758

In 1949, PM Jawaharlal Nehru donated two Indian elephants to the Ueno zoo (Tokyo) and India invited then-occupied Japan to participate at the New Delhi Asian Games as an independent nation in 1951(Tuke, 2009,6) Further, India's refusal to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty paved the way for the amicable relationship between the two countries. This refusal on the part of India led Japan and India to sign peace treaty and establish diplomatic relations between them in 1952.

India was a central player in lobbying for Japan's entry into the United Nations and to Japan's participation in the first Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in 1955 (Ibid:6) In the year 1957, a momentous year, the Japanese Prime Minister Nobuske Kishi made a path-breaking visit to India and following this visit Japan started providing its first yen loans to India.

Cold-War Period

The historical and cultural links since 7th century, India's stand for Japan after World War II, lack of any negative historical legacy and conflict of strategic interest provided a perfect optimistic background for both countries to nurture the then emerging relationship into a strong and stable relationship.

However, with the advent of cold war the relationship with the potential of flourishing and reaching great heights took opposite turn due to ideological differences between them and this acted as a barrier for developing a strong and stable relationship further. Both the nations drifted apart from each other. Therefore, for four decades the relationship between the two countries got stagnated and the interaction between them was least as the interaction existed only at cultural level.

During this period of aloofness, in-between a cautious joint venture of Maruti-Suzuki in 1982 between India and Japan was signed to manufacture small cars for the Indian market. Besides, Suzuki, National Panasonic, Sony, Yahama, Honda, Nikon and Canon had become household names by 1970s (Pant, 2015,64).

In addition to this, the Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone paid a visit to India in 1984. This was followed in quick succession by the visits of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to Japan in 1985, 1987 and 1988 (Borah,2011,26) Thus, the joint venture provided a ray of hope for turnaround in the relationship that was cold nevertheless it failed to put life into the cold relationship.

Post-Cold War Period

The Cold war ended and the Soviet Union had got disintegrated leading to a set up of new world order of uni-polar world led by USA. The collapse of former Soviet Union made India found itself automatically out of the perceived shadows of the "now former mighty USSR" (Malhotra, 2014).

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During the early post-cold war period India faced severe economic recession due to balance of payment crisis and India's stance as a non-aligned nation did not receive popular support in the new world order. All these factors had great impact on India's domestic, economic, security and foreign policy.

To overcome the situation India made series of economic reforms in 1991. India adopted an outward-looking policy to make its own economy by utilizing the tide of globalization (Kojimo,2014,7) And this helped India to attract foreign investment in India particularly Japan. Further, India began to widened its foreign policy, therefore, in 1992 India launched its Look East Policy.

Although, initially it was targeted to revamp the relationship with the Southeast Asian countries but later as India's relationship matured with the South East Asia the Look East Policy was directed towards North East Asia (Japan, South Korea and China). In addition, India also began to build friendship with US by building bridges of understanding and deleting differences.

The early post Cold war period had coincided with India's reformation phase both in terms of economic and foreign relations and during this period India-Japan relation mainly economic relations showed sign of progress. But the growing relation received setbacks when India conducted nuclear test in 1998.

As a reaction Japan imposed economic sanctions on India and this brought stagnation in the relationship between the two countries. During 1998-2000 when ODA, the core element of the partnership, remained suspended, it virtually affected the whole gamut of bilateral ties (Kesavan, 2010,9) Tokyo lifted the sanctions in 2001 and such a move came only after a landmark visit to India by the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in August 2000.

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori Visit to India

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's visit to India in August 2000, the first by a Japanese Prime Minister to South Asia in a decade (Limaye,2000,129) became a starting point for reviving the relationship between the two countries. During Prime Minister Mori's visit to India in August 2000, he proposed a "Global Partnership"—a term which was used by Japan only to describe its relations with the United States (Mathur,2012,25)

This proposal or declaration raised the hitherto donor (Japan) and recipient (India) relationship to global partners. Consequently, for the first-time strategic dimension was added to the re-established bilateral relation. Japan's move to re-establish its relation with India was driven by number of factors both at international and domestic level.

First, the collapse of erstwhile Soviet Union led to the end of cold war thereby making the world a uni-polar solely led by US. This change in power at the global level also brought changes in Asia particularly

ISSN-2278-9758

the rise of China and later rise of India. Japan's economic might helped it to become influential and powerful country in Asia.

But Japan began to face economic stagnation due to bubble burst by the early post-Cold war period and this coincided with rise of China in Asia during the same period. Japan's economic problems and China's rise not only economically but also militarily and strategically began to trouble Japan and limit Japan's influence and power.

Second, the Gulf war of 1991 and the criticism of "cheque book diplomacy" levelled against Japan by its ally the United States proved a turning point for Japan. Although, the criticism compelled Japan to change its policy but at the same time it lowered Japan's profile in Asia and in the world.

Third, after the end of Cold war India liberalised its economy and altered its foreign policy and moved away from non-aligned stance. Liberalising the economy helped India to get economically integrated with the world and it acted as a stimulus to forge closer ties with the world, also helped to attract lots of foreign investment.

Change in India's foreign policy was reflected through the launch of "East Policy" in 1991, initially it concentrated in South East Asia. It helped India to improve its profile in Asia. Through Look East Policy, India was able to re-establish its relationship with South East Asia that had vanished with the arrival of colonialism and then with the advent of cold war. India's re-engagement with South East Asia helped India to become the full-fledged dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1994 and then became the member of ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) in 1996 all helped in building India's profile.

Fourth, India's improving engagement with European Union, Gulf countries, Russia, South Korea, China, and most importantly its relationship with United States had begun to improve and grow in a positive manner, thus all these factors helped to improve India's profile in the world.

Lastly, nuclear test conducted by India in 1998, Japan made sever opposition and imposed economic sanction. But India's self- imposed moratorium on conducting further nuclear test and declaration of never to use the nuclear weapons reflected that India is a matured and responsible country. In addition, within Japan also India's nuclear capability was seen as a balance to China.

Therefore, apart from the above factors there are other factors such as historic and cultural linkages, being democratic countries, India's rising military potential, economic progress, growing presence in Indian ocean, common interest and absence of any dispute between the two has helped both the countries to improve their relationship and paved the way for making the relationship into global partnership.

India-Japan Relation 2000 Onwards

ISSN-2278-9758

After global partnership the relation between the two countries grew by leaps and bounds. In 2001 Japan lifted all the sanctions it had imposed on India after 1998 nuclear test. In 2003 India became the largest recipient of the Japanese ODA for various projects. In 2005 a momentous year for India as India became a member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) with the support from Japan.

In the same year Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visit to India gave strategic orientation to the Indo-Japan global partnership and further strengthened the global partnership between the two countries in the new Asian era through eight-fold plan.

Moreover, Indo-US nuclear agreement in 2005 bettered India's profile in the world and this further boosted India's relationship with Japan. In 2006 the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made a return visit to Japan and this resulted to the declaration of India-Japan relationship as 'Strategic and Global Partnership'.

Although, India and Japan had added strategic element to their relationship when PM Mori in 2000 declared both countries as global partners but in 2006 it was a straight forward declaration that both countries are now strategic partners and provided a roadmap for multi-layered bilateral relationship.

As a follow up to the 2006 declaration, in 2007 Prime Minister Abe's visit to India led to the joint declaration for 'Roadmap for New Dimension to the Strategic and Global Partnership'. This roadmap identified six areas of cooperation which were Political, Security and Defence Cooperation, Comprehensive Economic Partnership, Science and Technology, Strategic Dialogue on Economic Issues, People-to-People Exchange, Academic Exchange, Cultural Exchange and Issues of Common Interests.

The main objective of this roadmap was to build a strong and enduring relationship between the two countries so that both can withstand as well as promote new dynamism growth in Asia.

Until 2007 only strategic element was added to the growing relationship between the two countries but 2008 was a historic moment for India as during PM Singh's visit to Japan both the countries made a Joint Security Declaration thereby adding the security element in the relationship.

The Security Declaration represents the third security declaration made by Japan (after declarations involving the United States in 1996 and Australia in March 2007) and is the first such declaration made by India and it aimed at strengthening the bilateral security relationship between the two (Brewster, 2010,103) One significant aspect of the Declaration is the emphasis placed on the need for bilateral policy coordination in regional affairs, as well as bilateral cooperation within multilateral fora in Asia such as the EAS, ARF and RECAPP (Kesavan, 2010,14)

ISSN-2278-9758

Following the security declaration of 2008 during Prime Minister Mr. Yukio Hatoyama visit to India in 2009 both the governments jointly declared the action plan to advance and strengthened the security cooperation.

The plan outlined comprehensive agenda that mentions specific measures to be taken by the two countries in nine areas, including strategic and defence cooperation mechanisms, maritime security, safety of transport, cooperation at the UN, disaster management, and cooperation on disarmament and non-proliferation (Ibid, 15)

Of particular significance is the decision to annually hold a comprehensive 2+2 security dialogue at the cabinet/senior official level (Ibid,15) The Joint Statement declared on Vision for India -Japan Strategic and Global Partnership in the Next Decade by the two countries during Prime Minister Singh visit to Japan in 2010 gave further fillip to the existing bilateral ties. In addition, the negotiation for Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) was completed so as to liberalize trade and services between the two countries.

In 2011 both the countries made a joint declaration entitled "Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership" upon entering the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations. In 2013 PM Singh and PM Abe made a joint declaration entitled "Strengthening the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India beyond the 60th Anniversary of Diplomatic Relations" that not only reaffirmed the existing strategic and global partnership between the two countries but it also highlighted the efforts of both the countries to further expand and deepen their existing relationship.

In 2014, PM Shinzo Abe visited India and was the Chief Guest at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi. In the joint statement "the two Prime Ministers reaffirmed their resolve to further deepen the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan as two democracies in Asia sharing universal values such as freedom, democracy and rule of law, and to contribute jointly to the peace, stability and prosperity of the region and the world, taking into account changes in the strategic environment" (Joint Statement, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2014).

After the change of regime in India the new Prime Minister Modi visited Japan in 2014 for the 9th Annual Summit with Japanese counter-part Prime Minister Abe. During the summit the two Prime Ministers in their joint declaration "Tokyo Declaration for India - Japan Special Strategic and Global Partnership" committed to realize the full potential of India-Japan Strategic and Global partnership, and also upgraded the existing relationship to "Special Strategic and Global Partnership"

ISSN-2278-9758

In 2015 both the leaders during the annual summit held in India jointly declared "India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World" thereby laying out the future plan for India-Japan relations.

In addition, it was declared that the relationship has the largest potential for growth into a deep, broad-based and action-oriented partnership. Prime Minister Modi's visit to Japan in 2016 was a momentous summit for India. In the summit meeting India and Japan signed a landmark "Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy". India is the first non-signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) country to have received an exemption from Japan.

In 2017 in their joint declaration the two countries decided to work together to elevate their partnership to the next level to advance common strategic objectives at a time when the global community is faced with new challenges (Joint Statement, Ministry of External Affairs, India, 2017).

Both the leaders decided to synchronise cooperation between India's Act East Policy and Japan's Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy. For this synchronisation India and Japan declared to cooperate in the development of India's North Eastern Region by setting up India-Japan Act East Forum. This declaration was one of the first such declarations made by any foreign country in the North East Region that not only has insurgency problems, development issues but also an area that has border dispute with China. Furthermore, the inauguration of Mumbai-to-Ahmedabad bullet train was an important development for India.

In nutshell, since the visit of Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori in 2000 the relationship that was mainly on cultural basis and economic basis (mostly ODA Loans with minute trade between the two countries) the relationship between India and Japan has been elevated and diversified such that today the relationship is not just confined to cultural, religious and economic (mostly ODAs)

Economic Relations

While tracing the relationship between India and Japan after World War II, it mainly took off primarily on economic lines when India received first Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in 1958 from Japan. During this time strategic, political and other drivers of the relationship did not exist.

Though, historically cultural and religious drivers existed and these drivers actually helped to encouraged the economic linkage between the two countries. The first amount disbursed under ODA was US$50 million in 1958 and then it gradually began to increase till the early 1960s. From mid 1960s the ODAs, though, was continued by Japan but the amount had declined and this remained until the end of Cold war.

Nevertheless, during the Cold War period Japan became the largest bilateral donor to India (Rajamohan, et al. 2008, 7)

A positive spark emerged when India undertook economy reforms thereby opening and liberalising her economy and the pursuit of Look East Policy in 1991. Since then although the political interaction remained low and Japan was hesitant to forge close relationship but the ODAs to India from Japan increased as compared to cold war period.

The nuclear test conducted by India in 1998 spoiled the relationship and Japan imposed economic embargo and all fresh loans were ended. The stagnation in the relationship and the economic embargo ended with the visit of Japanese PM Yoshiro Mori to India in August 2000 and his landmark declaration of "Global Partners".

Since, 2003-04, India has been the recipient of the largest ODA (Kesavan, 2010,19). The 2001 ODA loan of 65 billion yen was almost doubled in 2002 to 111 billion yen, doubled again to 225 billion yen by 2007, and had been increased a further 60 percent to 365 billion yen by 2013 (Jain, 2017, 25-26)

The cumulative total of yen loans to India in 2011 stood at 3,600 trillion yen, rising to 4,575 trillion yen in 2014, that is, an increase close to 975 billion yen in the four years from 2011–2014 (Ibid,26) In 2015 the ODA loan amounted to Yen 366.47 billion. The Government of Japan committed ODA loans for an amount of Yen 371.345 billion (=Rs.21,590 crore approx.) under FY 2016-2017 loan package (JAPAN's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Loan, (Government of India, 2017) In 2018-19, Japan committed to provide ODA loan to India of Yen 416.458 billion (Embassy of India, Tokyo, Japan).

Although, ODAs has always been the main driver in the relationship between the two countries but at the same time complete absence of trade between the two countries cannot be ruled out. A miniscule amount of trade existed between the two countries post World War II. India mainly exported iron ore, hemp fibres, precious and semi- precious stones and textile products.

Japan mainly exported heavy machinery products, metal and metal products and iron and steel. Adding to the minute trade the two countries undertook a cautious joint venture in Maruti and Suzuki to establish car manufacturing plant in India in 1980s which was a great success. But this success could not be a sufficient base for both the countries to strengthen their relationship and it also didn't open doors for establishing strong bilateral trade relations.

In 1991, India opened its economy which was until then closed for the foreign investors. It could not attract Japanese investment into India. With the improvement in the political relation between the two countries after the landmark visit by the Japanese PM Mori. The door for engaging in economic activities opened for both the countries. This visit changed the hitherto donor and recipient relations overshadowed

ISSN-2278-9758

by ODAs into trading partners. Besides, trading Japan also began to make investment in India. Thus, India not only became a new trading partner but also a new destination for Japanese investment.

Conclusion

India and Japan had religious connection since 7th century and it gradually developed into a cultural relation. After the World War II the religious and cultural relation played an important role in forging a relationship between the two counties. However, with the onset of the Cold war the relationship also became cold.

End of cold war and some significant steps taken by India such as liberalising its economy and bringing changes in its foreign policy by the launch of Look East Policy was thought to help India to re-build its relationship with Japan. Though, the relationship between India and Japan re-started but the start was not sufficient to win the confidence of Japan, consequently the relationship was confined to that of ODAs loans only with minute trade.

As the relationship was growing India conducted nuclear test in 1998 and this evaporated the entire relationship that had just begun. Japan imposed economic sanctions. A new turn in leaf in the relationship came when Japanese PM Mori visited India in 2000. From 2000 onward there was no looking back mainly because the relationship between the two countries gradually changed. From the relation of donor (Japan) and recipient (India) the two countries became global and strategic partners as well as trading partners. In nutshell the relationship between India and Japan has grew and elevated and has become multifaceted.

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Alienation, Affiliation, Assimilation: Cross – Cultural Issues in the Novels of Michael Ondaatje

Pritam Singh

Abstract

Migration, whether voluntary or forced, national or international, individual or group, always causes unrest, instability and uncertainty. Several factors like political persecution, religious intolerance and search for better economic pastures, have contributed to the growth of the phenomenon of migration. Humans have been migrating since their evolution, in search of better living conditions and resources. The overseas migrants not merely take with them their skills and expertise, but also their culture, styles of their life and ideologies to the place of destination. Settling down in the new country is not an easy process and it results in the cultural conflict between the host society and the immigrants. In today's world the problem of being displaced from one's own culture and finding oneself in totally new environment has been growing very fast. In this situation individual is seen geographically, culturally, linguistically and sometimes psychologically alienated or isolated.

Michael Ondaatje is one of the leading writers of Diaspora. His own life journey as a migrant to England and then to Canada from his mother land Sri Lanka makes him a self - possessed diasporic writer. His own mixed cultural identity and personality is visible in nearly all his works. Ondaatje is a natural mouthpiece for the problems and issues of immigrants as he himself has gone through this process of alienation, affiliation and assimilation. Present paper will be an effort to dig up the cultural issues as portrayed by Philip Michael Ondaatje in two of his novels namely, Anil's Ghost and In the Skin of a Lion.

Key Words: migration, displacement, culture, identity, existence, alienation, assimilation.

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In today's world the problem of being displaced from one's own culture and finding oneself in totally new environment has been growing very fast. In this situation individual is seen geographically, culturally, linguistically and sometimes psychologically alienated or isolated. Migration is a recurrent topic in postcolonial literature. This is hardly surprising since many of the most prominent postcolonial authors are migrants themselves, such as Salman Rushdie, Ben Okri, Jamaica Kincaid, Kiran Desai, V S Naipaul, Michael Ondaatje and many others. However, migration is not only the matter of many literary works but it is also a source for of theoretical reflections on the migrant condition. Especially its effects on migrants' identities are explored extensively. These identities are generally seen as doubled, or hybrid, or unstable, and the protagonists of migrant literature are often portrayed as being unsure of who they are, where they belong and how to reconcile their location between several cultures and countries. This perception of identities is closely connected with the notions of place, displacement and exile in postcolonial theory. It implies that in order not to suffer from a crisis of identity one has to somehow be connected to and identify with the place one inhabits. To be separated from this place– or to be otherwise alienated from it through the effects of colonization – consequently is not only a change of location but is also accompanied by a sense of displacement and a "crisis of identity". Displacement hence appears to be a necessary consequence of migration which is therefore also frequently referred to as aform of "exile", "from either a literal homeland or from a cultural and ethnic origin"(Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, "Exile" 92). To say where such migrants and diasporeans are at home is considered very difficult: "Where is the place of 'home'to be located for such people or such groups? In the place of birth (native), in the displaced cultural community into which the person is born, or the nation-state in which this diasporic community is located?"(Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, "Exile"93).

This sentiment is most famously expressed by Rushdie in his essay "Imaginary Homelands" in which he refers to migrant writers as "exiles or emigrants or expatriates,[who] are haunted by some sense of loss, some urge to reclaim, to look back" which leads to "physical alienation" and "profound uncertainties" (Rushdie, 10). He emphasizes that this alienation does not only apply to the country of immigration but also to the country left behind which turns into an "imaginary homeland" that has little to do with the reality anymore (Rushdie, 10). Rushdie's migrant seems perpetually stuck in-between these two while not belonging to either one.

ISSN-2278-9758

Accordingly, the migrant is considered to be neither here nor there. He is alienated from his origins but does not fit in with his new environment either. His sense of belonging to a place is either disturbed or lost altogether and he is not sure of his identity anymore as a result of this.

Ever since his 1982 fictionalized memoir Running in the Family, Michael Ondaatje's fiction has been characterized by a concern for the lives of migrants. More precisely, it predominantly focuses on the questions of identity that result from the characters' migrations. Thus, the narrator of Running in the Family travels to Sri Lanka trying to come to terms with how his long neglected Sri Lankan heritage influences his identity. Anil, the protagonist of Anil's Ghost, faces similar questions and likewise returns to her country of origin to reconnect with her past in war torn Sri Lanka. In the Skin of a Lion's hero, Patrick Lewis, undertakes a more metaphorical kind of migration by becoming part of Toronto's Macedonian diaspora in the first half of the 20th century, which is contrasted with the Macedonian Nicholas Temelcoff's immigration to Canada. Both of them accordingly have to adjust to their new environment and adjust their self-understanding in the process. The English Patient's eponymous protagonist calls himself an "international bastard"(The English Patient 188) and in a somewhat questionable move extends this label to the Indian sapper, Kip, who like the patient is part of a multinational community in Italy at the end of the World War II, but has a quite different understanding of identity and belonging. Finally, Anna, the central character of Divisadero, sees her life as a network that surpasses the boundaries between nations, characters, fiction and reality, and even time. As a result "[e]verything is collage" (Divisadero 16), evenAnna's identity, as she imagines herself to belong to and identifies with all the different story lines in the novel. While all these texts differ greatly in plot and setting they nevertheless depict aset of characters whose identities are equally influenced by multiple affiliations and affinities that cut across national and cultural boundaries.

Generally migrant writing is seen as dislocated and uprooted and its characters– as well as the author – as having no real home and celebrating their rootlessness. Especially when it comes to Ondaatje's fiction, such a judgement seems unconvincing and appears to merely repeating the usual concerns associated with migrant writing without taking a closer look. Though no one can deny the existence of the typical migrant writing motifs in Ondaatje's books as there certainly are instances when his characters seem unsure of where they belong and who they are and when they feel dislocated. If one approaches these texts with a different focus– on

ISSN-2278-9758

the transnational aspects of the characters' identities – the analysis must result in a quite different interpretation. Through such a lens one can see that in Ondaatje's fiction complex questions of post-, trans-, or simply national belonging, self-understanding, and connectedness are negotiated in subtle yet precise ways that are never uncritical. On the contrary, the texts do not offer simple, clear-cut answers to these issues and by this defy the categories that are usually applied to migrant literature.

An expatriate writer as he writes down his emotions in the form of letters, obviously feels that pull of his historical past and that past cultural bonding is apparently visible in his writings. Avinash Jodha observes this condition of an expatriate writer:

> Looking back, and to search for one's roots is not a leisurely act of romancing with nostalgia but it reflects an essential stage in the politics of exile. It is a politically potent move, by reclaiming an overlooked past, the expatriate stakes his claim to be considered beyond the constraints of existing frameworks. However, an exploration of the past ties, reassuring as it might seem at a personal level, has its significance in the sense of group solidarity, an anchorage that it offers to the expatriate in both the spaces. (Jodha, 134)

Michael Ondaatje is a writer who is shaped by the different cultures. He is Sri Lankan-Dutch immigrant to Canada, and his writing reflects the issue of identity, history, hybridity and cultural clashes.

Michael Ondaatje's In the Skin of a Lion (1987) articulates his concerns with the lives of the immigrants and the construction workers of Bloor Street Viaduct Bridge and a water filtration plant. The immigrant workers remain unrecorded in the Canadian official history of building of Toronto. The workers cross the boundaries of another culture and rendered as cultural outsiders in the host country. Ondaatje has explored the present day reality, way of living the life that is the culture of the Canadian society. Immigrants attempt to assimilate into the host culture but the cultural differences among the groups do not allow them to become one with host culture. Winfried Siemerling in his article, "Oral History and the Writing of the other in Ondaatje's in Anil's Ghost" notes how these immigrants enter into another world and their

ISSN-2278-9758

encounter with different cultural groups. He also explains the immigrant's crossing of boundaries into the reality of another world and in the periphery of new language. He writes:

> The novel defamiliarizes habitual perceptions of Toronto by superimposing a reconstructed and imagined new world. With the non-English-speaking immigrants of Toronto, Ondaatje follows a whole community that crosses boundaries and borders to another reality and a new language. (Winfried, 92)

The immigrant workers reach Canada from different geographical divides to overcome economic depravity or the political harassment at their own homeland. But the act of immigration is a very complex act either voluntary or forced. Cultural differences among the community is one of the major causes of the cultural conflict. The immigrant group's culture is different from the native. The immigrants live in a very poor and shabby condition:

> They sleep in the shacks behind the Bellrock Hotel and have little connection with the town…Neither the boy nor his father has ever been into those dark rooms, into a warmth which is the odour of men. A raw table, four bunks, a window the size of a torso. These are built each December and dismantled the following spring. No one in the town of Bellrock knows where the men have come from. (Ondaatje, Skin 8)

The immigrants in the novel are Macedonians, Finns, Greeks and Italian workers. Ondaatje's protagonists are labourers, doing filthy jobs in slaughter houses, tanneries, prisoners, and a thief and revolutionary who are cultural outsiders in Canada. As well as the insiders like Patrick Lewis and Commissioner Harris, Clara and Alice are also immigrants in their own country. Not only the outsiders but the insiders like the protagonist Patrick Lewis also find it difficult to survive in the multicultural country like Canada. Patrick Lewis knows very little about his culture. He is like an outsider who receives information about many things, including his own culture only after his interaction with immigrants' community.

Patrick has left behind his rural provincial background and arrived in the city of Toronto. Ondaatje has represented Patrick's entry into the new quicksand, in the world of Toronto leaving behind his solitude as:

> Patrick Lewis arrived in the city of Toronto as if it were land after years at sea. Growing up in the country had governed his childhood: the small

ISSN-2278-9758

> village of Bellrock, the highway of river down which the log drivers came, drinking working raucous, and in the spring leaving the inhabitants shocked within the silence…He was an immigrant to the city. (Ondaatje, Skin 53)

Patrick has been given the job of finding Ambrose Small, a lost billionaire. He befriends with Clara, Ambrose's wife in Paris. Patrick is an isolated person without any friend except Clara. She has not told him where Small is. She demands not to follow her after they drive to Toronto. After all Clara disappears from his life leaving him a blind "iguana." The theme of disappearance is rightly pointed out by Michael Greenstein as:

> Ambrose is missing, Patrick disappears into Clara who got lost in piano music, Nicholas looks for his absent nun, and the readers become another searcher refilling historical absence. (Greenstein, 102)

Disappearance and absence cause erasure of identity. After Clara's exit from Patrick's life, he works in lumber-yard as a labourer in the city, and Alice, Clara's friend finds Patrick still heartbroken over Clara. Alice suggests Patrick to heal himself of Clara. Patrick lives a life of silence for two years, broken hearted and finds Clara in his own hometown of Depot Lake, Ontario. He waits for Clara and finds Ambrose, tries to burn him. Injured Patrick stays in a hotel where Clara comes to visit him and treats his wound; makes love and leaves while he sleeps. Once again he loses Clara. Patrick works in the tunnel. The workers working in a tunnel are from different countries and they don't speak to one another. Patrick lives among the immigrant communities. Patrick can't understand the language of immigrants and perceives himself as an immigrant. Finally Patrick situates himself within Toronto's Macedonian communities. "He had discovered the Macedonian word for iguana, "goosther" and finally used it to explain his requests each evening at the fruit stall for clover and vetch. It was a breakthrough." (Ondaatje, Skin 112) Macedonian's active communal presence makes this area as 'Macedonian territory.' Patrick feels stranger among them in his own country and realizes "his street, their street, for he was their alien." (Ondaatje, Skin 113) In his own homeland he feels alienated. His cultural identity is crashed among these immigrant communities. The issue of identity loss is subtly portrayed by Ondaatje by portraying the lost identity of dyers in the Cypress Street leather factory. The dyers plunge into the pool of colours and lost their names even, and call each other

ISSN-2278-9758

by their country names only. This act maintains their ethnic identity but erases their personal identity, which once again poses questions for the survival of the individual.

Patrick's entry from his small town of Ontario to the city of Toronto makes him an immigrant in his own culture. "Now, in the city, he was new even to himself, the past locked away." (Ondaatje, Skin 54) Patrick is a man who knows nothing about the civilized society and with the limited provincial cultural background and now he has entered into the highly developed cultural setting of city. He is displaced from his limited childhood experiences to the vast setting of Toronto. "Twenty one years old Patrick dropped under the vast arches of Union station to begin his life once more." (Ondaatje, Skin 53) Glen Lorry in an article "The Representation of 'Race' in Ondaatje's In the Skin of a Lion" points out the trauma of immigration with the alienation of urbanization and remapping Toronto in terms of class struggle which is the cause of the cultural conflict as:

> Overlapping the trauma of immigration with the alienation of urbanization, it refigures the expansion of Toronto, the modern industrial core of an emergent nation state, within an international flow of bodies and cultures. Imagining voices for marginalized individuals and /or their forgotten communities, In the Skin of Lion re-maps Toronto in terms of class struggle; in so doing, it depicts city under construction returning readers to key sites in the social developments of the nation. (Lowry, 64)

Ondaatje expresses his deepest concern for the pangs and frustration of the immigrants as they have spent their life and labour in building the city of Toronto, but not a single one of them has found name in the official history of the city. This oblivion causes serious concerns in the minds of the expatriates and poses the question of assimilation and identity assertion. Patrick expresses his anguish when he goes through the library, searching about Ambrose Small:

> The articles and illustrations he found in the Riverdale Library depicted every detail about the soil, the wood, the weight of concrete, everything but information on those who actually built the bridge. (Ondaatje, Skin 145)

However, the novel depicts the plights and problems faced by the immigrant community as well as the insiders like Patrick Lewis in alien land. Though he is the part of dominant race and tradition, a Canadian born insider, is an immigrant in his own country and faces the problem

ISSN-2278-9758

of language. He is unknown with his country's culture. It also portrays the striking picture of cultural clash. The theme of isolation, alienation, dislocation and rootlessness is reflected. The novel depicts the excluded history of immigrants, who are the part of Canada's infrastructure.

Michael Ondaatje's next novel Anil's Ghost (2000), situated in Sri Lanka, addresses the complex relationship between religion politics, and violence in Sri Lanka in the context of cross-cultural background. The novel portrays the trauma of Sri Lankan Civil War ended in 2009. Ondaatje in an "Authors Note" of Anil's Ghost highlights the ongoing trauma of the civil war within the government, antigovernment insurgents and the separatist guerilla and number of disappearances of the loved ones as:

> From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, Sri Lanka was in a crisis that involved three essential groups: the government, the anti-government insurgents in the south and the separatist guerillas in the north. Both insurgents and the separatists had declared war on the government. Eventually in response, legal and illegal government squad where know to have been sent out to hunt down the separatists and the insurgents. (Ondaatje, Anil's unnumbered)

Born in Sri Lanka, studied in and lives mostly in America Anil carries with her a British passport so she possesses a hyphenated identity. Her identity is shaped in Sri Lanka, England and United states. Anil is a global traveler. She has no fixed identity. Her identity has undergone changes with time and place. Anil visits Lalita, her old ayah in Sri Lanka. The only connection she has with Sri Lanka is Lalita. "Lalita was the only person who taught her real things as a child." (Ondaatje, Anil's 20) When Anil visits Lalita, she barely communicates in Sinhala with Lalita. Lalita's granddaughter speaks in Tamil but Anil can understand only few words, she has to depend on Lalita's granddaughter, who speaks only in primary English. Anil compares this loss of language with the loss of ties with the motherland. The pang of separation or of not holding onto her past with the passing of time is translated by Ondaatje with a simple analogy with the thread of protection, tied in the East by the sisters to brothers or vice-versa:

> She struck a match, and in the dark hold, light focused and spilled up her arm. She saw the cotton thread of 'protection' on her left wrist, and then the match went out. In the month since the raksha bandhana had been tied on during a friend's pirith ceremony it had lost its rose colour. When she

ISSN-2278-9758

> pulled on a rubber glove in the laboratory, the thread was even paler under it, as if within ice. (Ondaatje, Anil's 5)

Her working in the West makes the ties weaker and this is suggested by the fading of colour of the thread due to laboratory gloves. Even Anil feels this loosening of ties and responds, "as if within ice." This icing of relations is acutely felt by her when she returns to Sri Lanka and find a lack of connection or communication with Lalita and Dr. Perera. The personal identity of Anil is confronted with her social identity in her homeland and she feels disturbed by it. This intruding habit of her homeland makes her to express her liking towards the West to Chitra: 'Oh – what do I like? Most of all I think I like that I can do things on my own terms. Nothing is anonymous here, is it. I miss my privacy." (Ondaatje, Anil's 68)

Anil is paired with local government archeologist Sarath Diyasena. Sarath tells Anil about the conflicting situation of the Sri Lanka during the Civil War. During the investigation she interacts with number of Sri Lankans but faces many problems like a migrant. Sri Lankan common man doesn't want any interfere by foreign powers and Anil is investigating the situation in Sri Lanka on behalf of International Human Rights Group in Geneva. Anil left Sri Lanka at eighteen for Higher education. While studying as a trainee forensic doctor at Guy's Hospital in London she feels alienated. In this new country Anil finds herself comfortable in the company of a medical student who is also from Sri Lanka. She loves him because of loneliness. She speaks with him about jaggery jackfruit or specific barber in Bampalapitiya. As a result of her alienation Anil marries with this Sri Lankan medical student. About Anil's married life Ondaatje in an interview with Catherine Bush states "they take their country with them to [the] the new place." (Bush) But soon Anil's marriage comes to an end. Anil divorces him and starts to live with no partner. Anil loses her only connection with Sri Lanka with whom she can speak about Sri Lanka. Ondaatje has presented Anil's feelings of rootlessness:

> She could cook a curry with him. She could refer to a specific barber in Bampalapitiya, could whisper her desire for jiggery or jackfruit and be understood. That made a difference in the new, too brittle country. Perhaps she herself was too tense with uncertainty and shyness. She had expected to feel alien in England only for few weeks. (Ondaatje, Anil's 137)

However, the novel Anil's Ghost paints the picture of everyday life during the Civil War or ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. The protagonist Anil Tissera, who is Sri Lankan by birth gazes her

ISSN-2278-9758

homeland as the representative of the Human Rights organization. She is torn between nostalgia for her Sri Lankan childhood and desire for the freedom of the exile. She feels rootless and alienated. At first, during her education period in England she feels isolated. She feels rootless and alienated. Her unsuccessful marriage with a Sri Lankan medical student is the result of her alienation. But her assimilation into foreign culture makes her complete foreigner with westernized outlook; even she no longer can speak Tamil or Sinhalese. While in Sri Lanka for her project she misses her life in West very much. Her character represents her fractured and fragmented identity. Sri Lankan government confiscates her report and forced to live the country is the indication of her double marginalization and crisis of her gender identity. Anil no longer continues the tradition of West as to fix the problem, go home and write a book about it. This is the story of the protagonist Anil who is a global traveler and faces the problem of cultural crash and identity crisis in the West as well as in her homeland.

However, Anil's fate to lose identity and suffering doesn't have an ending. Her identity as an insider is not stable. Government officials tries to discredit her whole investigation, her truth, her belief that, "One village can speak for many villages. One victim can speak for many victims." (Ondaatje, Anil's 272) Anil wishes to reveal the truth of government, that some government forces have possibly murdered innocent people. But the government confiscate her reports and she is told to work on another skeleton and report within forty eight hours. She was carrying no briefcase. "No papers." "No forensic equipment." (Ondaatje, Anil's 278)

Michael Ondaatje's fiction and transnational conceptions of space appear to suit one another rather well when it comes to the depiction of characters' identities. Ondaatje's description of the spaces of identity in which different nations and cultures are joined in boundary-transgressing unity precisely echoes trans-nationalism's perspective on the simultaneous experience of here and there of transnational lives. Nevertheless, Ondaatje's works do not only accentuate the positive experiences of transnational identities but also address their difficulties, such as the problem of different belief systems – for example in Anil's Ghost – which suppress the successful formation of transnational identities. Touching upon a similar concern, the rejection of migrants in the country of immigration is a topic in In the Skin of a Lion. The texts can therefore not be seen as a simple celebration of multicultural or post national ways of life, but reflect the challenges many contemporary migrants are faced with in a nuanced way: all stories are marked by a strong desire to unite spaces and transcend boundaries, no matter

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how successful they are in achieving it and thus seem to echo contemporary forms of life and identitieswhich are not bound by the borders of nation-states.

Ondaatje inherits the several types of hybridities such as racial, ethnic and socio-cultural hybridities. His status in Canada as a migrant causes crisis for identity. Ondaatje recreates the past eras of European and Canadian histories and chooses characters other than those from his own community. His novels and poems mainly focus on the issue related to identity crisis. His creative writing is influenced by the aspects of his life such as his migration to England and later to the Canada, his journeys across the continents, his alienation, his exile and his individual experiences. Avinash jodha has aptly analysed this confrontation:

> As the expatriate negotiates the opposing spaces of his origin and that of adoption, the strategies differ. The country of origin involves a looking back and there is a strong element of memory, both personal and communal. The cultural inheritance, and the past home is looked upon with nostalgia. Emotional ties, pain of separation surface and demand resolution. However, still grater is the challenge to seek a belonging with the country in the present with the distance of time and space. The treatment of the country of adoption involves and understanding of the landscape, culture, their internalization to some extent and carving out a place ion socio-economic and political terms. Multiple pulls, complex impulses, tug at/in the expatriate self as he/she struggles to negotiate identity and stability. (Jodha, 66)

ISSN-2278-9758

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Sport and Soft Power: The Growing Understanding in International Relations

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Abstract

The spectrum of international relations explores the multidimensional interactions and interconnections between nation- states and individuals across the world. Soft power has come out to be a valuable part of foreign policy objectives and cultural diplomacy especially, in the twentieth and twenty- first centuries. In this context, there is no denying the fact that sport has widely contributed as a soft power resource in ever changing geo-political affairs and thereby, becoming a fundamental area of studies in international relations. Given this backdrop, in the first section, this article endeavours to draw a framework to understand the growing nexus between soft power and sport. Following this consideration, this article wishes to explore the importance of soft power in international politics and how soft power can be explored through the prism of sport. In the last section, this article will investigate the multifunctional clusters of sports in world politics.

Keywords: international relations, soft Power, cultural diplomacy, sport etc.

Introduction:

In the new century when the multi-polar world is evolving with the changing geopolitical dynamics followed by the impact of swift globalization, a different phenomenon has emerged in global politics. Soft power appears to be an engine in driving and changing the contours of international relations among countries being intrinsically linked with factors such as cultural values, traditions, ideologies, social systems, mutual interdependence, and trust and so on. During the past few years, without a doubt, a growing academic understanding, and increasing political recognition about the impact of soft power on geopolitical dynamics have substantiated the necessity to classify, and assess the concept of soft power in an ever expanding diplomatic framework. Soft power, in its current usage, is structured upon the characteristics of culture, values of attraction and inclusive policies (Nye 1990, 167). It also tends to encapsulate Antonio Gramsci's concept of hegemony which stresses on the ideological and cultural power of the state to solidify its hegemony (Mahapatra 2016, 2). The concept of soft power was interpreted and explained by the renowned Harvard Scholar Joseph Nye in his book 'Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power' where he separated three types of power projection of a

ISSN-2278-9758

state: military domination, economic influence and influence through cultural links**.** Following this, he coined the term 'soft power' and 'co-optive power' which includes attraction (carrot) and threat (stick) to aid the attainment of a state's objective (Nye 1990, 188)

Given this backdrop, there is a growing understanding around international relations which fundamentally believes that sporting successes as part of governmental policy instrument, both domestically and internationally, has enhanced the countries' images, and served the purpose of achieving their social, political or economic gains. From the growing rivalry over hosting of international events like Olympics, World cup or Sport Mega Events (SMEs) to channelising sport as a confidence building measure in curbing international tensions, sport has served as a powerful source of soft power in manipulating the contours of international diplomacy and global political change. Following this context, the former United States ambassador to Denmark, Jim Cain's stated at Second Hague Conference in Diplomacy in 2009:

'Sport can be a powerful medium to reach out and build relationships… across cultural and ethnic divides, with a positive message of shared values: values such as mutual respect, tolerance, compassion, discipline, equality of opportunity and the rule of law. In many ways, sport can be a more effective foreign policy resource than the carrot and the stick (Murray 2012, 582)

Considering this context, it is imperative to explain the conceptual connotations of soft power under the broader purview of public diplomacy. Additionally, it is equally important to assess how sport has emerged as a powerful medium of soft power being intrinsically connected with the essential themes of ever changing geo-political affairs like nation building, public diplomacy and so on.

The Concept of Soft Power

Put simply, soft power, as opposed to hard power, is more than the ability to influence other actors; rather it's the ability to alter the policy preferences of the target country to produce the desired result one wants through attraction and not by coercion. Accordingly, by projecting soft power, states seek to persuade the foreign audiences to want what they want by creating a favourable and lasting image for them with their values and culture. It is no more denying that in spite of being an unpredictable asset, the ethnocentric resource of soft power has become the hallmark of national power in the post Cold War years when intangible power resources such as culture, ideology or institutions ought to strongly influence inter-state relations. Soft power is not similar to hard power which is based upon a country's military and economic strength. Soft power also equates to the Lukes' 'third dimension' of power which focuses on 'the power to shape, influence or determine others' beliefs and thereby ensuring their compliance (Lukes,

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2007: 90). This perception is also reflected in the Habermasian notion of legitimation and persuasion with regard to explain the factors behind the domination within democracies (Grix 2015, 155). Thus, considering this structural differentiation of these two types of powers it can be argued that although hard power is mostly built upon the material possessions of a country such as population, economic and military power which highlights the modus operandi of realists school, but soft power has grown out of the culture and community based people to people interaction among countries. Furthermore, moving away from the traditional state centric one way communication of old diplomacy, the arena of 'new public diplomacy' has expanded with the growing influence of soft power in which the two way symmetrical communications have largely contributed to influence the public opinion and initiate dialogues among the states in a state of political standoffs. Whereas classical diplomacy mostly stresses upon the interactions between governments and policy makers, new public diplomacy also refers to the role of non state actors. In this sense, soft power also expands the sphere of new public diplomacy by recognising and incorporating sporadic involvement of non state actors in international affairs to felicitate intercultural communications, dialogues, reconciliation and integration.

The interrelationship between Soft power and Sport

As addressed by Levermore, One could put forward the argument that there are lacunae in understanding and explaining the political usage of global sports cultures within the framework of international studies (Levermore and Budd 2004, 6, 7, 8) However, effective staging of Sports Mega Events (SMEs) which engages multifarious non state actors, such as the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) or International Olympic Committee (IOC), have arguably widened the vertical and horizontal networks of modern diplomacy and thereby, commanded the attention of international relations scholars to pursue a discursive and empirically based analysis on the growing nexus between sport and politics or diplomacy. Following the functional utility of sport in geo-political affairs, Murray and Pigman has highlighted that 'international sport creates opportunities for governments to demonstrate various types of superiority, from their athletic prowess to the ideology of a particular system of state. Governments are well aware of the power of the opiate of the masses and have long been drawn towards sport and sporting festivals' (Murray and Pigman 2014, 1100). In this context, Allison (1993, 17) further added that all type of governments 'have endorsed international sporting competition such as a testing ground for the nation or for a political 'system'. German Nazis, Italian Fascists, Soviet and Cuban Communists, Chinese Maoists, western capital democrats, Latin American juntas – all have played the game and believed in it'. This relates to a series of sporting events which are found to be instrumentalised as potential political weapon in international politics aiming at arousing national pride on the international stage and boosting

ISSN-2278-9758

their agencies in international politics. For instance, the hosting of 1936 Nazi Olympic was seen as the most influential and calculated use of sports mega events, which showcased the culture and political values of the then Germany. Under Nazi leadership Olympic Games was propagandized as "Hitler's Games" with the purpose of securing image of Nazism in global power hierarchy (Min 2015, 21) Cuban sports policy, as noted by Bush, also created huge political impression through its capacity building programmes by sending 100 sportsmen and women to some 100 developing countries which led to strengthen cooperation between Cuba and other developing countries. China's strategy behind organising 2008 Olympic Games, being promoted by a theme of Chinese narrative of national harmony in the opening ceremony of Beijing Games, has indicated its rise as a potential global player in the world**.** Beijing's cumulative television audience in this event reached around four billion which was very impressive (Grix 2015, 167) Besides, Brazil's successful staging of 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games along with the hosting of the Rio+20 United Nation Conference has successfully pushed Brazil to shift from regional actor to global power in international affairs. (Grix 2015, 171 - 172)

Thus, considering the above discussions it is pertinent to explore sport as a credible mechanism of soft power. Given this backdrop, three dimensions of sport as significant elements soft power can be discussed below: image building through sport, dialogue making through sport and cultural diplomacy through sport.

Image Building through Sport

Although, the liabilities of branding any country's image depends on the concerned governmental policies, but the reputation of the nation is determined by the target audiences and foreign governments. The collective attraction and global legitimacy concerning sporting events help the states in projecting a sense of national pride. It often appeared to be a deliberate strategic tool to channelize large-scale sporting events aimed at promoting state's images abroad as well as attracting inward investments and trade to leverage regeneration. Achievements of athletes of a country also intensify a sense of collective national identity while representing nations of millions. Especially, in the time of World War I and World War II, sport became 'an expression of national struggle, and sportsmen representing their nation or state, primary expression of their imagined communities' **(**Hobsbawm 1992, 143)**.** Thus, mobilizing its sporting resource by hosting sporting events as a mechanism of nation branding, a nation can maximize its image and its agencies in the international arena with a motive to achieve non-sporting goals. For example, Australia became called as 'Sport Nation' during and after 2000 summer Olympic Games. In accordance with the report of the Australian Tourist Commission, this successful

ISSN-2278-9758

outcome of the event has helped Australia to improve its country's brand as much as 10 years. (Feizabadi et al. 2015, 15)

Dialogue making through Sport

Sporting events also can effectively be instrumentalised for initiating and enhancing the platform for dialogue making especially when tradition diplomacy failed to bring normalcy between the conflicting nations. The universal principles of sport such as inclusion, team spirit, and respect for the opponents, fair play or tolerance are considered to be the most appealing characteristics of sports which are expected to be appropriated for the greater service of negotiation or dialogue making, peace and global solidarity. This is due to these cross-cultural values of sport, the United Nations has appropriated 24 resolutions with the purpose of incorporating sport into peace building and peacemaking strategy. It also founded UN Office on Sport for Development and Peace (UNOSDP) aiming at harnessing sports as a cost effective mechanism to facilitate cultural exchanges, people to people contacts, post-conflicting relief, rapprochement, conflict prevention, resolution, and reconciliation (United Nations, 2008) To illustrate this point more concretely, the conscious and successful strategy behind the historic event called 'Ping Pong Diplomacy' is mention worthy. With the conviction of making sport as an 'ice-breaker' between USA and China, the diplomatic efforts of sporting cooperation between these countries cannot be disagreed. This historic match has led them to open the doors of formal negotiations after long freeze in their relations following a basketball competition between them after one year later. According to Cha's observation 'Ping-pong diplomacy offered an out-of-box channel for demonstrating good intentions that no other form of diplomacy could replicate. The event contributed to an underlying decision by the Nixon administration to engage China' (Cha 2009, 1594). When diplomatic climate of international relations was clouded by cold war propaganda, a real breakthrough took into place when United States table tennis team had visited China in 1971 accompanied by the US President Nixon's decision to lift a trade embargo with China. China's superiority in ping pong and US' excellence in basketball had set the stage for turning sports into a positive forum of diplomatic innovation.

Cultural Diplomacy through Sport

It is also imperative to mention that certain aspects of soft power also equates to cultural power. In other words, sport seems to be valuable both as a resource and as a relevant arena of public diplomacy when competitions over cultural power among states have become strongly visible which develop closeness and positive relations among different groups and peoples across the globe through which negative perceptions about a country or a region can be changed. For example, the hosting of 27 SEA by Myanmar turned out to be the most successful regional

ISSN-2278-9758

sporting event which reasonably showed their government's effort to convince the world that they are open for business after long years of military rule and isolation**.** Moreover, South East Games can be a good example of culturally significant and politically important international sporting cooperation in contemporary times which encourages soft power diplomacy among Southeast Asian Countries. With an aim of enhancing cooperation and greater integration of this region an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Sports (AMMMS) was recommended in 18th ASEAN Summit in Jakarta in 2011.20 (Min 2015, 35, 39, 40)

Conclusion

Coming to conclusion, it can be argued that soft power as a part of public diplomacy has become an intrinsic part of global politics where sporting actions can be utilised to send subtle messages to foreign audiences with a purpose of serving the national interests. The effective staging of sports mega events by states have been seen instrumental in attracting attention of billions of people across the globe, showcasing the culture and values of the hosting nations and thereby, altering the negative stereotypes about their countries among international audiences. Although there are instances of sporting hooliganism which often leads to war like situation and end up with the negative image of sport. For instance, a long term animosity between El Salvador and Honduras over the issues like border conflicts, political intrigue, migration problems leading to a 'Soccer war' (Bar-On 2017, 43) was the prominent example of intersection between state sport and conflict. Despite all these evidences being centered on the aggressive reflections of sport, the universally acclaimed values of sports cannot be denied. The growing rivalry over the bidding for and hosting of sporting mega events among the emerging global players like the India, China or Brazil are the recent geopolitical developments which complemented and reinforced the relevance of sport as a legitimate soft power entity in achieving the desired outcomes in international system.

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Emergence of New Trends in Students Movements and its Impact on Political Institutions

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Abstract

Indian history is enriched with the phenomena of social movements. Student's movement is one of the frequent occurrences and has occupied prominence in contemporary India. Upsurge of the recent trends seen in the collective actions of the students at Marina Beach for Jallikattu in 2017 and from the inclusion of Bollywood entity in current JNU protest, have brought in the keen interests to do the analytical study on the evolution of student's activism tracing from the history of students movements till the present. The article reviews the change in the old and new social movements. Kerala, Delhi, Tamil Nadu etc. are the few states of India where, student's action is active. Therefore the paper evaluates state based student's movements pertaining to their role of political actions and social needs. Indian political system is a nexus between the authority, Industrialists, farmers, professionals and most importantly Youths. India strongly campaigns for its youths, which makes us to ponder few related topics like; the connection between political Institutions (legislature) and students and how does a movement by students affect the political institution? This leads the paper to conduct another intellectual exploration. One of the regions in India, Karnataka had banned students union since 1989-90 and had student's council running instead, for almost as 28 years. Thus, it requires an inquiry into what is the future of students union and their movements? Subsequently the following subject that needs to be debated and

ISSN-2278-9758

discussed are: will the Centre make legislations to ban all students union and replace that with the student council, by affirming on the issue that, students politics must be concerned about issues (improving conditions of life in the campus) which directly affect the students community. On the contrary, if it happens, then in my opinion, students union will fail to exist as an effective pressure group of Indian democracy.

Key words: students and politics, pre-independence and post-colonial, political institutions, political affiliations, campus politics, students union and students council.

Student's struggle in India has a history of more than 150 years. There is hundred percent agreements amongst Historians, sociologists, political activists, scholars, social workers and others on the identity of Students as the educated youth of a society. Students have played a central role in India's struggle for freedom by giving reason and soul to the movements. Their first strike as an independent initiator was at the King Edward Medical College Lahore on the issue of academic discrimination between English People and Indians. There have been innumerable Incidents of student's involvement in small and mass movements, which have shaken the foundation of British Raj then. 1905, a protest against scheme of partition which was spearheaded by Surendra Nath Banerji and Bipin Candra Pal, was another example of the beginning of students resentments and their engagements in protests. In the period of Contemporary India, there was a massive protests by a large group of students on 16th January 2017, in the state of Tamil Nadu, against the ban on Jallikattu hit a huge success that had impacted both executive and judiciary wing of the political Institution to an extent that as a

ISSN-2278-9758

result, theban made by the Supreme Court of India in 2014 on Jallikattu as a cruelty to animals, was uplifted by an ordinance promulgated by the executive. However, on the issue of the latest occurrence of student's strike which is against the hot enacted Bill by the Parliament on Citizenship Act on 12th December 2019 and against the proposal to newly enacts a nationwide National Register of Citizens, is still going on, and creating comprehensive disapproval from the Nation. Incident then or now, clearly, emphasizes upon the continuity in the crucial part played by the actions of students and its influence on the Authority. The existence of this particular group and its relationship with the formal governmental Institutions arise within the political system. To understand the nexus between the students union, their movements and their impact on the public authorities, epistemologically, there is need to venture into the idea about the social system and Political system is needed. Within the social system, there exists number of varied fabrics in a society like groups of individuals bearing their integrity depending on caste, class, religion, professionals, ethnicity etc. Then there is a Political system, which is the study of Politics and the structure of Government. Political Thinker Almond, have described Political System as structure and role; activity and associations. The system is conceived as an interconnecting network of specifically political roles. This includes the state, the Government and the other formal Institutions. In modern world, the social system has integrated with political system; constructing as a third group called a civil society which exists as a subsystem to the political society. This clearly means that, the political system is the larger unit which comprises of the public authorities and the other environmental structures of residuary characteristics, of which the latter includes the various kinds of pressure groups. Almond Pressure groups into four different parts and they are: Institutional groups, Non-associational groups, Associational groups and Anomic groups. These voluntary environmental groups when interacts more likely to

ISSN-2278-9758

express dissatisfaction with the formal-legal-political institutions, for a purpose is considered as a social movements. Therefore, a social movement is a deliberate collective endeavor to promote change in any direction and by any means not excluding violence, illegality, revolution or withdrawal from the main political stream. The above mentioned four groups historically divided by Comparative Political thinker Almond broadly falls into a social system. Of the many Movements of different types like peasants, feminists, Dalit's, Backward. There are a student's movements. Thus, Student is an integral part of the social system, which is classified into the Associational groups, which puts the formal authorities in accountable positions through their activity as a union. Moving forward, it is necessary to understand what is student's union and their movement? Students union refers to the collection of learning professionals from the education circle. They are mostly the emergence of influential youths of a society with strong political spirit. And as far as the student's movement is concerned, India has seen years of academic unrest in the past and in the present. Students movements is a social or political protest by the student's representative for a narrow and immediate cause, affecting student's lives within the campus or for a broader social cause or it can be even be connected to a political interests. Further analysis, on the grounds related to the interlink ages between the social system, political system Vis a Vis students movements and political authorities leads the author to exploring another dimension of students role in the pre independence, modern free India, and postmodern India. Eminent postcolonial thinker Partha Chatterjee and other neo Marxists like Gramsci deconstruct the notion of civil society as another branch of the colonial roots, which is nothing but cooperation between the authorities and the individuals in a system. As far as the relation between the modern India and postmodern India, the student's position in civil society as a potential pressure group is seen to be changing in postmodern era. There is tangible upsurge of

ISSN-2278-9758

student's outlook and their techniques currently. Student's role has gone far and beyond the Eurocentric role as a member of civil society to becoming an independent, politically awakened and socially concerned powerful subalterns of the third world Country.

No definite trace to find the origin of Students movement, however it is known that the essence of class consciousness did not develop much during the ancient and medieval period, therefore the existence of students movement is seen to be prevalent in modern India tracing back to the British period. Social movements became a major topic only when the integrated discipline as political sociology emerged. Majority of earlier studies of sociology are related to kinship, caste and village society. And the concept of politics adopted by political scientists by American and British traditions is narrow, confined to the political system whose functions are: Rule making, Rule application and Rule adjudication. For many political scientists, 'politics is who gets what and how in society (Lasswell and Kaplan 1950).Along with other social movements, the popularity of Students Movements was gained in 1960's and 1970's.Nevertheless, its first appearance can be dated back to nearly 200 years ago as a course of activism against the discrimination between the whites and coloured students at King Edward Medical College Lahore. Forums were founded and associations were established for the students to take part in an open house discussion, to articulate demands and to express discontent in case of unfair treatment by the campus authorities. Also, to have a vision for pursuit of intellectual exploration and a mission to keep educational vigor high. For example, formation of the Academic Association in Undivided Bengal's Hindu College under the guidance of Henry Louis Vivian Derozio, in 1828. In 1848, Dadabhai Naroji founded 'The student's scientific and historic society', as a forum for discussion. In subsequent years, several more debating societies came up across educational institutions, namely the Marathi Literary Societies in Bombay College etc.

ISSN-2278-9758

Thus, during the age of Renaissance, these establishment in the first half of the British India gave an exposure to modern literature and science which paved the way to rational and progressive thought among the educated youth Students commitment in the freedom struggle is marked as a turning point in their movements in India as the nationalist movements provided a political identity to the Indian youth in general and students youth in particular. Roughly, from early 19th C to India's independence is observed as a first phase of students movements. Early period of this phase involved movements related to social reforms and students association took full interest in fight against the social evil, social oppressions and backwardness. Political consciousness drove in students community and influenced it only after the outbreak of first war of Independence. The development of which was seen as early as 1875; when Anand Mohan Bose established "Students Association" where steps were raised to spread political awareness among the students community in the interest of country. 1893,a small strike was visible by the students under the leadership of Ashutosh Mukherjee in protest against the trial of Surendranath Banerjee who was the main faculty responsible for developing the sense of struggle for Independence amongst students. However, the event of communal split of Bengal pulled a trigger for a widespread protest by the students groups.1905, ignited a massive uprising from students community as a protest in the swadeshi movement. Including boycott of schools, there was a massive assembly of students at College Square, in Kolkata as much as 3000, protesting against the suppressive circular issued by Bengal Governor Carlise, threatening to punish and rusticate any student participating in the Swadeshi movement. This event formed, 'Anti-circular society, an organization with strong mass base, whose activities spread to Dhaka, Medinipur, and Tripura.

ISSN-2278-9758

After this, a new wave of socialist thought was emerging, on the lines of Marxist and Leninist ideas which influenced thousands of Indian students the 1920s. Then, there was mass movement of 1920 non-cooperation which took all of India in its initiative to fight back colonial oppression. This movement got a huge response from Group of students from Vidyasagar College, Ripon College. Students from these colleges met at Shraddhananda Park with black flag in protest and vowed to not return to college till independence was attained. However, to their dismissal, the mass movement was called off in 1922. Just few years after a pause, in 1928 the entire country rose up to protest the Simon commission for not including any Indian representatives. At Bombay there was a nationwide hartal, a Kolkata a strike in schools and colleges. Bethune College joins in the protest and for the first time girls participation in a strike.

Student politics took stronghold from 1919 onwards and in post 1935, birth of organized students association started taking place. In 1936, on 12th August the All India Students Federation was formed in Lucknow at the All India Students Conventions, which was presided by Muhammad Ali Jinnah and was inaugurated by Jawaharlal Nehru. This is a non-sectoral, non-communal organization which brings together students of every color, shades and opinion. The framed charter included demands for educational rights, compulsory and free primary education, using mother-tongue as the medium of education, recognition of students unions, and giving the public to control primary and secondary education. These well-organized students union with congress backing and other communist ideological leaders backing, not only spearheaded freedom struggle movements and continued rallies and campaigns against anti-imperialism, racism and fascism. The first All-India Student's Conference met at Lucknow in August 1936. Nine hundred and eighty-six delegates came from 210 local and 11 provincial organizations to attend this session. Likewise there were many as three conferences were organized with determined aims

ISSN-2278-9758

and objectives and their laid out activities. The reflection of activities of student's organized unions and federations was visible from its spread in Punjab, U.P. Bengal, madras and other provinces. Towards the end of second phase of student's movements during nationalist struggle was a continuous support and participation of students in second non-cooperation movement-civil disobedience, to protest against Gandhi-Irwin pact, to mass rally in Quit-India movement and in the end there was a protest from Bengali students on Mountbatten's plan of partition, urging their demands to let live both Muslims and Hindus in the same state of Bengal. In spite of it, at the midnight of 14thAugust, 1947, Independent India was partitioned. In the whole time, students community could not refrain itself from the circle of political turmoil. Student's community constructed its strong base in India's struggle against anti-colonialism and gaining Independence has also smoothly made its way in post-independence free India, getting ready to meet its new issues and challenges.

With Independence, the nature of student's politics changed on the basis of the transformation in the Indian politics. The movement continued but this time it was against the unpopular activity of the Indian government for the purpose of the socio-economic concerns. Leaders of free India, promised its people that their dream of illuminating India where there is proper education, opportunity of employment, religious tranquility, containment of poverty etc. Unfortunately, the whole of escape from its tragedy of war effect, refugees' rehabilitation, famine, unemployment, food crisis and several other problems. In conjunction with that there was high economic depletion, which ill effect was experienced relative higher in states like Bengal, U.P and Bihar. Naturally, there occurred a problem of educated unemployment raising an alarming proportion. This created anger, discontent amongst the youth and students of these regions because of their

ISSN-2278-9758

loss of faith in the Congress and on parliamentary politics. It was clear to them, that the then, leaders failed to provide leadership to the rural landless and the urban educated youths. Instead of uprooting the traces of colonial rule, leaders of our country chose to live with the lines of values of imperialists owing support to the landowning and rich classes.All these led to the ongoing protest by the student's community even after the Independence. This gave a political opportunity for other smaller political factions to gain students support for their own vested interests. Resultant, there was an evolution of many students union, branching out from various political parties. Particularly in Bengal. Such as Chhatra Bloc affiliated to Forward Bloc, Progressive students Union affiliated to Revolutionary Socialist Party, Democratic Students Organization affiliated to Socialist Unity Centre of India. Except AISCF, which was split and it converted in to All India Students Union of India (NSUI), in 1947 itself. It became the student wing of the Congress party. The students protest involved socio-economic movements, movements in favor of the refugees, food crisis movements, unemployment movements, Teacher-students movements, Chipko movements. The paper will discuss three major protests in the third phase of the students movement.

Naxalite movement:

The period of 1960s was dominated with the Naxalite movements in areas of West Bengal, Kerala, AP and Bihar. These movements have drawn students support from Calcutta and elsewhere in to the struggle. Large number of students had come together to support the landless peasants, tribal community and to contribute in whatever ways for the battle against the age old landlords and zamindars. 1967, The outbreak of an agrarian movement at Naxalbari, in the

ISSN-2278-9758

outskirts of the Siliguri Sub-division of Darjeeling district was one of the significant movement in agrarian matters. Another important feature of this movement was, it had received students participation at par with the peasants involvement. Students associating with the landmark agrarian Naxalbari Movement, had socio-economic and political effect. Politically, the opposition party mostly, the leftists began to get ground support from the students wing, which acted as a catalysts in galvanizing support from the public in the forthcoming state election to be held in the 1967. Congress in turn was losing its popularity. On the eve of the election of 1967, CPI(M) promised in their Election Manifesto that they would end the police interference in stopping any democratic movement, if they were ever brought into power. The party won the election. It is known that, peasant uprising of Naxalbari toured a big section of youths and students community which began in deliberating on revolutionary politics and it seems has created a stir among the students of North Bengal University and Presidency College who organized demonstration in support of the peasant struggle. According to Kisan Chatterjee, the then veteran student leader of NBU, the problems of the peasant always posed to be social problem to them. But the victory of the Left Front did not bring about any changes in the hitherto repulsive political landscape of west Bengal. This was a starter of the jingoist movement of the students who were then much agonized by the frustrating volte-face of the Left front Government".

Anti-emergency Movement:

1974 was the beginning of a dark phase in Indian politics. Movements started rising upagainst the then ruling Government, which was responsible for the political mishaps.

ISSN-2278-9758

popular anger over the rise in the prices of foodgrains, cooking oil and other essential commodities exploded in the cities and towns of the state in the form of a student movement which was soon joined by the opposition parties. Students of two states Gujurat and Bihar were fully involved inthe protests against the poor governance of their states and demanding dissolution of the assembly which led to forcing out the existing government and having a fresh election. This was the same pattern of protest in these states. The dramatic event of students protest in Gujarat was backed by the opposition leader, Morarji Desai and Bihar protest by J.P.Narayan. The Gujarat wave of protest was a big success and Inspired by the success of the Gujarat agitation, a similar kind of protest was started by students in Bihar in March 1974. The students, starting with the gherao of the assembly on 18 March. The Bihar movement was, however, characterised by two new features. Jayaprakash Narayan, popularly known as JP, came out from political retirement, took over its leadership, and gave a call for 'Total Revolution' and going beyond Bihar and organize a country-wide movement against widespread corruption and for the removal of Congress and Indira Gandhi. The JP Movement attracted wide support especially from students, middle classes, traders and a section of the intelligentsia.In a rally in Delhi on 25 June JP announced that a nation-wide one-week campaign of mass mobilization and civil disobedience to force Mrs. Gandhi to resign would be initiated on 29 June. JP urged the people to make it impossible for the government to function and once again appealed to the armed forces, the police and the bureaucracy to refuse to obey any orders they regarded as 'illegal' and 'unconstitutional'. Mrs. Gandhi's lightening response was to declare a state of Internal Emergency on 26 June.

ISSN-2278-9758

Mandal Commission:

Nation wide protest by students from Universities and Colleges was visible in 1990, against the V.P.Singh, then Prime Minister's decision to implement Mandal Commission's report, which constituted to give at least 27% reservation to OBCs, resulting to 49.9% of reservation in public Universities and government jobs on the basis of their birth instead of merit. Massive students protest on similar lines occurred against Congress –UPA government to implement reservation for the Other Backward Classes(OBCs) in Central and Private institutes of higher education, including All India Institute of Medical Sciences(AIIMS), Indian Institute of Technology(IITs), Indian Institute of Science(IISc), calling it as discriminatory, dying meritocracy and was driven by Vote-bank politics. During the third phase, movements like The Nav Nirman Student Movement in Gujarat (1973), Bihar Students Movement (1974), Asam Students Movement(1979) are the few examples that was pertinent.

In India, students movement has undergone an evolutionary process. An analysis reveals that there is a noticeable difference between the pre Independence and Post- Independence phase of students movements. Though, the students protests against the authorities was in the narrow matters, which concerned their lives. But their objective of the students community got bigger to the extent that they got involved with the rest of India as an important group in a war against Colonialism and Imperialism. As in regards to freedom struggle movements. While in the case of students movement after the independence, fought against the infamous activities of the government authority, with a broader objective for diversed socio-economic and political concerns, which means active

ISSN-2278-9758

participation in peaseants, tribals, women's and other movements. In addition to this, as far as the political support to the students Association is concern, Indian National Congress, was the sole and only big political organization that existed to back students union. On the other hand, between 1947 to 1980, in due course of time, the political scenario had changed drastically, which led to the transformation in numbers of birth of students Organizations. AISF was split up to become separate wing of Congress party, NSUI Then, there was emergence of The Akhil BharatiyaVidyathi Parishad(ABVP) in 1949, and many others like, Chhatra Bloc affiliated to Forward Bloc, Progressive students Union affiliated to Revolutionary Socialist Party, Democratic Students organization affiliated to Socialist Unity Centre of India. These many political party affiliation, However, may have disadvantage of creating many factions within the community of students, causing weaker and fragmented agendas. Another significant dissimilarity is in the affairs of students position in both the eras. In British India, students were considered as strong allay of India's freedom fighters, where as, in Free India, the position of students union is a potentially powerful pressure group. The position is seems to be changed due to the students campaigning and drawing support base for political parties during elections in conjunction with the campus election in itself has made the students as an dominant entity in our society, so much so that they can spearhead students protest without any political support. Last observation is that, the best effect of advancing education is reaped by the students. Students today unlike the early modern India, uses technology, media in its best advantages giving them the scope of easy connectedness with India and the World.

Moving forward, India has entered into its fourth generation of students community of 21st century. Reckoning the recent trends in 20th century students movements, the next

ISSN-2278-9758

section of the study will involve in understanding the contemporary students movements on university basis and state basis for example Tamil Nadu. It is to be found that Movements of the early phase of 19th century was not well defined and their activities were of sporadic nature. It was also difficult to discover a movements of students only. Students of contemporary time have transformed into a more organized group, which is politically awakened and socially driven. Students movements is as old as University. This means students movement starts from university based. One of the important phase of developing students solidarity happened in its initial stage of mid 50's when the spread of education began with the establishment of universities in Calcutta, Madras and Bombay. College education began in India in the 1850s. There were 2.4 lakh students attending College in 1946-47. Their number has increased to 31.3. lakh in 1979-80. A large number of students participated in the freedom movements at various stages and launched agitation against their own Universities and Colleges authorities. Similar agitations have continued in the post-independence period. There was many records oflarge scale disturbances as "students indiscipline" in the Banaras Hindu University and universities of several other cities of Calcutta, Indore in 1958, and it continued in Universities in Delhi in later periods from 70's. The movements by students from mid 1970's and now is lot of difference. The most notable is that the students as an important source of power for a country, is now an organized intitaor, of a well formulated group that challeneges the government from its root, without any political help. Today's movements taken by the 21st century students gets the fullest support from other social groups more than probably any other social movements. Further crystallization of students movement reveals that even in today's time the movements of students happening

ISSN-2278-9758

in big university campus is more impactful than other social movements. Students community today constitute a primary source of technologically trained manpower and an important impetus to the process of modernization. They have well organized themselves into political and social actions. The study takes to the dimension of fast pacing students union that can shake the foundation of sovereign power and collect social support. To support the argument the illustration of incidents from Jawaharlal University can be taken and the most recent incidents of students rally in Tamilnadu. Let us start briefly with what was JNU like? JNU was an elite educational landscape of upper class Intellectuals. It was a creation of congress with a vision to produce large number of network of guild organization of professionals and bureaucrats which will contribute to build a nation. JNU was established in 1969, with an objective to make it a novel institution of higher learning and research. The beginning of early journey of student union protest was for demand to have equitable allocation of resources within the university. For example reduce room rents, monthly mess rate, abolition of tuition fees for scholars etc. Apart from these economic demands the union campaigned towards academic restructure at least a provision to constitute a body of academics to revaluate the papers for which the students request to.

The institution lent academic and intellectual legitimacy to India's foreign and economic policies. The journey of JNU from then on continued under the influence of left of the Centre ideological framework. India was also in close proximity with Soviet Union introduced a strong communist influence by manifesting in the form of the rise of students federalism of india and the All India Students Federation (AISF) as the students wings of the CPM & CPI respectively. Congress had their love and patronage for JNU continued

ISSN-2278-9758

till emergency. Resentment of AISF against Gandhi started. This led her to support the rise of National Students Union of India as the students wing of the Congress party in JNU. However, 2014, there is observed that the rise of BJP under Atal Bihari Vajpayee and since 2014 under Modi, there has been fast growth of Akhil Bharatya Vidyarthi Parishad as a student wing. The field of JNU became the ground of protest by the Students Union to be heard. There has been a cordial nexus between students and Administration. But recent developments speaks of mishandling of management affairs by the students. It is seen that the students protests are pouring out across colleges in Delhi against privatization of education, fee hikes, poor condition of life etc. However, premium universities in Delhi was not meant to be yet another centre of learming. These universities were designed to bring intellecuality , effective practices of values and free will. The effect of which is seen from the issues concerning them and society. Universities of this kind is required for the nation in making and ensuring the structure is in right spirit. These universities helps in knowledge production, inventions of thought to occur and engages in opinion formulation. The university based students intellectual rigor is required to break the advancing, linear, patriarchal, rigid top-driven system of thought. Premium institutes have seen violence in the past few weeks. 21st century students fight has revealed not only an ideological stark difference between the Left and the Right , but also an attack on one another. This shows a negative fall back of student community. Since the emergency time, there has been a serious lockdown on any ambush by the students. Their protest has returned in campus after 2014.December 15, 2019, students of Jamia Millia Islamia in Delhi and Aligarh Muslim University suffered from police launched crackdown. Two Sundays later, three masked men intruded into the campus and had

ISSN-2278-9758

beaten up both the male and female students, leaving them wounded, ended up to their admitted to AIIMS. In the same pattern of protest, incident of Huderabad University can be retold. Rohit Vemula, a research scholar hailing from a Dalit Community committed a suicide after he and four other students were expelled by the administration. Against this unfair punishment, a wide reage protest began that spread to all the University Campus in the Country forgetting the government. The division between the left and the right was complete when in February 2016, in JNU campus an event was organized to voice protest over hanging of Afzal Guru, held guilty in parliament attack 2001. The protest by the left had fierced the right wing students leading them to raise slogans as " TukdeTukde Gang". The latest violence against JNU premises is the extension of the divide. Students all over the country today are protesting against the CAA and NRC. The mode of protest, not leaving behind old fashioned methods of protest like demonstration, gheraos, strikes , meetings processions etc, currently, students are using its new trends of using technology like petitions through mails, facebook pages, posting posters on social media etc. Secondly, the neo students movement have managed well in spearheading the protest without any political guidance or support. Also, students of early days as far as late 20th century to early 21st century were united as one unit, which has parted away to two opposing factions divided on ideological lines. Students are powerful tool of politics. Students momentous steps in Bengal Renaissance that turned into an Indian Renaissance of 20th Century is now on the roll as a big social movement. Also that now various educational campus, including the prestigious IITs, IISc and IIMs saw protest by the students against the police crackdown in Jamia in Delhi on Sunday night and against the controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act.

ISSN-2278-9758

Yet another new fashion of students movement is reflected from 2016 Marina beach incident of Tamil Nadu. Be it the struggle of Caste discrimination or better medical and hostel facilities or protecting local cultural heritage, students union in Tamil Nadu has always been in the fore front of the issues.2010, a protest dharna was organized in Salem demanding proper maintenance of Hostels and payments of scholarship dues. Same year, a girl student died because of inadequate health care facilities. Another incident was of an outstation student of Annamalai University, Chidambaram who met his death after falling from an overcrowded bus. The tragedy occurred due to negligence and delay to have the investigation or silent on the matter has caused resentment agains the authorities demanding protests from students. The police called to stop the protest, in the incident of lathi charged on the students protesting led to the tragic death of three students from Bihar. Another incident was from Tamil Nadu was the issue caste based Identity Card to the students. The management of the school issued ID Cards to the students where they were marked by their Caste discrimination. The students Union AISF taken the issue and stood victorious , assuring the immediate withdrawal of the discriminatory ID Cards by the authorities. These are the few basic demands of the students and their rights that must be taken forward. Above all that, 2016, incident had taken everyone in whole India with surprise. The incident clearly demonstrated the power of students in Indian landscape. January 2017, a tourist place in the heart of the capital of one of the states of India, had become student's occupancy for raising local voice in support for protecting the play of Jallikatu. Atleast as 4000, students had gathered at Marina beach. For almost as 4 days intense campaigning against the supreme court upheld of 2014 verdict of the ban of Jallikatu. The movement was definetly not the revival of any of the other students

ISSN-2278-9758

movement ever occurred past. It rather added a new upsurge which were: The students initiated the movement. They gained support from its own faculties from various institution ranging from schools to colleges to universities. Another new trends to add was it did not have any ideological factions. The movement was intense yet peaceful. The political parties were refrained to either take part in the movement or from giving their support. Students in this protest used social media to urge common man to come and join them. All the more very important was that the movement gave scientific explanation on how a native cattle breed (only five left) can survive with the continuity of Jallaikatu. Another logical reason was to encourage the use of good breed bulls for farming , which would give incentive to our farmers as well. Therefore the movement suggested the ban is not a good idea, rather there be a strong law to protect the safety of bulls y persecuting the human predators causing harm to the animals. The paper gives a detailed analysis of the thread of events about students protest from a pre-independence to the post-colonial period expresses a close relationship between students and politics. Major issues of unrest ranging from fight for India's political sovereignty, naxalite issues, language issues to more confined to the subject like revision in the education policy, fee revision, admissions and appointment of vice-chancellor have had impact on the political organizations and institutions India is the biggest functioning democracy and is one of the top 3 leading countries in the world with the largest number of university students. Having such a unique position, its impact is felt on the political organization for decades prior to 1947. INC got full support of the students in their battle to form India's own government. After gaining political Independence, the strengthening of students movement and outbreak of more than one students union led to the wide emergence of competitive political parties

ISSN-2278-9758

extending their support to these Unions.

In the preview of the students movements which develops into major political implications and complexities in Indian society, there is one vital anticipatory question arises out of deduction is – should India's student Union be transferred to Students council? If presumably Yes! Let us assess the possibility. What is a Student council? A student council is a group of elected students working together within the framework of a constitution. They contribute to the school spirit and its community welfare. Second step, is how does student council differ from students union? There are many parameters upon which they can be differed. Number one, on the subject matter, contrary to the students union whose scope of dealing with issues is beyond campus extending to socio-political matters aswell, on the other hand, the students council, represent for the issues confined to the campus. Secondly, membership to the students council is exclusive not inclusive. The nature of the students council is curricular and nature of students union is extra academic. Election to the students union is open, wide and independent of authorities. Whereas students council election is controlled by college authorities. Third step, what are the benefits of establishment of student council? The council has a soft approach to redressing of students grievances in the Institutions. Recruitment of members is through the tradition of merit over mass popularity. Students union mostly has turned into confrontational, but student council works in coordination with the institution. Furthermore, future political ambition do not play a part in students council's agenda. Next, will the government try to curtail the activism of students as an in disciplinary and take steps to dissolve the union to establish students council. Let us analyse the consequence of the council and why would it not be the suggestive alternative to the union either for the students, political institutions

ISSN-2278-9758

and for an Indian democracy. If students council is a replacement for the students union, then there will be less democratic functioning. For example- Independent voice of students will diminish. Students will not be able to negotiate with the institutional authority on equal footing. Their aims and objectives and their functioning's is highly influenced by the institution itself. Students council limits students movements and their socio-political awareness to camps and students related matters only, while students unions allows students to be a part broader socio-political spectrum also equipping them with the leadership skills and socio-political how to be the future political leadership of India. Though this proposal seems as a novel idea on paper, the above discussed drawbacks and the results of reformation of students union after 27 years long experimentation with the students council which had proved to be unfruitful in practice, in cases of major nationwide socio political issues. Students union are part of dynamic nature of Indian politics infusing with a vital energy and critical elements in gauzing public opinion.

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In cross-roads of 'Identity': The Case of the *Axomiya Musalman* Community in Assam

Tanzim Masud

Abstract

The term 'Assamese Muslim' or 'Axomiya Musalman' itself suggests a specific community that is trying to create an equilibrium between its linguistic, ethnic and religious identities. Assamese Muslims also known as Tholuwa Mussalman, Axomiya Mussalman orKhilonjia Musalman in the local language are well assimilated into the Assamese society and are integrated with the Assamese identity and nationality on the basis of language i.e. Axomiya.The identity of the Axomiya Musalmans is greatly influenced by the Axomiya folk culture, which can be seen in many points of similarities, they have, in their socio-cultural identity with that of the Assamese Hindus. The research paper will aim at looking into the multi-layered identity of the Assamese Muslim community in Assam and the Brahmaputra valley in particular.

Keywords: Assamese, *Axomiya Musalman, Tholuwa Mussalman, Khilonjia Musalman*, identity.

The Muslims in India form the single largest minority and are dispersed across various regions like their other religious counterparts.The Muslims in the North-eastern state of Assam constitute 34.22 per cent of the total population with Islam being the second largest religion followed in Assam after Hinduism. In terms of percentage of total population within a state, Assam stands second after Kashmir, i.e. Assam has the second largest Muslim population in India as compared to any other Indian state. However, Muslims in Assam too are far from a being homogenous category and can (at least) be divided into four main groups; the Assamese Muslims/*Axomiya Musalmans* also known as *Garia, Maria, Tholua, Khilonjia Musalman*, the Barak valley Muslims, the up-country Muslims who had migrated from UP, Bihar, or even as far away as Peshawar and Kabul also known as *Deshi Musalmans*,and the immigrant category or so-called Bangladeshis also popularly known as the *Miyas*. This paper will focus on the first category of Muslims in Assam, i.e the indigenous Assamese Muslims or *Axomiya Musalmans*.

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Authors like Bose and Jalal, Paul Brass, Liza Mitchell in recent times have realised the heterogeneity of the Indian Muslims, and the range of effects of local roots, regional affiliations and class and caste effects. These authors conclude that the Indian Nation is the culmination of various regional identities with the Indian Muslims too, not constituting a single, monolithic or homogenous identity; and in factenveloping all the differentiating features that characterise Indian national society. The paper aims to follow a similar trajectory in locating the *Axomiya Musalman* category in Assam.

Historical back-drop of Muslims in Assam

According to historical accounts and the popular narratives the beginnings of Muslim settlement in Assam can be traced back to the thirteenth century which marks the invasion of Bakhtiyar Khilji , also noted from the *Kanai Barashil Bowa Sil* inscription found in North Guwahati issued after Bakhtiyar Khilji's invasion referring to Muslims as 'turushka'(Saikia 2017, 116).The movement of the Muslim army from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century followed by the trading groups led to new Muslim settlements in the Brahmaputra valley especially in Western part of Assam bordering Bengal. The presence of Muslims in the region during this period can also be deciphered from Sufi khanqahs dating back to the thirteenth century and the reference of Muslims as '*Yavana'* in the Vaishnava literature of the sixteenth century (Saikia 2017, 117). The prevalence of Muslims in Upper or Eastern Assam in the sixteenth century, especially in the royal capital, around modern day Sibsagar, began from the rule ofSuhungmung Dihingia Raja. Ahom's invited Muslim professionals from Bengal to undertake architectural and other projects in Assam leading to the proliferation of the Muslims in the region. Both Hindu and Muslim men from other parts of the country were invited by the Ahoms, especially skilled workers like artisans, accountants, weavers, scholars, saints etc. Muslims were appointed by the Ahoms for interpreting and deciphering Persian documents, minting coins, carving inscriptions, weaving, tailoring, painting, carpentry. These people who came to Assam were welcomed as citizens of the Ahom state but were accorded a lower position in the Ahom hierarchy. In the early seventeenth century (1638-39) Kamrup, including Guwahati, became a part of the Mughal Empire under Emperor Shahjahan., bringing the Mughals in close proximity to the Ahoms, who were ruling over Eastern Assam, thus leading to cultural exchanges between the two groups.

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Many Muslims like, Rupai Goriya, Bagh Hazarika, Sardar Zulfikar Barua are known to have served the Ahom kings and are documented in the History of Assam. It is also suggested by some historians that Muslims in Upper/Eastern Assam arrived even before the establishment of the Ahom rule in the region. The term *Goriya, Tholua Musalman, Khilonjia Musalman* is often ascribed to these early Muslim setters of Eastern and Western Assam. This group of Muslims are native speakers of the Assamese language and, are 'traditionally' referred to as '*Axomiya Musalman'. Goriya* is a generic term used for the Assamese Muslims. There is no consensus among scholars regarding the origin of the word *Goriya*, while Gait believes that the term signifies the introduction of Islam by the early invaders from Gaura or Gaur, the Muslim capital of Bengal (Gait 1963, 89), some have the opinion that the term signified the professions of the early Muslims in Assam, while according to popular belief the term is used for the Muslims as they eat beef or *goru*. There is also a popular phrase called *Goru khuaGoriya.* i.e. beef eating *Goriya* in Assam connoting the Assamese Muslims. Another group of Muslims known as *Moriyas*, grew rapidly in the Goalpara district under the reign of Hussain Shah, the king of Gaur (1493). It is believed that the term *Moriya* is used for early Muslim settlers in Nowgongprobablybecause of the fact that they were engaged in metal ware production that required beating and hammering (maar) (Saikia 2017, 118). The *Moriyas* claim their descent from the early Pathans who came to Assam during its invasion by Turbak in 1532 i.e. they claim to be the descendants of the Pathan army who accompanied Turbak during the invasion of Assam and were taken as prisoners of war by the Ahoms or those who had decided to stay back on their own. This group like the *Goriyas* are well assimilated in the Assamese socio-cultural fabric and are put under the umbrella of *Axomiya Musalman* along with the *Goriyas* as per the modern day culturo-political narrative. This group of Muslims are considered to be the earliest Muslims settlers and include descendants of Muslim/Pathan/Mughal soldiers who stayed back on their own or were held back as prisoners of war, the North Indian technicians and artisans brought by the Ahom kings, medieval Islamic preachers/ saints and the local converts to Islam during the medieval Ahom period(Hussain1987, 398). This paper is mainly concerned with this category of Muslims i.e. the *Goriya-Moriya /Khilonjia/Tholuwa* Musalman category and will discuss the various socio-cultural and political aspects of the same.

It is to be borne in mind that not all Muslims were outsiders; there were various sections of people from the indigenous origin who converted to Islam as well. Sufism propagated Islam to a great deal across the globe leading to what is known as 'soft' conversions to Islam. In

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case of Assam, saints like Azan Fakir and Boga Shah, propagated unity in the society and may have influenced some to convert to Islam directly or indirectly. According to Monirul Hussain (1987, 398) even though Assam came in contact with Muslims in 1203, it is because of Saints like Shah Milan also popularly known as Azan Fakeer, that a full-fledged 'systematic'propagation of Islam began in the 17th century. Azan Fakir who came to the region from Baghdad in 1630 is known to have propagated the various tenets of Islam through devotional songs called *zikirs* and *zaris*, composed in the Assamese language which may have attracted the masses towards Islam (Hussain 1987, 398). Another reason that may have led to conversions may be the attraction of people towards the humanitarian values of Islam as practised by their Muslim neighbours. The story of conversion of a tribal man named Ali Mech during Khalji's invasion is a case in point. However, it was not only the common people who converted to Islam but also the royalty as in case of the Kamata ruler, Chakradhvaj (1455–1485) who converted to Islam after his defeat in the hands of Sultan Barbak Shah, ruler of Gauda (Saikia 2017, 117).

Udoyan Mishra (1999, 1264) states that 'what is known as Assamese or *Axomiya* today is associated with the process of Aryanisation and the consolidation of Ahom rule in the Brahmaputra valley' and, as a matter of fact almost all communities who proudly identify themselves as *'Axomiya'* today had migrated from one place or the other over a period of time as noted by A.H.W. Bentick noted in the Assam legislative council:

"So far as Assam valley is concerned the Assamese other than Ahom's came from the West, the Ahom's came from the East, the Kacharis from the North, the Sylheties, Bengalis and Mymensinghias (Mohammedans) fromthe South, the Europeans came from overseas; which of these has the best right to be called as the children of the soil". (Dev and Lahiri, 135)

In the nineteenth and the early twentieth there was large scale influx of Muslims from various districts of Bengal such as Mymensingh, Pabna, Bogra, and Rangpur due to the new colonial agricultural policies that encouraged migration, for instance, new settlements in the Nowgong district and in the chars of Barpeta and Mongoldoi were encouraged in the early twentieth century in order to increase the land under cultivation (Saikia 2017, 119). It is this group of people who came to be known as Na Axomiya or New Assamese, however, terms like *Pamua Musalman* (the farming Muslims), *Charua Musalman* (the Muslims of river islandsor banks seasonally submerged into river waters), *Mian Musalman* and *Mymensinghia*

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Musalman is also ascribed to this group (Hussain, 1987, 3).Over the passage of time and with the politics of polarization this group of 'Bengali Muslims" came to be identified as 'illegal immigrants' or *'Miyas'* which is a 'stereotypification'.Monirul Hussain noted in 1987 that this group of 'immigrant muslims' had taken up the Assamese language to integrate themselves with the Assamese society. He further adds that although the older generation is bi-lingual, the newer generation remains largely unilingual speaking in Assamese. Nonetheless, the rapidly growing population of this particular group has been a major concern for the *Axomiya Musalman* identity and Assamese identity at large, that is also reflected in the politics of the region (Hussain 1987, 399).

The Barak valley Muslims who had migrated from East Bengal during the colonial period constitute the third category of Muslims living in Assam. This group of Muslims live in Karimganj and Cachar districts of Barrak valley and remain linguistically Bengali and are least assimilated with the other Muslim communities living in Assam. This category of Muslims is sometimes also misrepresented as *Miyan*/ Bangladeshi as they are native Bangla speakers which leads to their further detachment with the *Axomiya Musalmans.*

Muslims from North India migrated to Assam throughout the colonial rule and even after Independence for acquiring their bread and butter. They form the fourth and the last group of Muslims in Assam. They settled in and around the colonial market towns of Dibrugarh and Tinsukia and came to be known as '*Desi' /Julaha* Muslims (Saikia 2017, 18). They are skilled workers who had migrated mainly from the states of Uttar Pradesh or Bihar and work as dhunias, dhubis, kasais, barbers, tailors, carpenters, etc. (Hussain1987, 400). This group remain predominantly Hindi or Urdu speaking and similar to the Barrak valley Muslims, this group too has not integrated with the Muslims of Assam or with the Assamese society at large.

Thus, Muslims in Assam are far from a being homogenous category and can (at least) be divided into four main groups, each having a different identity and relation with the Assamese society at large. It includes the Assamese Muslims also known as *Goriya, Moriya, Tholua, Khilonjia Musalman*, the Bengali Muslims from Barrak valley, the *Desi* Muslims who had migrated from UP, Bihar, and even as far away as Peshawar and Kabul, and at last, the immigrant or so-called Bangladeshis also popularly known as the *Miyas*. This paper is

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concerned with the first category i.e. the *'Axomiya', Tholua, Khilonjia, Goriya or Moriya Musalman.*

Understanding the In-group Identities and the socio-cultural practices of the *Axomiya Musalmans*

The *Axomiya Musalmans* can broadly be divided into two main groups; *Goriyas* and *Moriyas.* As mentioned abovewhile*Goriya* is a generic term used for the Assamese Muslims and the *Moriyas*claim to be the descendants of thePathan army who accompanied Turbak during the invasion of Assam and were taken as prisoners of war by the Ahoms or those who had decided to stay back on their own. The *Axomiya Musalmans* can be defined by various overlapping identities as evident in the ethnographic and documental sources that show how the Hindu caste system too has an influence on the Assamese Muslims or *Axomiya Musalmans* that has split up the category into caste like groups such as *Syed's, Sheikhs, Moriyas* etc. The *Syed's* claim to be the descendants of Prophet Muhammad, and claim their descent from Azan Fakir, the Medieval Sufi saint who came to Assam in the Seventeenth century.On the contrary, Edward Gait (1963, 202) believes that most of the *Syed's* in Assam were of indigenous origin and were not related to the Syed's of Arabia. The *Syed's* generally use the prefix of *syed/syeda* along with their first name and consider themselves to be *bamuns/* brahmins among the Assamese Muslims thus,claiming their superiority over both the *Sheikhs* and *Moriyas*.The second group called *Sheikhs* are believed to be indigenous converts to Islam. According to Gait (ibid), some Sheikhs who were able to earn status in the society declared themselves as Syed's during the colonial period.The *Moriyas*, considered to be the descendants of Mughal soldiers captured during the Mughal invasion of Assam in 1532, who along with the *Goriyas* constitute the *AxomiyaMusalman* category is also considered to be a different caste and are put at a lower position than the S*yed'*sand *Sheikhs*. It must be born in mind that *'Goriya'* has become more of a blanket term for the Assamese Muslims over time and is not considered a different caste unlike the *Moriyas*. However, each of this group have their own in-group identity that is seen up until recent times, in non-existent marriage relations between the two groups of *Goriyas* and *Moriyas.* Although, interviews conducted in the urban areas of Guwahati and Nowgong reveal inter-group marriages happening. It is to be noted that apart from restriction on inter-marriage, there is no other rigid restriction followed by these groups such as ban on inter-dining or social interaction. However, a certain "othering", especially of the *Moriyas* by the *Goriyas* is

observed in the perpetuation of certain myths and stereotypes. One such myth,popular among the *Goriyas*, is;'*Moriya bure basonbojaikajia kore',* or Moriyas beat utensils while fighting, which may have percolated down from the fact that the Moriyas used to work in metal ware production and beating metals was a part of their job. But today it signifies their lower position in society as ill-mannered and without etiquettes. Thus, the *AxomiyaMusalman* category in itself is diversified or pluralistic in nature,and,interestingly while the different groups within the category have their own socio-cultural identity, they shoulder their differences and boundaries during political mobilizations.

The *AxomiyaMusalmans*,however, have a higher position in the social hierarchy of the Assamese society, not only because they are well assimilated within the Assamese socio-cultural fabric but also because they are mostly educated (in comparison to *Miyan*) and are attached with occupations and trades that largely falls under 'non-cultivating' category and has contributed to their economic affluence. The 'immigrant'/ *Na-Axomiya/Miyan*category of Muslims, on the hand, have largely been uneducated, engaged with agriculture or other menial jobs that has led to its low status in the social hierarchy, although there is the rise of a nascent category of 'new urban middle-class' within the *Miyas*.Theotherization of the immigrant Muslims by the *AxomiyaMusalman* is common as the *AxomiyaMusalman* feels that a close relationship with a *Miyan* may put his/her identity in question.As a result, what we see islimited social interaction between these two categories and marked absence of matrimonial relations between the two categories, even though both the categories are followers of the same faith.

The Assamese Muslims have retained many of the customs and rituals of the indigenous Assamese culture, which may be because of the fact that a good fraction of them were actually indigenous converts or because most of the early Muslim settlers be it the Muslim soldiers or the artisans or technicians did not bring their wives with them which led them to marry local Non-Muslim woman(Hussain1987, 398). The syncretism of the Assamese society is still alsoreflectedby the fact that even Azan Fakir, who popularized zikr's in Assam is believed to have married a high-status Ahom woman.The early census reports also throws light on the co-existence and the interaction between the Islamic traditions and the local indigenous traditions in the colonial Assamese society. According to the Census report of 1881 the Muslim converts in Assam were ignorant of their Islamic faith. While some had not even heard of Prophet Muhammad others associated him with the Hindu

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God Rama (Imperial Gazetteer of India 1882,). Gait (1963, 238) further adds that the Assamese Hindu converts to Islam could not completely cut them off from the earlier Hindu social life and retained various Hindu norms such as restrictions on inter-dining or inter-marrying outside one's own caste. Muslims in Assam, thus,adhered to their Islamic faith only in a marginal way in the nineteenth century and there was rarely any difference between the social life of an Assamese Hindu and a Muslim until the later part of the nineteenth century.

As shall be observed, from the author's own ethnographical observations in the districts of Jorhat, Sibsagar, Nagaon and Dibrugarh, Assamese Muslims in have many points of similarity in terms of their socio-cultural identity with that of the Assamese Hindus due to a constant interaction/assimilation between the Islamic traditions and the Assamese folk traditions.The marriage customs, child-birth rituals, death and post death rituals of the Assamese Muslims remain a combination of Islamic as well as the indigenous folk tradition or the majoritarian tradition in these districts.

The custom of *'juron'* for instance is observed by both the Assamese Muslims and Hindus alike with the only difference being that the application of vermilion or *'sindoor'*on the would be bride's forehead by the mother or a close relative in terms of the Assamese Hindus is skipped by the Assamese Muslims. However, both the Assamese Muslim and the Hindu bride are presented with clothes, ornaments, cosmetics, mirror etc. alike. Again the marriage songs sung during the marriage known as '*Biyanaam'* is widespread among the Assamese Muslims similar to their Hindu counterparts.The indigenous practices of providing the basic household objects like furniture or electronics with the bride is followed throughout the Assam valley including the Assamese Muslims, although the Islamic custom of *'mahr'* or *'mauharana'* where the bride is paid in terms of money or other possessions by the groom is retained by the Assamese Muslims. Another custom known as '*Athmongola'* is also observed by the Assamese Muslims and Hindus alike in which the bride and groom invited over for a feast to the bride's parents home on the eight day of marriage. Both the groups avoid marriages in the months of *Puh*(December, January), *Chot*(March/April), *Bhado*(August/September) and *Kati* (October/November), while Assamese Muslims also avoid marriages in the holy month of *Ramzan.* Cousin/Kin marriages common in the Islamic world aren't common among the *Goriyas* in the present times, however, the *Moriyas* have retained this practise to some extent.

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The first child of a married Assamese Muslim or a Hindu girl is always born at the girl's maternal home and a common ceremony called '*bajoloiolua'*is celebrated in which the new born baby is brought out in the courtyard after the detachment of the navel cord. The similarity in rituals and customs of the Assamese Hindus and the Muslims can also be seen in the post death rituals, for instance, as per Islamic rituals the post-mortuary rite is to be performed on the fortieth day after death, however, Assamese Muslims additionally perform the post mortuary rites on the third, seventh and the tenth day similar to the Assamese Hindus. The traditional Assamese dress called *mekhela chador* is worn by the Assamese Muslim and Hindu women alike and is a common link between the two communities.

The harvest festival of *Bihu* is celebrated by the Assamese Muslims like their other religious counterparts reflecting upon the affinity and the syncretic culture of the Assamese society. Even though the *AxomiyaMusalaman* like their co-religionists remain adherents of the Islamic faith and observe the five pillars of Islam, the influence of local indigenous traditions on their social life is quite significant, which is evident in the regional syncretic variations of their customs and rituals. Here, *AxomiyaMusalman* category refers to both the *Goriyas* and the *Moriyas*.

Let us take an example to better understand the syncretism of culture in Assamese society. PurnandharRajkonwar or Probhu is a guru of the famous MaibelaAshram in Sibsagar. The mention of Probhu is important because in him we find an existing example of the coexistence of the Islamic traditions as well as the local Hindu traditions and also the fact that it is not only the Muslims in Assam who are heavily influenced by the local indigenous traditions but also the Assamese Hindus who have been influenced directly or indirectly by the Islamic traditions. Now,Probhu, for instance, believes in the combination of the philosophical methods of *Mukti*and *Fana,* i.e. isthecombination of the Hindu philosophical method of liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth with that of the Sufi/ Islamic philosophical method of self-annihilation for unity or oneness with God. And according to Probhu, he follows both these paths in his personal life. Probhu's deep knowledge of Islam comes from his association with a Sufi Saint called NasrullahChishti,who came to Sibsagar in 1971. Probhu states that. Nasrullah was a disciple of the famous Chishti Saint Sheikh MoinuddinChishti. He was working as a teacher when he met Nasrullah and felt a spiritual connection to him. Nasrullah over time shifted into Probhu's homeand stayed with Probhu's

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family till 1977, whenfinally, he retired into a Muslim village. Nevertheless, the association of Proud with Nasrullah left a deep impact on him forever. (Saikia2017, 120-23)

In Probhu's words;
"The truth is inside us and it is only known to the creator, our*Khuda*. When *qayamat*(judgment day) will happen, *Khuda*will receive us. Those who search for unity with Him and togetherness in humanity will be welcomed. I learned this from Nasrullah." (Saikia 2017, 121)

Probhu and Nasrullah went beyond the prejudices of theirHindu or Muslim identity and cultivated a blended identity. Today, Probhu is as much a Muslim as he is a Hindu. He believes and propagates the blended ideologies of both the religions in the Maibela Ashram in Sibsagar, shining upon the syncretic culture of the Assamese society. Another such case exemplifying the syncretic culture of Assam is that of Imran Shah who is a teacher, poet, novelist and the ex-president of the Assam Sahitya Sabha. Imran Shah is an Assamese Muslim and he like most Assamese Muslims stresses on his Assameseidentity as much as his Muslim identity which may have led him to his Hindu pen name Ishan Dutta that he had used for his poetry, published in *Ramdhenu*. His literature is very critical of all kinds of religious fundamentalism and throws light on the fused traditions of the Hindu and Muslim world in Sibsagar.

The region of Assam in itself is quite diverse and has a pluralistic cultural identity. The region is known as *'Shankar-Azaan or dexh'* i.e. the land of Shankardev and Azan Fakir. However, even with the evidences of syncretism we find in the discussion above, the inauguration of violence politics of identity from the twentieth century has led to an identity crisis of the *Axomiya Musalmans*, the impact of which is twofold, while on one hand political parties have sprung up giving an united representation to the various groups within the *Axomiya Muslim* category, paving the way for unity amongst the different groups ,on the other hand a section of the Assamese Muslims have begun to feel dis-connected with both their Muslim as well as Assamese identity.

Conclusion

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In this paper an attempt has been made to bring about the historical narratives regarding the different groups of Muslims i.e. the *Axomiya Musalmans*, on the basis of both the historical and popular accounts. The second part explores various in-group identities of the *Axomiya Musalmans* like that of the *Goriya/Moriya* categorization or the percolation of the Hindu caste system giving rise to categories like *Syeds, Sheikhs* and *Moriyas.* The author also throws light upon the affinity of the *Axomiya Musalmans* with the *Axomiya* folk culture and its impact on various rituals and customs performed by them like *juron*, *athmongla, biyanaam,* etc. as revealed in the ethnographic surveys.Lastly,the paper reflects upon syncretism or *'xanmiloni'* culture as Yasmin Saikia calls it, of the Assamese society with the examples of people like Purnandar Rajkonwar and Imran Shah.

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PERSPECTIVE SECTION

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Family Dynamics and Child Psychology: a Study of Physical Abuse in Families

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Abstract:

Physical abuse on children is one of the surest ways to scar them for life. The repercussions of having faced or witnessed physical abuse as a child last all through one's life leading to extreme emotional turbulence and impaired social and inter-personal skills.

Parents inflict physical abuse within the families or on their children due to a variety of social, economic and personal reasons, none of which justify the trauma a child goes through because of the same. This study is conducted to analyze the effect of physical abuse, its effect on family dynamics and children psychology. The child abuse and trauma scale was used to see the affect of children in rural, small town and urban area in India. The research will help to identify the reason for physical abuse and devise strategic plans to eradicate them from Indian society.

Keywords: Physical abuse, Children Psychology, Family dynamics, Trauma scale

Introduction

The impact of witnessing and undergoing physical abuse on child development can be quite daunting on society which can affect the children's cognitive and emotional development. It can have a long term effect on child behavior, with symptoms of aggressiveness, and can result into child's anxiety disorder.

As per as Pavicevic 275 million children across the world suffer due to physical abuse at the hands of a close family members. Children witnessing abuse are more likely to fall prey to abuse themselves sooner or later (Pavićević 2019). A study conducted on children having witnessed and undergone physical abuse concluded that such children show delays in cognitive and emotional development, depict extreme withdrawal or aggressiveness, showcase anxiety disorders, as well as portray internalizing and externalizing behavior problems (Lippy et al. 2019).

Literature Review:

Any child who witnesses physical abuse goes on to experience profound grief coupled with an intense degree of trauma that lasts way into their adulthood as well. It negatively impacts their psychology, self-esteem, and the relationship of the child with their caregiver (Herman-Smith 2013). The psychological effects are quite heavy even if they don't undergo the abuse themselves. Children who are subject to physical abuse lose their sense of self as an individual, fail to respect themselves and their boundaries, and are more likely to face emotional troubles in their later years (Antle et al. 2012). Children who experience abusive care are more likely to develop

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negative reaction to the care provider , due to absence of attachment , or increase in anger due to negative reactions of themselves (Waldman-Levi et al. 2017).

Emotional insecurity, chronic stress, mental health issues, avoidance and being withdrawn, anti-social, highly sensitive, and low on self-confidence all stem from having faced or witnessed physical abuse as a child, especially within close family(Pingley 2017). The alarming fact is that a solid correlation has been established between children who face physical abuse and adults who go on to inflict abuse on others. Studies have shown that children exposed to family abuse are more likely to administer the same behavior on their respective families when they grow up (Moffitt 2013). This is highly evident even in teenage romances. 10-20 per cent of teens have experienced dating violence at some point, especially through their significant others who have been a victim of physical abuse themselves in the past (Choi, Weston, and Temple 2017). While case series are quite fruitful when it comes to making the general public aware about child abuse and to offer a direction for professionals to work towards, they aren't quite enough when it comes to resolving the issue at its core. Instead, population-based surveys are the best alternative to deduce the real extent of abuse and also to address the truth of it at the ground level (Ma, Fallon, and Richard 2019).

Such population-based surveys have been conducted in plenty of countries across the globe including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Romania, South Africa, the United States and Zimbabwe.

Research Objectives:

The purpose of this systematic review and comparative analysis was to summarize current research, bring to light the findings of the survey, measure the extent of the impact, and decode the real reasons behind the happenings of physical abuse within families on and in front of children.

This study was also carried out using CAT, the Child Abuse and Trauma scale. The CAT is a 38-itme Likert-type scale measure that is specifically meant to analyze certain core aspects of the data collected during the study (Sanders and Becker-Lausen 1995). It analyzes the child abuse and maltreatment a person has suffered as a child and calculates the effect of it in their teenage years as well. This scale also helps in understanding the impact of childhood emotional abuse(Kent and Waller 1998). The research tested two hypotheses to measure impact on children by virtue of physical abuse in families as shown below. It also compared the six variable for sever physical punishment and ten variable for moderate punishment.

Hypothesis:

- Null Hypothesis - H01: There is no significant impact on children by virtue of physical abuse in families
- Alternate Hypothesis - HA1: There is a significant impact on children, their psychology, and the bond of the family as a whole when there exists physical abuse amidst it.

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Research Methodology:

Convenience sampling has been used. Parents of children and toddlers from 0-12 years of age were asked to fill out this survey based on their actions in the past 6 months. The area around Jaipur urban, Jaipur rural and small towns such as Chomun, Ringas, Samod, Ringas were targeted. Respondents fall in age group of 18-35 years residing in both the rural and urban regions of India. 500 respondents and their data were collected and studied for further analysis.

Tools for data collection and analysis:

A comparative survey was carried out to draw an inference between the parents of young children residing in the rural areas, small towns, and urban cities around Jaipur city. This study aims to collect and analyze sufficient data to draw parallels and deduce a result from the same.

Results:

500 families with kids aged 0-12 agreed to participate in this study. This study consisted of a survey carried out both manually and online through social media to find out more about abuse, the extent of it, the reasons it stems from, and the repercussions it holds in the lives of children and families.

The abuse ranged from moderate to severe, and was predominantly observed in the rural areas, followed by the small towns, and then the urban developments and cities. Table 1 shows severe physical punishment for rural, small town and urban area. It compares severe physical punishment such as hitting, kicking, burning, and beating, threatening the child with a knife and choking the child.

Table 1: SEVERE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT

	Punishment Type	Rural areas	Small towns	Urban areas
1	Hit the child with an object	54	15	9
2	Kicked the child	47	12	2
3	Burned the child	12	1	0
4	Beat the child	68	26	6
5	Threatened the child with a knife	29	7	0
6	Choked the child	11	3	0

Results shown that physical abuse in rural area in India is rampant compare to small town and urban area it is much lesser extend due to education. Urban parents and children are more aware about the rights and responsibilities. Table 2 shows the moderate physical punishment in rural area, small town and urban areas. Ten moderate punishment such as spanking, hit the child on buttock, slapping the child, pulling the hair, shaking,

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hitting with knuckles, pinching, twisting the child ear, forcing the child to kneel or stand and putting hot pepper in the child's mouth were measured.

Table 2: MODERATE PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT

	Punishment Type	Rural areas	Small towns	Urban areas
1	Spanked buttocks	32	3	2
2	Hit the child on buttocks with an object	27	8	1
3	Slapped the child's face or head	66	19	4
4	Pulled the child's hair	43	0	0
5	Shook the child	16	2	0
6	Hit the child with knuckles	9	4	11
7	Pinched the child	35	5	3
8	Twisted the child's ear	54	3	7
9	Forced the child to kneel or stand uncomfortably	17	0	0
10	Put hot pepper in the child's mouth	12	0	0

Survey results shown that rural area parents are more prone to conduct moderate physical punishment to child compare to the small town and urban area.

Research Findings and Analysis:

The results were analyzed based on the following 7 criteria which were studied during the research. Here are the findings of that data and their respective interpretations.

1. Age:

Younger kids are more vulnerable to be negatively impacted by physical abuse as well as fall prey to it. This includes infants, toddlers, and any other kid with special needs. The average age lies between 6-11 years for Indian kids who are largely surrounded by physical abuse in their growing years.

2. Sex:

Girls are more likely to be subject to physical and sexual harm and be the most affected by it as well, considerably more than male kids are. While girl children are more vulnerable to infanticide, boy children are found to be the most physically violated and punished as a means to 'prepare' them for their adulthood.

3. Family size and structure:

ISSN-2278-9758

Overcrowding of children is one of the key commonalities between most cases of abuse in this study. It is also a pattern seen in the studies conducted by other countries too including Chile, Brazil, and other African nations.

Chronic neglect of children is the most prevalent in households in which family members keeping moving in and out quite frequently with no specific person dedicated to look after children.

4. Financial background:

Lack of finances in the household can lead to issues at the core causing parents to unleash their frustration upon their vulnerable children. Money seems to be the driving force in resolving plenty of issues thereby preventing abuse to a considerable extent.

5. Personality and behavioral characteristics:

Parents who regularly abuse their children tend to have low self-esteem, anti-social behavior, mental health problems, and an overall dissatisfaction from life which leads them to have poor control over their impulsive actions themselves.

6. History of abuse:

It has also been observed that parents with a prior history of being subject to abuse in their own childhood go on to inflict the same pain on to their children as well. This could be a means of channeling their pent-up frustration and anger through an unhealthy means, only to repeat the vicious cycle of abuse all over again.

7. Societal influence:

The role of cultural values, societal presence, contribution to society, and a reputation within the community are a few key factors that prevent really abusive parents from going all out on their abuse.

The effects of these are negligible on families that are generally secluded form the neighborhood and tend to be anti-social. It is also evident from the findings that there is a close relationship between physical abuse on children and societal factors like finances, status, and the mental health status of the parents. The culmination of all these factors goes on to create reasons through which physical abuse emerges.

Abuse needs to be addressed at the core of it. Instead of preaching about stopping abuse, societies must run awareness programs, educational institutes, financial literacy, and beneficial social reforms in order to eradicate this issue at the ground level.

Moreover, children need to be taught to recognize and address abuse, be it verbal, physical, or sexual. Right from a young age, schools must implement the techniques required to train children to ask for help if they're being physically abused in their household or see someone else being abused.

Conclusion:

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Physical abuse is one of the most damaging aspects in our society, be it rural or urban India. By rendering damage to children, it erodes the very fabric of our community. India can only progress as much as its youngsters, and the first step to ensuring a robust young community is to look after their children.

Since most cases of physical abuse stem from the evils mentioned above, it is imperative for us as a society to address them at their very roots and to devise strategic plans to eradicate them completely.

Future Research:

There is ample scope for future studies wherein the after-effects of abuse can be observed in children. There can be comparative studies carried out on adults who grew up in abusive homes and the ones who were brought up in safe environments to understand the emotional and social repercussions on the lives of such children.

Consequently, there can be studies carried out to decipher the mindset of parents and understand the core reasons that lie beneath their superficial actions.

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An analysis of media's contribution towards strengthening regional politics in India

Satraajit Palchoudhury

Abstract: *Breaking the 30 year long logjam in Delhi Durbar Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stormed to power in Lutyen's Delhi in 2014 with a majority of its own. With this feat BJP proved that in a multi-party polity like India it's indeed possible to form a government on one's own brute number. The 2014 Lok Sabha elections showed the power of social media and BJP used this tool to strike chords with the masses especially with young voters. This trend continued even in 2019 and BJP rode back to power with a thumping majority. The verdict of 2019 put the fate of established regional players of Hindi belt in jeopardy. However, it has also been observed that today's resurgent BJP has failed to make similar inroads into South India. It is still seen crawling in South barring Karnataka. Compared to regional satraps in Hindi belt the regional parties in South India are using media as a tool to further their political agenda. This paper will try to make an analysis of media's relationship with regional politics in India.*

Keywords:

BJP, AIADMK, DMK, Media outlets, NDA, regional forces, propaganda

Domination of regional forces in national politics

If we look at the chequered political history of India from 1947 to 1975 we see that Congress dominated Indian polity like an undisputed Tsar. Following Indira Gandhi's decision to impose national emergency in 1975 the country began witnessing a new brand of politics. The fulcrum of opposition parties was led by Jay Prakash Narayan and since then regional parties realized their importance in national politics because a fledgling anti-Congress front was trying to gain its foothold in Delhi.

However, the Janata Party – a conglomeration of many regional parties failed to live long and due to its internal squabbles and personal ambition of respective leaders the bridge collapsed.

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Many offshoots emerged from the Janata Party experiment and the lone branch of JP experiment that turned out to be the main pole of anti-Congress politics in today's India is—BJP.

The saffron brigade's political journey from 2 seats in Lok Sabha to 303 seats has not been an easy cake walk for the party. Till 1996 Congress remained in the centrestage as P V Narasimha Rao successfully managed to run a minority government for full five year.

This situation changed in 1996 and till 2014 the regional parties succeeded in keeping the premier two mainstream national parties—Congress and BJP on tenterhooks. Coalition governments have never succeeded in India—but this jinx was broken by former prime minister late Atal Bihari Vajpayee who led a 27 party coalition government.

In fact Vajpayee cemented his place in the annals of Indian political history by becoming the first non-Congress leader to complete a full tenure in office—a feat that could not be achieved by the likes of Morarji Desai, Viswanath Pratap Singh and Chandra Shekhar.

Vajpayee's contribution towards coalition politics was his astuteness in giving a national outlook to regional parties. This pragmatic politics of BJP helped it emerge as a strong alternative to Congress.

The late 1990s indicated that India has already entered into an era of coalition politics because the premier two national parties—Congress and BJP lacked pan-India appeal and above all it also became crystal clear that without the support of regional parties neither Congress nor BJP would be able to come to power in Delhi.

History of regionalism in India

The seeds of regionalism were sowed in India by our colonial masters because they believed that this system will help them stretch their arms in India. In later years following our independence from the yoke of British imperialism the founding fathers of Indian Constitution tried to promote Indianness among the various regions.

Unfortunately this drive could not achieve its desired goal and certain factors emerged that led to the growth of regionalism in India. Regional politics took birth in South India as the southern states vehemently opposed the imposition of Hindi as an official language. This gave a fillip to anti-foreigner movement in Assam spearheaded by regional Assamese forces with a view to preserving their distinct Assamese identity.

ISSN-2278-9758

Among the other factors that led to the growth of regional politics in India is the neglect of a region by ruling elites for decades. This has also fuelled the passion of regional forces.

Moreover, it also needs to be mentioned here that regional parties like Telegu Desam Party (TDP), All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), Akali Dal, Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) have played the regional card to seek political mileage in their respective bastions.

It is very difficult to govern a multi-cultural and multi-ethnic state like India. The regional forces are myopic and are not interested to develop a holistic approach. This attitude has given rise to regional politics in India.

Domination of regional parties from 1996-2014

Following the exit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee government after 13 days, a hotchpotch Congress backed alliance under the banner of United Front stormed to power in Delhi. But this experiment could not last long and due to internal contradictions neither Deve Gowda nor Inder Kumar Gujral could complete their tenure.

But from 1999 to 2004 Vajpayee-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA)—an amalgamation of 27 regional parties with BJP at its helm acquired the magic number and had an uninterrupted run in the corridors of power till 2004.

From 2004 to 2014 Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) with Dr Manmohan Singh as the head too gave the country a stable coalition government. However, the entire picture changed in 2014.

A kind of debutant in national politics and a sitting chief minister of a tiny state like Gujarat Narendra Modi changed the very definition of electoral politics in India. He set the tone and tenor of general elections in 2014 by making use of social media and undoubtedly this strategy was never used by any political party as India's electoral politics followed the traditional way of campaign trail.

Reasons for BJP's dream run in Hindi belt

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Of the 543 Lok Sabha seats—Hindi belt sends 225 MPs to the lower house of Indian Parliament. In the 2014 Lok Sabha polls BJP bagged 190 seats in Hindi belt leaving all political pundits in a state of shock and awe. Prior to 2014 general elections established regional parties in Hindi belt were living in their comfort zone. But this scenario changed with the advent of a resurgent BJP. The lotus brigade came up with new ideas and most importantly it used social media—a tool that was never used in India's electoral politics before.

A new leader with a new slogan and a dream for a new India succeeded in galvanizing a sizeable chunk of loyal voters who prior to 2014 voted on the basis of their caste and identity. In this context it would be apt to mention about the unflinching support of Hindi newspapers to BJP as it helped the party cement the political ground in Hindi belt.

This media blitzkrieg put BJP on a different pedestal. Compared to Congress, BJP has invested its resources on media as it understands the importance of this medium of communication. However, it also needs to be stated here that some of the prominent media outlets are close to BJP and it is helping the party further its political agenda.

Media outlets close to BJP

Mukesh Ambani owned Network 18 has a very good and cordial relationship with BJP. The group runs 16 channels. Subash Chandra owned Zee Media network is also very close to BJP. Rajat Sharma—one of the renowned television journalists in India owns India TV network. This 24x7 Hindi news channel is also having a very close relationship with the ruling dispensation in Delhi.

Media as a tool of propaganda

Fritz Hippler, the head of Nazi Germany's film propaganda division offered a very simple definition of propaganda. In his opinion propaganda is a means to simplify a complex issue and the desired goal can be achieved by repeating the message again and again. The lone aim of a propagandist is to discredit his opposition and reap the maximum mileage. With the steady rise of online news portals the distinction between hype and facts has become blurred.

ISSN-2278-9758

Media management has now turned out to be an order of the day. Politics is a game of perception and with a view to maintaining the people friendly image political parties are seeking assistance from media.

Scenario in South India

All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK) of former Tamil Nadu chief minister late J Jayalalithaa owns Jaya TV along with entertainment channels like Jaya Max, Jaya Plus and J Movie. Maintaining this trend nephew of late Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) leader Karunanidhi launched Sun TV, Sun News, KTV, Sun Music, Chutti TV, Sumangali Cable, Adithya TV, Chintu TV, Kiran TV, Khushi TV, Udaya Comedy, Udaya Music, Gemini TV, Gemini Comedy and Gemini Movies. In fact Karunanidhi's family owns Kalaignar TV and a close affiliate of DMK patriarch M. Raajhendran owns Raj TV.

Tryst of regional parties with media

Compared to the Hindi belt, regional parties in South India are way ahead and it is also being noticed that all the established regional players in South India have invested their resources on media to run their propaganda.

Janata Dal (secular) of H D Devegowda has a 24x7 electronic news channel by the name of Kasturi TV. Devegowda's heir apparent—his son H D Kumaraswamy looks after this channel. In Andhra Pradesh YSR Congress supremo owns Sakshi TV, NTV and TV 5.

Telegu Desam Party (TDP) of N Chandrababu Naidu too has a friendly media outlet to bank upon. It is Studio N and is owned by Narne Srinivasa Rao who is considered to be one of the closest confidantes of Naidu.

In Kerala, M K Muneer of Muslim League owns Indiavision. Akali Dal in Punjab too runs a news channel by the name of PTC. This channel belongs to party supremo Parkash Singh Badal's son Sukbir Singh Badal.

In the coming days elections are likely to be fought on social media and the mad rush among the politicians to make their presence felt on twitter stands testimony to the observation made above.

Future of regional parties in India

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Going by the recent trend it seems for the moment the days of established regional satraps like Mulayam Singh Yadav, Mayawati and Lalu Prasad Yadav are over. They have all become a shadow of their glorious past. The BJP of today is not the BJP that used to be around 20 years back. This BJP is hungry for more and is setting new targets with each passing day.

Compared to the present breed of political leaders Prime Minister Modi is ruling the roost on social media. His twitter follower is close to around 60 million and this itself shows BJP's aim of connecting to the masses through social media platforms like twitter and facebook.

The regional satraps realized this a bit late and their heirs apparent are now taking to twitter and facebook to catch up with the netizens.

To be very precise almost all the political parties have now realized the importance of social media and are investing heavily on this medium. However, it also needs to be stated here that Samajwadi Party made its debut on social media in 2017 just after stitching the alliance with Congress. It shows the Samajwadis as laggard who took a long time to realize the importance of social media.

Twitter statistics of few prominent Indian politicians

Prime Minister Narendra Modi for the moment is leading from the front. His twitter followers stand at 63 260 822. He is being followed by Union Home Minister Amit Shah whose twitter followers stand at 23 492 006.

Delhi chief minister Arvind Kejriwal comes third with a following of 20 831 800. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh's twitter followers stand at 18 889 946. Congress scion Rahul Gandhi comes next with a following of 16 583 872. National Conference chief and former chief minister of Jammu & Kashmir Omar Abdullah's twitter followers stand at 3 263 397 and he is being followed by Congress general secretary Priyanka Gandhi Vadra whose following on twitter stands at 2 971 874.

Going by the present situation, it has become crystal clear that BJP has emerged as a strong pole around which the politics is revolving. The regional parties in South India are in a strong position to give BJP a run for its money. Indian politics depends solely on identity and at this juncture Modi strikes chords with the voters in Hindi belt.

ISSN-2278-9758

But this charisma of Modi is not bringing electoral dividends for BJP in South India,, barring Karnataka. In the last Lok Sabha elections BJP did manage to spring surprise in West Bengal by winning 18 seats—at the same time one also needs to borne in mind that saffron brigade failed to put a dent in the land of Odisha chief minister Naveen Patnaik who made his debut on twitter just in 2015.

The long and short of the tale is that presence on social media and proper utilization of media will help the political leaders create their perception in the minds of common electorates. This young India is tech savvy and now efforts will have to be made to reach out to these core voters through the digital medium.

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ISSN-2278-9758

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COMMENTARY SECTION

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Discrimination in Devaswom Board Temples in Kerala

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Discrimination at the place of worship is not new in India irrespective of any religion, though the forms and degree may vary from religion to religion. What is interesting is that a few fundamentalist forces not only want to continue this practice but discover new practices of discrimination. However, it surprises us that such practices are nurtured in a state which not only has highest literacy in India but tops Human Development Index (HDI).

The latest form of discrimination is earmarking separate toilet for each men and women, and for the Brahmins by Kuttumukku Mahadeva temple in Kerala's Thrissur. When the issue surfaced in social media and largely criticized by all quarters, the temple authority withdrew its decision (Swami 2020). True, we see practice of separate toilets in most educational institutions for staff and non-staff (students or other visitors). But they are two forms of arrangements rather than based on superiority of one type of people over others. However, the basis have never been caste, religion and race for such common facilities. Had temple authority earmarked separate toilet for the priest or temple staff, there wouldn't have been any anger. The issue is more serious especially when this temple is owned by the Dewaswam Board, rather than by any individual or family or community.

It is worth mentioning here that Devaswom Boards in Kerala were established with a noble purpose to undertake the temples of Princely states of Travancore ,Kochin and Malabar, to regulate their finances, maintenance and removal of pre-existed discriminatory practices (if any) by bringing the Travancore-Cochin Religious Institutions Act (1950) & subsequent laws passed by State Legislative Assembly of Kerala. If we look at the past, various forms of discrimination were practiced in the temples in the state of Kerala, i.e. ban on entry of lower caste people in the temple, barring the rituals, practiced by depressed communities, etc. However, a lot of social reforms were initiated by government, non-governmental organizations and individual social reformers to eliminate discriminatory and superstitious practices.

Though the establishment of Devaswom Board was considered to be one of the reformative steps, but in reality, the temples owned by the same have become one of the most discriminatory places of worship in 21st century. They are practicing various forms of discrimination, i.e. separate queues based on payment, ban on the entry of non-Hindu devotees or visitors, priority to Brahmin for the post of priest, ban on entry on the basis of gender, removal of shirt, etc.

The price discrimination in Darshan(seeing) of the deities in temples is found only in temples owned by Devaswom Board. Many famous temples in Kerala have provisioned separate queues based on payment. Which means pay higher and enter into smaller queues and save time. While ordinary people, who can't pay or don't want to pay, face longer queues to take Darshan of the

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ISSN-2278-9758

deities. Moreover, all the devotees do not get similar kind of Darshan in the temple, some form of product differentiation is also applied to justify differential price, where devotees can get darshan of deities from less distance if they pay higher.This practice is found in Guruvayoor Temple, one of the most popular religious centre in Kerala, where a VIP queue system exists with INR 1000 can be paid to see "special darshans". Similar practices cannot be found anywhere in the world in any other religion.

In another surreal practice, most of Devaswom Board temples do not allow non-Hindus to enter temple. A controversy had also erupted in the state in 2007 when purification rituals were performed by the temple authority after some religious ceremony of former union minister Vayalar Ravi's grandson took place at the Guruvayur temple since minster's wife was a Christian. Similarly Legendary singer K.J. Yesudas, a recipient of prestigious awards i.e. Padma Shri, Padma Bhushan and the Padma Vibhushan, and had sung some of the best devotional songs in praise of the Hindu deities, was not allowed to enter the Sree Krishna temple in Guruvayur and Kadampuzha Devi temple in Malappuram for being a non-Hindu. Later, he was allowed to enter famous Sri Padmanabhaswami Temple in Thiruvananthapuram, which is not under any Devaswom Board, after years of waiting (Outlook Web Bureau 2017).

Similarly, Shabrimala Temple, another Devaswom Board owned temple, doesn't not allow the entry of women aged 10 to 50. However, the same is not applicable for the men. One may call it diversity, but it could have been made on voluntary basis by educating people regarding the beliefs. The case has been fought in the honorable Supreme Court, and despite directions from the same, women had to face stiff resistance from temple authorities as well as some devotee activists. Presently the case is still under review under larger bench of honorable Supreme Court.

It can also be found that Devaswom Board temples have not been considering people belonging to scheduled caste and scheduled tribes for the post of temple priest. That is why their first scheduled caste priest was appointed only in 2017 in Travancore Devaswom Board (Balan 2017). It is noteworthy that the state of Kerala had unique culture prior to the formation of Devaswom Board, where most of the temples were owned by a caste or community itself, who uses to appoint their own caste people as temple priest. This practice can still be noticed in many parts of the state where rituals related to marriage and birth are still performed by own caste people expert in mantra vidya(chanting hymns) rather than Brahmins. While Devaswom Board temple authorities indulge in such discriminatory practices, there exists scores of private/trust run temples in Kerala which were appointing persons from Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribal communities as their priests for many decades. Popular temples in the capital city of Kerala-Thiruvananthapuram such as Kollampuzha Devi temple in Attingal, Elambrakode Devi temple in Pallikkal, Mullanalloor Devi temple in Navayikulam have priests belonging to Paravar and Kuravar caste of SCs while priests of Venkamala Devi temple belongs to Kaani community of Tribals.

Similarly, the medieval practice of verifying 'janau' (sacred thread)of people by removal of upper wear (shirt) is still being continued in the temples owned by Devaswom board especially in Travancore region i.e. Sharkkara Devi temple in Thiruvananthapuram,Sreekandeswaram temple in Thiruvananthapuram,Pallippuram Devi temple in thiruvananthapuram etc.

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Interestingly, this practice is abandoned or discontinued by non Devaswom Board temples. This practice has been opposed by many among Hindus.

The pertinent question is whether Hindu temples are getting more rigid or more liberal over the time. The answer is both yes and no. Though we can notice wave of liberalism in temples all over the country, and the temples in Kerala are no exception of it. But we can still notice such discriminatory practices in most of the temples owned by Devaswom Board. They are: Pattambiguruvayur temple (Palakad), Mulayankavubagavathy temple (palakkadu), Vadakumnatha temple (Trissur), Kalaribagavathi temple (maruthur,Pattambi, Palakkadu), Angadippuram temple, Thirumittakodu temple, Thirunavaya temple, Thiruvilwamala temple, Kadampuzha temple, KuttumukkuMahadeva temple in Thrissur and Shabrimala temple. Such discriminatory practices are not only bringing bad name to the religion but to the state as well. It is very surprising that despite the fact that communist party, which is considered to be religion-neutral and progressive, have ruled the state many a times in the past and currently as well, but they did not find courage to initiate reform in temples owned by state itself.

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BOOK REVIEW SECTION

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West Bengal Politics: Understanding 'Continuity' to Understand 'Change'

Book Review

Jyotiprasad Chatterjee and Supriyo Basu(2020): *Left Front and After : Understanding the Dynamics of Poriborton in West Bengal*, Sage, New Delhi, PP.253,
ISBN 978-93-532-8723-8(HB), Rs. 1195/-

Rakhahari Chatterji and Partha Pratim Basu(eds.) (2018): *West Bengal under the Left 1977-2011*, Levant Books, Kolkata, PP. 321, ISBN 978-81-93603-65-9, Rs. 995/-

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West Bengal assembly election is scheduled in mid 2021 and after a decade of Trinamul Congress rule the call for '*poriborton*'/'change' has been institutionalized electorally following the Lok Sabha election results of 2019 whereby the B.J.P has positioned itself for a neck-to-neck competition with Trinamul Congress. Such a call is rooted in the historicity of dynamic of 'political change' in West Bengal from three and a half decade long continuous Left Front rule to Trinamul Congress in 2011. Many fault lines identified in Trinamul Congress regime can be seen as a continuity of earlier Left Front regime. Was the '*poriborton*' in 2011 real in terms of 'politics' or an expression of 'general will' to come out of suffocating political milieu under Left Front regime? Retrospectively the second point holds good as scholars point out that "much of the electoral success of CPI-M especially from the 1990s onwards was by default"(Chatterji and Basu, 2018:4) positively due to "a new social and political process (democratize institutional politics, institutional reforms in agriculture, ideological stand and coherent organization) potential enough to sustain its rule for almost three and half decades"(Chatterjee and Basu, 2020: 15) and negatively due to absence of coming together of opposition forces in unison willing to topple the government. So the 'continuity-change complex' is central to understand contemporary traits of West Bengal politics to which the books under review contribute significantly.

Jyotiprasad Chatterjee and Supriyo Basu, two state coordinators of CSDS-Lokniti team, wrote Volume 3 of Sage series on Politics in Indian States focusing on West Bengal and organized their viewpoints around five chapters, viz. 'Left Politics: The Challenges'; 'Rise and Growth of AITC: Socio-Cultural and Economic Dimensions'; 'Social Movements and Democratic Politics in Contemporary West Bengal: The Cases of Singur and Nandigram'; 'Politics of Identity'; 'Poriborton: West Bengal since 2009'. Being and believing in surveys, the authors substantiate all their claims with ground level data, mostly collected by them for CSDS-NES during and between elections, and presented them in tabular and graphical form. Highlighting a peculiar kind of "cultural double bind" operating in West Bengal where despite presence of caste groups, politics remained unaffected by caste based interest(p.18), the introductory chapter notes that due to the first flush of land reforms and decentralization "a new language of politics paved the entry of the non-elites or the subaltern into the arena of power relations"(p.16). The first chapter mentions that two fold challenge eroding the support base of Left Front are their failure to "confer ownership rights

ISSN-2278-9758

of the land to the tenants"(p.55) and "unable to acknowledge the political alternative of organizing resistance to neoliberal reforms (they) took recourse to opportunist and contradictory strategies to maintain electoral power"(p.61). The authors offer two innovative ideas in second chapter – "new politics of agency of people at the grassroots"(p.80) which is simultaneously depoliticized (as Left Front failed to address growing economic inequalities) and politicized(strengthening anti-Left forces) and "colonization of locality (due to) mediation by governmentality by the party(CPI-M)"(p.88). These ideas support their basic claim that "distancing itself from the praxis of revolutionary social movements to transcend capitalism, the CPI(M) gradually got used to a class collaborationist strategy"(p.93) which in a way "assisted the AITC(All India Trinamul Congress) both symbolically and materially to create and consolidate its own niche in the political domain of West Bengal"(p.80). The third chapter indicates how in the last leg of Left Front regime democratic politics transformed into materialist politics under the aegis of CPI(M) – the leading party of Left Front as "brokers, promoters, middlemen came to compose the party leadership at local level and more than politics to them joining the party was a means to attain the goal of maintaining and consolidating their economic interest"(p.124) and consequently Left Front lost touch with ground realities and "in its rush to carry out the land acquisitation in Singur at the aegis of Land Acquisition Act of 1894, the LF government perhaps failed to do justice to the term public purpose"(p.111). Talking about identitarian politics, the authors claim that CPI(M) had to pay a heavy price for its misunderstanding of the three movements –Kamtapur, Gorkhaland and Lalgarh(Maoist) with their concomitant arrogance. Even on dalit(namasudra) identity, the authors mention that political forces in West Bengal failed to acknowledge the twin approach required to deal with politicization of Matua's as an "extension of the sphere of institutional politics to pay due attention to caste discrimination" and also "as a means of their collective bargaining with the democratic state by forming a pressure group"(p.151). As a result Matua's of Thakurnagar have become "insiders of either the TMC or BJP by joining and competing elections on their behalf"(p.155). Interestingly the authors highlight that Mamata Banerjee failed to appreciate the "sharp cultural edge"(p.172) of Gorkhaland, Junglemahal and Kamtapur movements despite her repeated sympathisation and concrete actions favouring their cause as reflected in massive swing of their votes for BJP in 2019 Lok Sabha elections. Zeroing on fault-lines of Trinamul Congress, the authors unequivocally state – "Mamata Banerjee at present is not only appearing to be busy in disconnecting her earlier ties with the movements and its leaders, but also attempting to inflict cracks among historically developed inter-ethnic-solidarity of the communities….(which)paves the way for the rise of BJP as a viable contender of the AITC in the arena of party competition"(p.185). Having a seasoned, sensible and stable sense of field-level political perception, the authors innovatively theorise the "gesture of Mamata Banerjee to financially assist the neighbourhood clubs and community organizations (as) an attempt on her part to replace the party-society of CPI(M)(p.221)" by a new party-society of AITC. Implicitly contextualising elections in West Bengal in coming days, the authors conclude that it is "heading towards a bi-polar party competition"(p.218) between AITC and BJP but as "liberal democracy in such a situation may encounter a serious challenge as politics increasingly become focused upon charismatic leadership at the cost of growing redundancy of the rational, formal and well-

organized internal party structure"(p.224), one guess that there will be advantage to AITC because of presence of charismatic leadership of Mamata Banerjee.

Dealing with dynamics of *poriborton*/change in West Bengal and remaining true to series editors'(Suhas Palshikar and Rajeswari Deshpande) attempt to address "glaring absence of detailed documentations of state-specific political processes during the past two decades"(p.xiv), Chatterjee and Basu in their book presents factual evidences of electoral vote swings counting comparatively public perception about the experiences of Left Front regime and Mamata Banerjee's government on issues of land, social and identitarian movements, and social governance. The book basically deals with 'what' and 'how' questions of *poriborton* and traces elements of 'second coming of *poriborton*' in West Bengal in days ahead infused with a tussle between "welfare populism of Mamata Banerjee"(p.223) and right-wing populism of Narendra Modi led BJP.

The quintessential 'why' question of break-down of Left Front by highlighting the fault lines of its governance in all formats - political, social, economic, cultural and communitarian have been addressed in fourteen chapters organiased in three sections on 'politics and parties'; 'politics and policies' and 'politics and society' in the edited volume by Chatterji and Basu(2018).The introduction and epilogue written by Rakhahari Chatterji provides interesting insights to scan the performance of decade long Trinmaul Congress government and their concomitant fallacies and strengths in the light of experience of Left Front government. For instance on the approach of Left Front on Mamata Banerjee, Chatterji's remark –"CPI-M decided to treat her movements as personal tantrums bound to disappear in utter futility or simply as a law and order problem and not a serious political challenge. The government's response lacked both political wisdom and moral responsibility"(p.13) holds good at present to review approach of Trinamul Congress party and government to some forms of social discontent and rise of BJP. The first chapter titled 'The Left Front in West Bengal: From Movement to Government' written by Apurba Mukhopadhyaya and Partha Pratim Basu argues that "CPI-M inculcated especially since 1990s the habit of putting pragmatism over and above normative and ideological considerations"(p.35) which can be a critical lesson for Trinamul Congress which also transformed from movement to government and gradually replaced public emotions with crude mechanics of administration. Amitabha Ray in his chapter 'The Left Extremist Politics in West Bengal: From Birth to Resurrection and Beyond' also highlighted the duality of Mamata Banerjee when based on evidences he shows why and how "extreme left publicly aligned itself with Trinamul Congress for the purpose of unseating the LF from power"(p.47) but "Mamata after her massive electoral victory turned her face away from the Maoists"(p.59). Shibashis Chatterjee in his chapter on 'The Left Front and Politics of Regionalism in West Bengal' laments that during Left Front regime "the boundaries of politics of redistribution and the recognition have collapsed"(p.84) primarily due to partisan approach. Entering in the domain of public policies, Ambarish Mukhopadhyay in his chapter on 'Governing Urban West Bengal: The Left Front Experiment' points out that in the midst of two opposite trends in urban governance in India- the movement to bring the government closer to the citizens through decentralization, and the movement 'out from government' by which the government works with the private sector

ISSN-2278-9758

and civil society groups in providing services to its citizens, "the LF experiment in urban governance has not been fully inclusive in nature"(p.110). Srikumar Bandopadhyay and Partha Pratim Basu historicise the process of industrialization in West Bengal to conclude that "West Bengal's industrial scenario remained dominated by the small scale sector which outstripped the growth of big manufacturing units ever since mid 1960s only further strengthened by certain developments under the liberalization regime"(p.133). On the highly debated issue of 'Agriculture under the Left Front Regime in West Bengal', Partha Pratim Basu argues that "LFG was visibly caught on the wrong foot as the proposed policy measures(e.g. allowing entry of MNCs in the state's agricultural sector which fed the apprehension of alienation of small and marginal farmers limited landed possessions) appeared to collide head-on with its long held ideological convictions or its much touted land reform policies"(p.155). In a chapter on 'Lost Decades? Human Development in West Bengal with Special Focus on Health' a very interesting insight is provided by Satyabrata Cahkraborty that "the major maladies of public healthcare system in West Bengal are spending by the Government much below the requirement for infrastructure and human resource development, absence of sound monitoring and very poor performance of the rural health services….these are the central areas where intervention is urgently needed to realize the goal of health for all"(p.177). In the present context of Covid management, same issues are discussed under Trinamul Congress government. The chapter on 'Elementary Education in West Bengal: Issues in Governance and Political Economy' by Achin Chakraborty argues that Left Front government never assessed the position of West Bengal in primary and secondary education comparatively in an all India perspective "which led to an overwhelming focus on protecting the regime by all means ignoring plurality of concerns and considerations with certain counterpoint that would basically assert priority of so-called progressivity of the regime"(p.198). Praskanva Sinharay in the chapter on 'The Caste Question and the Decline of Left in West Bengal' argues that the Left Front turned a deaf ear to various forms of social identities and group politics whose "powerful assertions which have successfully challenged the urban, upper-caste bhadralok hegemony in present politics of West Bengal"(p.218) that Left Front epitomized. Bonita Aleaz in her chapter on 'Muslims, Christians and the Left in Bengal' forcefully argues that "pragmatism of the everyday…was mutually satisfying both to the small minority communities and as well as the coalition of parties….this tacit agreement was never fully explored by the party in power leaving the links very loose and tenuous"(p.241-42) which forced the minority communities to bind with other political forces, namely Trinamul Congress. The prophetic remark by Bandana Chatterji that "women in Bengal today confront a major crisis of security, of retaining one's dignity and respect in aspiring for equality"(p.262) in her chapter on 'Women/Community and Politics in West Bengal' stands as an eternal truth both during the Left Front and Trinamul Congress government period. It can be said that Trinamul Congress have not been able to create a sense of community among those who celebrate them as 'trinamulis' alike to the community feeling among 'communists'. In that respect the role of party newsletter or newspaper is of utmost importance. Trinamul Congress started its own brand of newspapers *365 din* and *Jaago Bangla* but they failed to generate a scenario like "Ganashakti newsroom (which) is practically like a commune where ideological commitment and satisfaction provide the

ISSN-2278-9758

motivating forces even in a commodified and consumerist society"(p.284) as stated by Nilanjana Gupta in her chapter 'Ganasakti 'The Enormous Pair of Bellows': Tracing the History of the Party Organ'. Amartya Mukhopadhyay in 'Civil Society Initiatives in West Bengal' writes that "as long as 'command polity' held sway, civil society had to be either weak or dormant"(p.286) and will raise "unsavoury questions about the possibility of sustaining civil society autonomy in post-paribartan state(p.299)." Such a comment holds an important key to grapple with answers for the necessity of a call for second coming of poriborton beyond Trinamul Congress rule. But who will paint the picture correctly? Rakhahari Chatterji writing the epilogue rightly doubts the efficacy of opposition forces in West Bengal at present to "find out the truth about development and of reaching to the poor however noisily they are made , and more importantly, whether such claims are targeted towards push in more fundamental issues into oblivion"(p.311).

The fascinating part of reading through the edited volume of Chatterji and Basu(2018) is that it smoothly puts reader in live assessment with the present. Continuity between administrative and policy experiences between Left Front and Trinamul Congress government is so striking that one can think of poriborton of the 'system' rather than of 'politics' as a proper call in West Bengal.

Both the volume under review focuses and comments primarily on Left Front but with present continuous appeal on experiences during Trinamul Congress government period. For instance some comments like "with the growing entrenchment of CPI(M) with constitutional politics its priority tended to shift from its earlier pro-social movement stance to a more pro-election one"(Chatterjee and Basu, 2020:77) and "liberal-left-secular space constitutes the most dangerous vacuum in India's (and West Bengal's) political space"(Chatterji,2018:16) can be addressed to all political forces in West Bengal trying to resist the right reactionary populist force like BJP. But as in earlier times so also today political forces in the state are playing to the gallery creating a situation of 'war of all against all' missing the brewing revolutionary moment in Indian and West Bengal politics.

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ISSN-2278-9758

Book Review

Torture Behind Bars: Role of the Police Force in India

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JOSHUA N. ASTON*, Torture Behind Bars: Role of the Police Force in India.* New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2020, pp 225. Hardcover: Rs 1,195.

Joshua N. Aston's recent book, *Torture Behind Bars: Role of the Police Force in India*, has been published at a time when the world is witnessing avalanches of state- initiated violence tumbling upon citizens. This book acts as an eye- opener for the conscientious citizen who should no longer perceive the state as sacrosanct. Though Aston has to his credit several publications on law, this book stands out for an unconventional yet sensitive theme that needs to be addressed not only in academic discourses but also at the level of the civil society. One can hope that the book will act as an initiator of more ethical citizen/subject friendly state policies and also inspire civil society resistance to state violence.

The title of the book sums it up all. The precise title indicates what is there in black and white between the covers and eloquently expresses the concerns of the author. This book exposes the cruelties carried out by the Indian state apparatus, through its police force, on its incarcerated citizens. It showcases how the dignity and rights of incarcerated Indian citizens are stripped off despite having constitutional guarantees. The book traverses further to express concern over regular and extreme violation of human rights by the Indian state overriding all national and international covenants. It narrates how the protector of laws – the police becomes a ruthless violator of laws, constitutional rights, human rights, and all norms of civility. The crucial aspect of the book is that apart from dealing with state- initiated cruelties; it dexterously deliberates on recommendations, declarations, laws, etc. – both international as well as national --- in respect of custodial crimes and most notably attempts at coming up with an elucidation to curb "torture behind bars". Supported with a substantial body of data and graphs this book is one of its kind and a must- read for all who stand up for an ethical and just state apparatus.

Torture Behind Bars is spread over eight chapters along with a "Foreword" by Dr. Kiran Bedi, retired IPS and Lieutenant Governor of Puducherry, celebrated for Tihar jail reforms. The book also has well defined "Introduction" and "Conclusion" apart from the usual

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preface, index, appendices, and a brief section about the author. It is also furnished with lists of tables, abbreviations, etc. The preface eloquently discusses what follows in the following pages. The Introduction begins with a brief yet lucidity drafted overview for understanding what custodial violence is. The Introduction, further, proceeds to highlight the legal provisions against torture in India and gives detailed statistics of custodial violence committed in India.

Chapter One is entitled, "International Legal Framework in Prohibition of Torture and Custodial Violence". As evident from the title, this chapter primarily focuses on the international framework of safeguards for the incarcerated. It deliberates, in great detail, the role of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in the Prohibition of Torture. This is quite a long chapter which, apart from the above, also delves into regional legal frameworks.

From the international plane, the focus shifts to India in the second chapter. The title of the chapter is, "Policing in India and the Status of Human Rights". Here, the author takes cognizance of the fact that the Indian Police Act of 1861, which is unfortunately followed even, today, does not encompass human rights considerations, and thus, leads to their violations. The chapter provides instances of human rights violations, third- degree methods, custodial crimes, handcuffing, etc. in India. Furthermore, the nature of the relationship between the National Human Rights Commission and police is analysed here and certain reforms are suggested.

In Chapter Three the theme shifts to a very definite issue --- NARCO analysis. It discusses NARCO analysis and its legal basis in India along with undesirable aspects of the NARCO analysis test. Nevertheless, the chapter concludes by observing that such tests should be preferred over third-degree tortures as the procedure can be conducted without violating the rights of the suspect. Appropriate to the concerns discussed here the chapter is titled - "Nacro-analysis: Is It Legal or a Form of Torture?"

The Fourth Chapter--- "Police in India: Its Structure and Pattern", discusses the organisational structure of the Indian police force. For a more lucid understanding of those who are uninitiated, the author has furnished this chapter with diagrammatic representations. Further to this, the functions of the police in India are carefully listed here. Here, the author also takes note of the Indian Police Act of 1861 that is still in operation along with other relevant acts and amendments.

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Chapter Five is a critical and lengthy chapter complemented with graphical representations. Here, the author studies how the Indian state has responded to torture by police and custodial violence. Aston presents a fact sheet here and then showcases the state's response through parliamentary laws and other legislation, Supreme Court, statutory and other commissions to curb this menace. Further to this, there is a special focus on the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions: Mission to India here. This chapter is entitled, "Response of India towards Torture and Custodial Violence".

In the next chapter – that is in Chapter Six - the police system in India is discussed in much detail. Here, the author tries to address important yet contentious issues like the attitude of the Indian people towards the police, politicisation of the force, and accountability issues plaguing the police force in India. The chapter titled - "Crises in the Indian Police System" also delves into the role of the Right to Information Act, 2005 in ensuring accountability of the police.

Chapter Seven is a logical extension of the previous chapter. It raises the key concern that needs to be addressed immediately to unfetter Indians from torture by police and from the horrors of custodial violence. "Reforms in the Police Forces: The Need of the Hour" is the title of this chapter and as evident from the title, here, Aston highlights recommendations of different committees, guidelines of the National Human Rights Commission, clauses of Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010 to reform the police system and make it more humane.

The Eighth and last chapter preceding the "Conclusion" is styled as "Community Policing: A Reform and the Indian Scenario". Here Aston promotes the idea of community policing to make the police personnel empathetic and citizen-friendly. The author feels the urgency to remove the antipathy of Indian citizens towards the police. For this, he opines, the existing police system needs to be revamped to community policing. Community policing or neighbourhood policing, as elucidated here, emphasises on the interaction between police and society where instead of being distanced ordinary citizens will assist the police. This chapter also makes an in-depth assessment of community policing as implemented in some parts of India.

Aston has incorporated a separate "Conclusion", after the eighth chapter, much to the benefit of the readers. This section critically points out that in post-independence democratic and republican India, surprisingly and unfortunately, the Indian police system is still largely based on the pre-independence abusive colonial model. Here it is very categorically stated that there

ISSN-2278-9758

are ample instances of police atrocities and misconduct. The author suggests that the Supreme Court and Human Rights Commissions should work towards providing guidelines prohibiting torture, central and state governments should take cognizance of all crimes committed by security personnel, and the right to reparation needs to be implemented, abusive laws like UAPA, et.al should turn into citizen-friendly laws and most importantly the entire police system should be overhauled to community policing but not leading to moral policing. Apart from the above and other suggestions, the author recommends that international conventions related to torture should be ratified by the Government of India.

In conclusion, one can say that the theme of this book is the concern of the hour. Though it is specific to India this book truly illustrates how any state can violate the rights and dignity of its people. *Torture Behind Bars* ought to be a must- read for all and sundry to make the people aware of the excesses that a sovereign state can commit. It is imperative that the issues raised here be a part of the larger public discourse rather than being constricted in ivory towers of scholars. Unfortunately, what worries one is that though the book is well crafted for researchers it is an extremely tedious read for the uninitiated and those not trained in the grammar of social sciences.

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